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Abstract 
 
The plain packaging of tobacco products, the disposal of hazardous waste and the 
management of toxic chemicals are all areas of health, safety and environmental (HSE) 
regulation which have faced legal challenges by private corporations under international 
investment agreements established as a means of promoting and protecting inward 
investment.  How these legal challenges are made possible by the international trade and 
investment regime, and what lasting impact they are having on the regulatory autonomy of 
governments is the focus of this research. 
 
This empirical work seeks to understand the impact of International Investment Agreements 
(IIAs) on national regulatory autonomy.  By probing trends in regulation as well as the level 
of awareness of IIAs by government regulators, this research aims to identify the likelihood of 
constrained regulatory decision making or ‘regulatory chill’ amongst those governments who 
have faced challenges, or the threat of challenges, to their regulatory measures under IIAs.  It 
will also consider whether any chilling effect is more likely in a developing country versus a 
developed country environment.   
 
This research engages with the relevant international relations literature which looks at the 
impact of the international integration of markets and trends in globalization on the policy 
autonomy of national governments.  More particularly it looks not only at whether 
globalization leads to the erosion of national policy autonomy, but whether this manifestation 
of globalization (ie: increasing numbers of negotiated IIAs with private corporate access to 
binding investor-state arbitration) leads to the erosion of national policy autonomy in the 
form of forced regulatory restraint or chill.   
 
There has been a proliferation of bilateral and regional rules on investment and with 
worldwide levels of investment expected to reach $1.8 Trillion by 2015, these agreements are 
arguably relevant to the overall trade and investment system.  In this context, this research 
will contribute to existing academic literature with respect to the impact of trade and 
investment agreements on state policymaking autonomy within both developed and 
developing countries and will make recommendations in the area of trade and investment 
policy development and negotiations, including the role of investment provisions and 
investor-state dispute settlement in future bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
The plain packaging of tobacco products, the disposal of hazardous waste and the 
management of toxic chemicals are all areas of health, safety and environmental (HSE) 
regulation which have faced legal challenges by private corporations under international 
investment agreements established as a means of promoting and protecting inward 
investment.  How these legal challenges are made possible by the international trade and 
investment regime, and what lasting impact they are having on the regulatory autonomy of 
governments is the focus of this research. 
 
As investment flows have increased under globalization, foreign investors have been 
concerned with ensuring legal security with respect to the enforcement of their property 
rights when investing in countries with weak institutions.  With many investors lacking 
confidence in the legal recourses available within the developing host countries in which they 
are investing, the attraction of international agreements as a means of ensuring and enforcing 
this protection has been appealing.  The attractiveness of international investment 
agreements (IIAs) versus the reliance on domestic host legal systems has been enhanced by 
the unique access private investors have had through these agreements, to investor-state 
dispute settlement provisions and impartial international arbitration.1   
 
These agreements take the form of investment chapters in preferential trade and investment 
agreements (PTIAs) or stand- alone bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  Modern day IIAs 
aim to ensure among other things, non-discriminatory and minimum levels of treatment for 
investors, the protection of investments through guarantees of compensation for legitimate 
cases of expropriation of investor assets, as well as operational flexibility through the free 
transfer of funds between countries.  There has been a proliferation of bilateral and regional 
rules on investment and with worldwide levels of investment expected to reach $1.8 Trillion 
by 2015, these agreements are arguably relevant to the overall trade and investment system.   
 
The negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) Chapter 11 on 
investment represented the first time that such a sophisticated investment protection 
agreement had been negotiated between developed countries.  NAFTA’s Chapter 11 also 
                                               
1Investor-state dispute settlement provisions allow private corporate investors to sue host governments for breaches of investment 
provisions under PTIAs or BITS. 
                   15 of 245 
served to highlight the concerns of civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
regarding the rights granted under the agreement, which were seen as giving foreign 
investors rights that unduly constrained national policy autonomy, especially in the areas of 
health, safety and environmental regulation.  More specifically, the private access to 
international arbitration provided for in Chapter 11 resulted in unprecedented challenges to 
Mexican, Canadian and US regulatory measures in these sensitive areas by private investors, 
addressing what they perceived as regulatory takings.2  This in turn raised concerns that 
these challenges could lead to regulatory chill3, as governments curtailed or amended their 
regulatory initiatives in an effort to avoid multi-million dollar lawsuits. This view was further 
reinforced by the increasing number of investor-state dispute challenges arising within 
emerging market countries under bilateral investment treaties (BITs).4 
 
Through this empirical work we have sought to understand the impact of International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs) on national regulatory autonomy.  By probing trends in 
regulation as well as the level of awareness of IIAs by government regulators, this research 
aimed to identify the likelihood of constrained regulatory decision making or ‘regulatory chill’ 
amongst those governments who have faced challenges, or the threat of challenges, to their 
regulatory measures under IIAs.  It has also considered whether any chilling effect is more 
likely in a developing country versus a developed country environment.   
 
This research engaged with the relevant international relations literature which looks at the 
impact of the international integration of markets and trends in globalization on the policy 
autonomy of national governments.  More particularly it looked not only at whether 
globalization leads to the erosion of national policy autonomy, but whether this manifestation 
of globalization (ie: increasing numbers of negotiated IIAs with private corporate access to 
binding investor-state arbitration) has lead to the erosion of national policy autonomy in the 
form of forced regulatory restraint or chill.   
                                               
2 The OECD 2004 Working Paper on International Investment entitled ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate in International 
Investment Law’ outlines that the concept of regulatory taking applies to the ‘misuse of otherwise lawful regulation to deprive an owner 
of the substance of his rights’ and is meant to cover such things as ‘creeping nationalism’. (p.8) 
3 Regulatory Chill is defined by Eric Neumayer in Greening Trade and Investment, as a situation where developed countries might either 
lower environmental standards or fail to raise them for fear that internationally mobile capital will move to countries with lower 
standards (p.68).  Kevin Grey & Duncan Brack in the OECD Report of the Working Party on Global and Structural Policies on 
Environmental Issue in Policy-Based Competition for Investment, outline a situation ‘where countries refrain from enacting stricter 
environmental standards in response to fears of losing a competitive edge’ (p.8).  Kyla Tienhaara argues in The Expropriation of 
Environmental Governance that this notion of regulatory chill has been further extended to address concerns regarding international 
investment arbitration such that regulators with knowledge of investor state challenges to regulatory measures or the threat of such 
challenges will curtail regulations or be reticent to pursue more stringent regulations in these areas.   This extension of the meaning of 
regulatory chill has also been advanced by scholars such as Gray 2002 and Peterson 2004 (p.25) 
4
 According to the May 2012 UNCTAD report Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 66% of new cases have 
been launched against developing or transition economies.  To date 61 developing countries and 16 countries with economies in 
transition ‘have responded to one or more investment treaty arbitration.’p. 4.  ‘Argentina continues to be the most frequent 
respondent (53 cases) followed by Venezuela (34), Ecuador (23) and Mexico (21) 
                   16 of 245 
 
There has been much written on the issue of the impact of IIAs on government regulatory 
autonomy and the possible chilling impact of the investor state dispute settlement provisions.  
The literature to date has focussed on a case-by-case analysis and provided primarily 
anecdotal evidence of regulatory chill.   This research will represent the first comprehensive 
look at the issue of regulatory chill, providing both a unique methodological approach and a 
consistent set of findings on the issue. 
 
The assumption of this thesis was that if the regulatory chill hypothesis was to hold or to be 
considered a viable possible outcome of IIA legal challenges, we would expect to find a 
number of observable outcomes in regulator behaviour and regulatory trends.   First, one 
would have expected trends in HSE regulation to reflect this chilling impact (through a 
stagnant or weakening regulatory environment or through the degree of uptake in regulatory 
policy), particularly in policy areas where regulatory measures were challenged under IIAs.  
Second we would have expected to find a level of awareness and understanding among HSE 
regulators about the existence and content of IIAs.  Any causal link between IIAs and 
regulatory chill also needed to demonstrate that beyond awareness, that IIAs had an 
influential role on regulators in the HSE regulatory development process. 
 
In order to test the expectations of the research hypothesis, this thesis used quantitative and 
qualitative tools within a comparative case study analysis.  This included statistical analysis 
and the qualitative coding and analysis of in-depth interviews and an electronic survey, as 
well as the statistical and qualitative analysis of government information such as regulatory 
databases, policy pronouncements and government reports and studies.  Case studies focused 
first on NAFTA Chapter 11 on Investment’s impact on the regulatory policy development 
process in Canada in the area of health, safety and the environment and second on the impact 
of IIAs on tobacco control regulation globally.5 
 
Overall this research found that the empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis on 
regulatory chill.  While there are some findings which raise the possibility of influence by IIA 
ISDS cases on the regulatory development process or trends in regulation, there is no 
consistent observable evidence to support the possibility of regulatory chill. 
 
In the case of the Canadian regulatory environment the analysis found a downward trend in 
the growth rate of new HSE regulations or regulatory changes but did not find evidence of a 
                                               
5 Chapter 3 gives a detailed outline of the methodology 
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trend of stagnant or weakening regulations in the wake of NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges 
which would suggest possible regulatory chill.  Rather, HSE regulation demonstrated an 
increasing trend in the stringency and comprehensiveness of new regulations and regulatory 
changes.  There was some evidence of a statistical correlation between NAFTA Chapter 11 
investor state dispute settlement challenges to government environment and health 
measures and the likely adoption of environmental and health regulations during a few years 
between 1998-2013.  Most importantly, the empirical evidence found a low level of 
awareness among HSE regulators regarding NAFTA Chapter 11 and the potential threat of an 
ISDS challenge to regulation.  The research revealed regulators rarely take Canada’s trade and 
investment commitments into consideration when developing regulations, but when they do, 
they are more likely to be concerned about trade commitments under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
agreements than NAFTA Chapter 11. 
 
The case study on tobacco control found a growing trend in the level of uptake of tobacco 
control regulations among countries worldwide, including in regions which were facing ISDS 
challenges under IIAs.  Additionally the empirical evidence found a low level of awareness 
among tobacco control regulators regarding IIAs and the potential threat of an ISDS challenge 
to tobacco regulation.  In line with the Canadian Case Study, the research revealed that 
tobacco regulators rarely take trade and investment commitments into consideration when 
developing regulations and when they do, they are more likely to be concerned about trade 
commitments under the WTO SPS and TBT agreements than commitments under IIAs.  At the 
same time regulators from developed and developing countries see the influence of the WTO 
challenge against Australia’s plain packaging legislation as an influencing factor in their own 
‘wait and see’ approach on this issue.  
 
The key themes to emerge from this analysis were that the absence of regulatory chill 
suggests globalization has not prevented policy divergence with respect to IIAs.  However 
there was evidence that policy diffusion and emulation were leading to an upward policy 
convergence in the area of HSE.  Furthermore there was evidence in the case of Canada of re-
regulation not de-regulation as illustrated by the focus on efficiency, modernization and 
streamlining and at the same time the increasing stringency and comprehensiveness in HSE 
regulations over a fifteen year period.  Moreover the extent to which regulators considered 
trade in the regulatory development process, was generally with respect to the WTO and SPS 
and TBT agreements suggesting that future scholars will need any consideration of regulatory 
chill to do so in the broader trade and investment context.   
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The regulatory development process in developing countries was driven by similar factors to 
those in developed countries however regulators faced greater challenges in the pursuit of 
HSE regulations as a result of the weakness of domestic institutions, the increased financial 
burden of any potential IIA ISDS challenge and a general lack of trade and investment 
expertise and experience.  
 
Finally, while the goal of this research has been to explore the impact of IIAs on government 
regulatory autonomy with a view to assessing the likelihood of regulatory chill through 
observation of regulatory trends and awareness of regulators, it has also sought to provide a 
comprehensive methodological approach which might be used to guide future research on 
this issue. 
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Chapter 1:  Globalization and national policy autonomy:      
A theoretical framework 
  
 
The golden straitjacket is the defining political economic garment of globalization.  The tighter 
you wear it, the more gold it produces.  
 
Thomas L. Friedman 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The last three decades have seen an increasing trend towards the integration of markets.  The 
establishment of global production chains, the explosion of trade and investment flows as 
well as the development of the international institutional framework to support these trends, 
have resulted in what is commonly referred to as globalization.  As globalization has taken 
hold, concern regarding its impact on the welfare of nations and the policy autonomy of 
governments has increased.  This concern reached public consciousness during the popular 
uprisings and civil society demonstrations in opposition to the proposed Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) within the auspices of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1998 and against the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) at its 1999 ministerial meeting in Seattle, aimed at launching the new millennium 
round of trade negotiations.  Currently these issues are being debated in the context of 
regional trade and investment negotiations under the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
bilateral negotiations such as the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP).   The questions these demonstrations  and debates have raised, and which continue to 
challenge scholars are whether globalization is having a negative impact on the ability of 
governments to set domestic policy and whether private actors are playing an ever increasing 
role in this equation.  There is a strand of international relations theory which has grappled 
with these questions by trying to determine the impact of globalization on government policy 
autonomy.   
 
The literature on the impact of the integration of markets is nothing new and has its origins in 
historical work as far back as Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, in which he considered 
the links between the imposition of taxes and capital flight.6 More contemporary literature 
                                               
6 Layna Mosely makes this point in her book Capital and National Government  2003. Cambridge University Press, p.4. 
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has looked at whether globalization or market integration has led to either a convergence or 
divergence of government policy making across nations.  Those arguing convergence have 
claimed that market integration has eroded national autonomy, reduced social welfare 
alternatives to the market, created interdependence among governments in policy making or 
led generally to the strengthening of markets and private actors at the expense of 
governments.  They claim that convergence is the result of a regulatory race-to-the-bottom as 
the exit threats of multinational enterprises (MNEs) lead countries to lower standards as they 
compete for capital.  While anecdotal evidence abounds, there is limited empirical evidence to 
support these claims.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, those globalization proponents 
arguing divergence reject this view and through their empirical work demonstrate that 
globalization has not prevented different approaches to national policies, hindered national 
policy autonomy or resulted in a decline in social welfare policies, at least in the case of 
developed countries.  Even the biggest proponents of globalization however, suggest that the 
impact on developing countries is likely more problematic. 
 
As a subset, this research explores globalization and its impact with respect to international 
investment. International investment represents one important aspect of the overall trend 
towards globalization, with a growing body of bilateral and regional rules in the form of 
international investment agreements (IIAs) 7, providing the institutional framework to 
support it.  There have been many claims that IIAs impose constraints on signatory 
governments, as they provide for a unique mechanism by which national policy decisions can 
be challenged by private actors.8  Over the last two decades government regulatory measures 
in the areas of health, safety and the environment have been the subject of challenges by 
private corporations under IIAs signed by countries worldwide, but particularly under 
NAFTA Chapter 11 on investment.9   
 
Just as scholars have linked the exit threats of MNEs to the weakening of regulation10, there is 
a belief that IIAs can cause regulatory chill11, as governments respond to the threat of 
                                               
7 International Investment Agreements (IIAs) refer to bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and preferential trade and investment 
agreements (PTIAs), but do not include investment agreements or stabilisation agreements signed between MNEs and host 
countries. 
8 Chapter 2 details the arguments made to this effect by scholars and civil society. 
9
 Reference is often made to landmark cases such as S.D. Meyers v. Government of Canada, Ethyl Corporation v. Government of 
Canada, Metalclad Corporation v. United States of Mexico and Methanex v. United State as examples of corporate challenges to 
health, safety and environmental regulations.  This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2. 
10 The threat of exit has been addressed by scholars such as Vernon (1971), Hirschman (1971), Dunning (1993), Bartik (1988), 
Stopford and Strange (1991), Vogel (1995), Bartlett and Seleny (1998) 
11 Regulatory Chill is defined by Eric Neumayer in Greening Trade and Investment, as a situation where developed countries might 
either lower environmental standards or fail to raise them for fear that internationally mobile capital will move to countries with 
lower standards (p.68).  Kevin Grey & Duncan Brack in the OECD Report of the Working Party on Global and Structural Policies 
on Environmental Issue in Policy-Based Competition for Investment, outline a situation ‘where countries refrain from enacting 
stricter environmental standards in response to fears of losing a competitive edge’ (p.8).  Kyla Tienhaara argues in The 
Expropriation of Environmental Governance that this notion of regulatory chill has been further extended to address concerns 
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litigation and curtail or amend their regulatory initiatives in an effort to avoid expensive 
international arbitration cases brought by disgruntled corporate investors.  This regulatory 
chill is seen as evidence of weakened national policy autonomy in the context of the debate on 
globalization.  Moreover, the belief is that these regulatory challenges are likely to prove more 
difficult for developing or emerging market countries which are under more pressure to 
attract and retain international investment and whose ability to deal with the expense of 
investor state litigation is limited.12 
 
This chapter will outline in more detail the strand of international relations theory which 
looks at the impact of globalization on government policy autonomy.  It will show how this 
doctoral thesis will engage with the theory and more broadly why it is relevant to the on-
going debate.  It will also give an overview of the research question, hypothesis and 
methodology and describe the layout of the remainder of the thesis. 
 
2. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON NATIONAL POLICY AUTONOMY 
 
The empirical literature concerned with the issue of globalization or the integration of 
markets and its impact on government policy autonomy is vast.  In fact there are numerous 
theories of globalization which each involve different balances of authority between the 
actors, be they states, NGOs or MNEs.  At the same time, global economic pressures, ideational 
influences and institutional pressures such as those created by regionalism, play varying roles 
in the many theories. 13  The theories on globalization today however are best understood in 
their historical context. 
 
Historical and contemporary literature has addressed this issue beginning with Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations through to the 1970s structural dependence theorists who considered the 
influence on government policy of the demands made by domestic businesses as well as 
patterns of investment, and whether low rates of investment were likely to lead to changes in 
corporate tax policy.14  Furthermore while the globalization debate seems to suggest a new 
phenomenon, it has been of concern for more than two hundred years.  ‘David Hume, Charles 
Louis Montesquieu, and Adam Smith all believed that capital mobility would restrain the 
                                                                                                                                         
regarding international investment arbitration such that regulators with knowledge of investor state challenges to regulatory 
measures or the threat of such challenges will curtail regulations or be reticent to pursue more stringent regulations in these areas.   
This extension of the meaning of regulatory chill has also been advanced by scholars such as Gray 2002 and Peterson 2004 (p.25) 
12 There is a whole host of literature dealing with the issue of the cost burden of investor-state arbitration for developing countries 
including Eric Gottwald’s 2007 entitled ‘Levelling the Playing Field:  Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing 
Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?’ published in the American University International Law Review. 22:237, pp237-275 
13 Higgott, Underhill and Bieler make this argument and refer to four different understandings of globalization in the introduction to 
their book  Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System.  Routledge (2000). 
14 Layna Mosely makes this point in her 2003 book Capital and National Government.   
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growth of the state’.15  The 1960s and 1970s saw concern about the nation-state rise again 
with Charles Kindleberger claiming that ‘the state is about through as an economic unit’ and 
Raymond Vernon penning a book entitled ‘Sovereignty at Bay’ which looked at the role played 
by multinational firms in the development of public policy .  Themes which governed 
concerns at that time, namely ‘transnational relations and interdependence and dependency 
and underdevelopment’ while separate spheres of scholarship in the 1970s have been blurred 
in contemporary debates about globalization.16  Later, theories of ‘interdependence’ as 
espoused by Keohane and Nye looked at the diminishing influence of national policymakers.17    
 
Influential work by John Gerard Ruggie has suggested that the Bretton Woods system 
contained an ‘embedded liberalism’ compromise characterized by trade liberalization 
alongside national government policies aimed at softening any negative impact that might 
result.18  Following Ruggie, Dani Rodrik’s work showed how this relationship continued to 
hold throughout the world.19  This theory supported the fact that trade liberalization was 
good for society but argued that in the short term it could cause social inequalities and 
dislocations which would necessitate government policies to soften the blow.  It is broadly 
held today that this compromise of embedded liberalism can no longer be sustained due in 
large part to the mobility of production and capital which is leading to a reduction in the 
ability of government to deliver on its side of the compromise.  These two strong voices in 
international political economy – Ruggie and Rodrik accept the core proposition of 
conventional wisdom on globalization, that the ‘exit threats of mobile producers and 
investors has tilted the balance of power strongly in favour of the market, over politics at the 
national level’.20 
 
This brings us to contemporary literature which has looked extensively at the impact of 
globalization on national policy autonomy, arguing either convergence or divergence, with 
the balance of empirical weight on the side of divergence despite popular consensus to the 
contrary. 
                                               
15 Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. “Global Market and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?” International Organization 
52: P.793 
16 Ibid, P.793 
17 Layna Mosely makes this point in her 2003 book Capital and National Government .  Details outlined in Keohane, Robert O. and 
Joseph S. Nye Jr..  1997. Power and Interdependence. Longman Classics in Political Science (Pearson)  
18Ruggie, John Gerard. 1998. Constructing the World Polity. The New International Relations Series. Routledge 
19 Rodrik, Dani. 1997. Has Globalization Gone too Far.  Institute for International Economics 
20 Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. “Global Market and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?” International Organization 
52: 787-824 
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a. Convergence vs divergence:  Is the MNE threat of exit causing a regulatory race 
to the bottom (RTB) 
 
The view that globalization is negatively impacting government policy autonomy is widely 
held within policymaking, civil society and some academic circles and often rests on the 
arguments of competition for production and capital or the diffusion of ideational values.  
Susan Strange argues that government authority has been universally weakened or diffused 
as a result of global economic integration and as a result many state responsibilities are no 
longer being discharged, leaving a ‘yawning hole of non-authority’ or ‘non-governance’.21 
According to Layna Mosley, anti-globalization protestors consistently make claims that 
globalization and the economic institutions which underpin it are controlled by investors, 
corporations and political elites.  There is a supporting body of scholarship which suggests 
that the integration of national capital markets is leading to the death of social democratic 
welfare policies and more specifically that capital markets are not compatible with 
distributive, welfare policies or an active public sector. 22   
 
Convergence theory suggests markets drive national policies through the ‘threat of exit’ of 
MNEs 
 
The convergence theorists claim that the globalization of trade and finance has severely 
hindered national policy autonomy.  The key driver for them is efficiency, where traditional 
welfare policies are considered uncompetitive and unjustifiable.  This theory suggests that 
markets drive national policies and lead to a race to the bottom, which in turn represents ‘a 
transfer of authority from national governments to private actors.’ 23  This authority manifests 
itself though the threat of exit by asset holders, which forces government policy makers to 
consider financial market participants preferences when setting policies.  Proponents of this 
theory suggest a convergence in national policies ‘toward smaller governments, reduced 
government provision of social services, lower levels of taxation, lower levels of regulation, 
and lower levels of unionization.’ 24  In effect, under convergence, governments will adopt 
market oriented policies rather than pay the market’s price for more social democratic 
alternatives.  Furthermore, this view claims that markets dominate politics and that the 
‘threat of “exit” by mobile asset holders has supplanted the “voice” of citizens as the primary 
                                               
21 Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State:  The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy.  Cambridge University Press. p. 
14 
22 A number of authors make this claim including Andrews 1994, Cerny 1999, Dryzek, Rodrik 1997, Schwartz 1994. 
23 Mosley, Layna. 2003. Global Capital and National Government. Cambridge University Press. p.7 
24 Ibid. p.8 
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determinant of public policy in the era of globalized markets.’25  The market it is argued has 
put constraints on leftist public policy choices and governments will pursue policies that 
attract investors and limit interventions or redistributive policies – driving out leftist parties 
and policies.  This situation is made worse by market integration which gives capital the 
option of exiting the national economy and seeking higher returns abroad.  The easier it is for 
asset holders to exit the more governments must seek to encourage them to stay.26   
 
These arguments are developed in the 2008 empirical study by Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 
which concludes that convergence in national policy is being driven by both competition 
between nations and policy emulation.  They argue that national policy choices are 
interdependent in that they are influenced by the policy choices of other governments in the 
global economy, sometimes with involvement by international organizations or private actors 
(MNEs).27  The empirical analysis undertaken by Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett suggests 
strong support for what they define as emulation and competition theories of policy 
diffusion.28  In describing emulation, the authors argue that the global consensus emerging on 
what are appropriate social actions, goals and means for achieving them is creating a norm 
which diffuses from country to country.   Emulation is characterized by the voluntary 
adoption of policies put forward by experts and international organizations, rather than their 
adoption through coercion.  This diffusion often appears as a result of the rhetorical power of 
these policies or physical proximity to countries which are adopting them.29   
 
The causal mechanism of competition reflects the whole race to the bottom literature.  Under 
this perspective governments are seeking to make their country most attractive (vis-a-vis 
other countries) to investors and to remain competitive in important markets and will 
therefore pursue policies which help them achieve this.  Policies which typically reflect this 
approach include reducing investment risk, regulatory or tax burdens.  This theory assumes 
governments adopt these policies in order to compete for a fixed level of investment or trade 
and that if given the choice would pursue far more interventionist policies.  ‘The expense of 
complying with environmental regulations  has fuelled a debate over whether, and to what 
extent, increasingly mobile firms’ exit threats can reduce environmental regulations in 
wealthy jurisdictions and account for the ‘dumping’ of dirty production activities in 
                                               
25 Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge University Press. p.129 
26 Ibid.  The author  argues that Charles Lindblom (1977) was an early proponent of this argument. p. 30 
27 Simmons, Beth A., Franck Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett. 2008. The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy. Cambridge 
University Press.  
28 Ibid. The authors claim ‘international policy diffusion occurs when government policy decisions in a given country are 
systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries.’ 
29 Ibid 
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developing countries and emerging markets with lax regulations.’ 30 There is vast literature 
on this31 and some of the studies demonstrate that the regulatory races to the bottom 
increase as the number of competing countries, locations and exit threats by MNEs also 
increase.  Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett point to studies which suggest that this competition 
for investment and markets impacts the level of government spending, particularly on social 
programs.  While results are not unambiguous, these studies suggest that there is pressure to 
reduce regulation and social policies in an effort to keep the costs of investment 
competitive.32   
 
Gareth Porter argues that the race to the bottom debate extends beyond the environment, to a 
whole host of regulatory issues impacting firms.  His argument is that it is not the OECD 
countries that we should be looking to but rather the rapidly industrializing countries which 
face the greatest impact from competitive pressures.  According to him it is among these 
rapidly industrializing countries that competitive pressures are most serious and are creating 
a situation where the slow response of political institutions are resulting in regulatory levels 
which are ‘stuck at the bottom’. 33  
 
Divergence theory finds little empirical support for mobility or threat of exit as driver for FDI 
Regulation 
 
Proponents of globalization however make a collection of convincing arguments to refute this 
view also supported by the weight of empirical evidence.  They argue quite convincingly that 
there is little empirical support for the view that the mobility or threat of exit of MNEs drives 
FDI regulation or that lower environmental standards attract FDI.   They argue that MNE’s 
motivations are broader than ‘lowest cost production’, that ideational forces play a role in 
government policy decisions and that globalization has actually led to re-regulation not 
deregulation.  Finally, this camp argues that the ‘compensation hypothesis’34 actually leads to 
greater regulation to offset the negative impact of globalization but that institutional strength 
is a defining factor in how governments respond to private interests. 
 
                                               
30 Simmons, Beth A., Franck Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett. 2008. The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy. Cambridge 
University Press.  
31 Stewart (1993), Esty (1994 & 1996), Bhagwati & Srinivasan (1996), Klevorick (1996), Levison (1996), Wilson (1996), Vogel 
(1995), Rodrik (1997) are among those that have written on this issue. 
32 As Mosely2003 argues, a number of authors make this claim including Andrews 1994, Cerny 1999, Dryzek, Rodrik 1997, 
Schwartz 1994. 
33 Porter, Gareth. 1999. Trade Competition and Pollution Standards:  ‘Race to the Bottom’ or Stuck at the Bottom’. The Journal of 
Environment & Development. 8: (2): p. 134 
34 This term is defined later in the chapter 
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Andrew Walter’s work looks at whether the mobility of MNEs give them the power to force 
the convergence of national policies to reflect their preferences?  He looks at the question 
strictly with respect to the rules related to the regulation of inward FDI and does not address 
whether globalization is responsible for ‘the claimed erosion of environmental or labour 
standards’.35  Further his study does not address the issue of ‘voice’ or political lobbying.  He 
claims that while it can be argued that the threat of exit may be supplemented by lobbying (or 
voice), the threat of exit is most powerful and therefore precludes the additional benefit of 
lobbying, particularly given the cost.  He therefore claims that exit and voice are largely 
substitutes. 
 
His assumption is that if the convergence hypothesis were to hold one would expect to see a 
‘link between actual FDI inflows and policy liberalisation in capital-importing states.’  His 
findings however are that the empirical evidence does not support the convergence 
hypothesis regarding mobility or threat of exit (or of political lobbying).  In fact he finds that 
many important developing host countries have received FDI while maintaining policies 
which do not reflect the clear preferences of MNCs.  While he suggests there are ‘some 
examples of considerable convergence’ there is ‘little evidence of systematic bias of FDI flows 
towards countries with investment regimes favoured by TNCs.’36 He claims that FDI has 
increased in some developing countries in spite of domestic policies towards FDI rather than 
because of those policies.  He also suggests that firms may not base their investment decisions 
on host country investment regimes but rather on other factors such as size of market, 
growth potential, political stability and infrastructure.  This view is supported by a wealth of 
empirical work on the determinants of FDI.37 He also claims that any argument that 
liberalisation might be driven by competition between countries for investment or that it 
might be ideologically driven is not supported by evidence.  Ultimately he claims that 
globalization theory has exaggerated the degree of mobility and power of the threat of exit of 
MNCs.38   
 
Geoffrey Garrett makes a similar argument regarding the motivation of firms in making their 
investment decisions. Garret suggests that market integration is believed to impact national 
policy autonomy via ‘trade competitiveness pressures, the multinationalization of production 
                                               
35 Walter, Andrew.  Globalization and policy convergence.  The case of direct investment rules.  Chapter 3 in Higgott, Underhill and 
Bieler.  (eds). 2000.  Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System.  Routledge  p.52 
36 Ibid.P.64 TNC transnational corporation here is used interchangeably with our term MNC multinational corporation.  
37 Literature on the determinants of FDI includes work by Dunning (1999, 2004), Henderson and Vernon (1992), Nunnenkap and 
Spatz (2002), Driffield and Love (2007), Bevan and Estrin (2004) and Henisz (2000) as well as Blonigen’s 2005 survey of the 
empirical literature on FDI determinants which further identifies institutional quality as a determining factor. 
38 Walter, Andrew.  Globalization and policy convergence.  The case of direct investment rules.  Chapter 3 in Higgott, Underhill and 
Bieler.  (eds). 2000.  Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System.  Routledge 
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and the integration of financial markets’.  While the conventional view is for multinationals to 
seek to produce in the lowest cost location and thus exit countries where policies raise the 
costs of production, he argues that multinational behaviour is more complex.  He claims MNEs 
take into account such things as productivity not just costs, access to technology, distribution 
channels and markets as well as the benefits of international diversification to hedge risk.  In 
summary the pressures on governments to constrain spending as a result of the threat of exit 
of investors is offset by the provision of collective goods attractive to investors.39 
 
Divergence theory finds no empirical support for lower environmental standards attracting FDI  
 
The fear among globalization critics is that these constraints will lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ 
in standards pertaining to labour and the environment as well as impact levels of taxation and 
levels of subsidies required to retain mobile firms.  Proponents of globalization see the 
integration of markets leading to a ‘beneficial ‘race to the top’ in regulatory and policy 
standards.’ 40  Rachel Massey explores the question of whether industry mobility poses 
challenges to environmental protection.  There is a view that as industry mobility or the exit 
threats of MNEs increase, ‘states’ autonomy to determine domestic environmental policy 
diminishes’.  In an effort to attract foreign investment, states pursue a ‘race to the bottom’ by 
competitively lowering standards.41  Massey claims that empirical studies which have 
examined the ‘race to the bottom’ issue have determined that stringent environmental 
standards in developed countries have not impacted location decisions of polluting industries 
and that there is no evidence that developing countries which lower standards will be 
successful in attracting industry.42  She argues however that there are glaring gaps in the 
research that has been done and the questions being asked in policy circles.  The more 
pertinent research would be to investigate the concept of a ‘natural resource depletion haven’ 
as well as ‘industrial flight’ out of developing countries.  She claims that it would be useful to 
test for evidence of regulatory chill in industries where exit threats would be more credible, 
such as those that ‘enjoy low fixed costs, face high costs of environmental impact abatement 
and low levels of product differentiation and rely upon a local, exhaustible natural resource.  
These represent gaps in empirical work on this issue. 
 
                                               
39 Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. “Global Market and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?” International Organization 
52: 787-82 
40 Walter, Andrew.  Globalization and policy convergence.  The case of direct investment rules.  Chapter 3 in Higgott, Underhill and 
Bieler.  (eds). 2000.  Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System.  Routledge.P.51 
41 Massey explains that most of the empirical studies have found no evidence to support these theories including  Bartik 1988, Dean 
1992, Engel 1997, Eskeland and Harrison 1997, Kopp et al. 1990, Lucas et al. 1992, Tobey 1990 and Dunning 1993) to make this 
point 
42 Ibid 
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Daniel W. Drezner also undertook a reappraisal of the evidence regarding how globalization 
affects convergence of regulatory policies, particularly labour and the environment.  His 
analysis suggests that there has been a tendency towards policy convergence but that this has 
been driven more by what he terms ‘ideational forces’43 rather than competition for capital.  
Like Massey he also claims, there appears to be little consistent evidence to support the race-
to-the bottom argument.  Rather, policy convergence has tended to move regulatory levels 
upwards rather than to the lowest common denominator.44  In other words, he claims there 
has been an ‘upward convergence among OECD countries and a slow and erratic upswing 
towards more protection in the developing world’.45  He also makes the argument that today’s 
levels of market integration are surpassed by those experienced in the nineteenth century, 
and that this earlier globalization did not result in constraints on state policy autonomy but 
rather diverging national responses to economic issues and regulatory standards.46 
 
Divergence theory argues that strong markets have resulted in re-regulation rather than 
deregulation 
 
Steven Vogel in his 1996 book Freer Markets, More Rules argues against the belief that 
privatization, globalization and deregulation trends have resulted in strong markets and 
weak governments with firms triumphing over governments, suggesting that strong markets 
exist but not weaker governments or any evidence of the loss of government control.  Even in 
very global industries such as telecommunications and financial services, these integrated 
markets are not resulting in weaker governments.  Vogel’s main arguments are first, that the 
forces of globalization have resulted not in deregulation but ‘re-regulation’ where 
governments ‘reorganized their control of private sector behaviour, but not substantially 
reduced the level of regulation.’47  He believes that generally governments have tended to 
liberalize and then re-regulate rather than deregulate resulting in ‘freer markets and more 
rules’.48  He does not believe there is a zero-sum trade off in the relationship between 
governments and markets.  Second, he argues that there has not been one common approach 
to liberalization and re-regulation but rather very different approaches amongst developed 
                                               
43 According to Drezner, the term ‘ideational’ refers to the fact that ‘states alter institutions and regulations because a set of beliefs 
has developed sufficient normative power that leaders fear looking like laggards if they do not adopt similar policies.’  Drezner, 
Daniel W. 2001. “Globalization and Policy Convergence.” International Studies Review 3: p. 57 
44 Drezner, Daniel W. 2001. “Globalization and Policy Convergence.” International Studies Review 3: p.75-76 
45 Ibid. p.75 
46 Ibid. p.76.  Drezner refers to studies by Hirst and Thompson, Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson and Polanyi to make this 
point. 
47
 Vogel, Steven. 1996.  Freer Markets, More Rules.  Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries. Cornell University 
Press.  
48
 Ibid. 
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countries suggesting policy divergence.  Third he claims that it has been governments which 
have been driving these changes rather than markets or private actors and their interests. 
 
Vogel argues that reregulation is the reorganization of government control.  Distinct national 
patterns of reregulation are driven by state institutions rather than simply market forces and 
interest groups.  He sees market forces as a ‘stimuli to which states respond’ while interest 
groups can ‘constrain state actors’.  Finally Vogel argues that regulatory reform has increased 
due to three factors which echo some of the arguments being made by Garrett.  First he 
argues that ‘market change, driven largely by technological developments’ is undermining 
existing regulatory systems.   Second it is driven by ‘theory and ideology of deregulation’ by 
the US through competition, imitation and direct pressure and third it is driven by 
‘macroeconomic shifts’ which have made it an attractive policy.  Vogel claims ‘the evidence 
does in fact contradict popular wisdom that the overwhelming power of international 
markets has forced national regulators in a common direction.’ 49   
 
The ‘compensation hypothesis’ and role of institutions as factors in the debate between 
convergence & divergence 
 
While globalization opponents focus on exit threats of mobile asset holders they neglect the 
fact that there has been increased demand for policies which deal with the inequalities arising 
under market integration or globalization (those focussed on assisting the losers of 
globalization).  In other words ‘market integration increases the portion of the population 
vulnerable to market dislocations’ and ‘generates a bias in favour of distributional politics.’50  
Because elections happen at short term intervals the focus of policies will be short term and 
the need to address distributional issues in the short term will be great.  Furthermore when 
you have left-wing governments as well as ‘powerful labour market institutions that can 
coordinate the behaviour of most of the labour force,’51 you will get political and economic 
stability which is attractive to investors and will prevent their exit threat. 
 
Geoffrey Garrett’s primary claim through his empirical work is that ‘globalization and 
national autonomy are not mutually exclusive options.  The benefits of globalization can be 
reaped without undermining the economic sovereignty of nations, and without reducing the 
ability of citizens to choose how to distribute the benefits – and the costs – of the market.’52  
                                               
49 Vogel, Steven. 1996.  Freer Markets, More Rules.  Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries. Cornell University 
Press. 
50 Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge University Press.p.31 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. p.6 
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His three main propositions are first that globalization has created support for left of centre 
parties amongst those most economically disadvantaged by integration.  Second, globalization 
has not weakened the link between left labour power and big government but increased 
incentives for left wing parties to pursue redistributive policies which favour those 
immediately impacted by integration.53 Third, globalization has increased the importance of 
economic political and social stability for investment decisions of mobile asset holders. 54  
 
This ‘compensation hypothesis’ is also addressed by Mosley who argues that there are many 
reasons to assume that cross national diversity in policy making will persist.  Her main 
arguments are that the effectiveness of domestic institutions in dealing with pressures from 
the global economy is high and economic openness may actually increase domestic demand 
for public sector intervention in order to deal with the impact of globalisation.  Mosely claims 
that among developed countries, diversity or divergence remains in many national policy 
areas such as ‘government consumption spending, government transfer payments, public 
employment and public taxation, yet shows substantial convergence in fiscal and monetary 
policy.  Overall however, Mosely claims that ‘domestic politics and institutions continue to be 
the most important determinants of the overall size of government, the distribution of 
government spending across programmatic areas and the structure of taxation.’ 55  There is 
she notes, greater pressure for convergence towards neo-liberal reform in developing 
countries, however even here governments retain some autonomy to pursue diverse 
approaches.  The ‘compensation hypothesis’ appears to hold in developing countries where 
studies have confirmed a ‘positive association between trade openness and the size of the 
public sector.’56 
 
                                               
53In Partisan Politics in the Global Economy, Garret has found that the data does not support the notion that the political left and labour 
market movement have been greatly weakened by globalization.  Although trade and capital mobility increased steadily from 1960s-
1990s there was no clear shift to the political right during the same period.  While a few countries saw such a shift others did not.  There 
has tended to be stability within countries and differences across them.  The 1960s-1990s did not see an across the board weakening of 
the power of the labour movement.   The average union density in countries studied fell by 1% over 20 years from 1970 however the 
average number of unions fell by 14%.  Differences were great across countries, with some showing significant increases in union 
membership during this period.  A general trend was towards consolidation, arguably making it easier to organize.  He has also found 
that the relationship between left labour power and big government has strengthened under globalization due to the fact that political 
incentives for left parties to redistribute wealth has grown with the economic insecurity brought about by integration.  Evidence shows 
that big government, countercyclical fiscal policies and progressive tax systems became increasingly popular in the 1980s despite the 
globalization of markets.   According to Garrett the data supports his argument that ‘the relationship between left-labour power and 
redistributive and interventionist government policies increased – rather than decreased – both with heightened exposure to trade and 
with greater capital mobility.’ (p.6)  Globalization or market integration did constrain left governments in their ability to raise taxes at the 
same pace that they raised spending which ultimately led to greater budget deficits.  This in turn led to higher interest rate premiums 
imposed on these governments by the financial markets in conditions of high capital mobility.  Garrett argues that the constraining 
effects of market integration were more clearly manifested in the 1990s in Europe with the elimination of capital controls, the rise in 
unemployment and a subsequent reduction of the welfare benefits.  He also acknowledges challenges to social democratic corporatism 
but argues they have little to do with globalization and more to do with demographics. 
54 Ibid. p.6 
55 Mosley, Layna. 2005. Globalization and the State: Still Room to Move? New Political Economy. Vol. 10, N0.3p.356 
56 Ibid 
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Dani Rodrik also highlights the importance of institutions in the debate on government 
autonomy.  While he argues that globalization brings opportunities such as greater 
prosperity, particularly for developing countries as world markets provide them with access 
to leading technology and inexpensive goods, at the same time globalization benefits 
countries with strong existing institutions while hindering the ability of nations to build 
institutions to address both regulatory and redistributive issues.57   Rodrik argues that 
because markets are becoming more and more global yet the institutions which support them 
are national this leads to restrictions in integration and to inefficiency while at the same time 
weakening ‘the institutional base of national economies’, resulting in concerns over equity 
and legitimacy.58 ‘Labour advocates, environmentalists, and consumer safety activists decry 
the downward pressures on national standards and legislation.’59 The solution according to 
Rodrik is to ‘combine international harmonization and standard setting with generalized exit 
schemes, opt-outs, and escape clauses.’  This will in effect allow for ‘gains from integration’ 
while providing for divergence where national circumstances require.60  
 
b. The verdict on policy autonomy and gaps in scholarship 
 
There does not appear to be a clear consensus among scholars regarding the impact of 
globalization on government policy autonomy, although the prevailing view among the 
general populace and policy analysts appears to come down on the side of downward 
convergence.  This therefore begs the question, why does conventional wisdom so strongly 
espouse the argument of the anti-globalization protestors that globalization is having such a 
negative impact on government policy autonomy, when the evidence is mixed at best?   While 
multiple empirical studies have argued that there is little evidence of the race to the bottom, 
downward policy convergence or a subsequent loss of autonomy on the part of national 
governments, there are a number of reasons which might explain why this perspective still 
governs the public psyche.  According to Layna Mosley this appears to be driven by both 
ideological and methodological elements.  It is ideologically driven in that it affords policy 
makers a convenient scapegoat with which they might justify policies aimed at reducing the 
size of government, where the claim is that they cannot intervene in the domestic economy as 
a result of globalization pressures.61  With respect to methodology, it is easy to find anecdotal 
                                               
57
 Rodrik, Dani. 2007. One Economics Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth. Princeton University 
Press p. 195 
58 Ibid p. 196 
59
 Ibid 
60
 Ibid  
61 This view as articulated by Mosley was also outlined by Colin Crouch and Wofgang Streeck in their 1997 book Political Economy of 
Modern Capitalism. SAGE Publications Ltd.  Crouch and Streeck describe the consequences of globalization, as ‘the decline of the 
governing capacity of the nation-state and its impact on capitalist diversity.’(p.10)  They argue that the decline of national economic 
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evidence of government policies enacted with a view to attracting investment but it is 
questionable whether such evidence is representative of a broader empirical trend which 
cannot be explained by another means.62   While much has been written on this issue there 
exist gaps in the empirical research done to date.  Mosley claims that future research should 
be asking the correct questions.  ‘Only by specifying how varying dimensions of globalisation 
matter for government policy choices can we begin to gauge the overall – and often 
contending – effects of economic openness on policy making.’63 
 
3.  THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: DO IIAs IMPACT 
NATIONAL REGULATORY AUTONTOMY? 
 
This research seeks to contribute to this debate by doing just that – focussing on one specific 
dimension of globalization, namely international investment and the international investment 
agreements (IIAs) which support it, with a view to understanding what impact they are 
having on government policy choices and national regulatory autonomy in the area of health, 
safety and the environment.   This research is interested more broadly in exploring the links 
between the institutional infrastructure which has grown up around the flow of FDI and any 
constraints this might be having on domestic regulatory regimes.   
 
a. The relevance of investment agreements 
 
As investment flows have increased under globalization, foreign investors have been 
concerned with ensuring legal security with respect to the enforcement of their property 
rights when investing in countries with weak institutions.  With many investors lacking 
confidence in the legal recourses available within the developing host countries in which they 
are investing, the attraction of international agreements as a means of ensuring and enforcing 
this protection has been appealing.  The attractiveness of international investment 
agreements (IIAs) versus the reliance on domestic host legal systems has been enhanced by 
                                                                                                                                         
authority has not resulted in the ‘end of national politics, or of the assertion of national interests in the international arena.’ (p.10)  
Governments defend their policies of deregulation and privatization as necessary and rational means of remaining competitive and 
addressing the constraints imposed by international economic pressures brought on by globalization. (p.11) Furthermore they use rhetoric 
to perpetuate the ‘democratic illusion’ to mask their loss of policy control, (p.12) and by attempting to hold on to national sovereignty 
prevent the establishment of strong supra national governance to effectively address the ‘globalized capitalist economy’. (p.12)  Crouch 
and Streeck argue that globalization has led to this weakening of national governments and is likely to reduce a state’s institutional 
capacity to address losses from market integration through appropriate regulation.  This is particularly the case they argue for 
institutional economies (such as ‘German style, high-wage, high-cost and high-quality regimes’ (p.5)) than for capitalist economies (such 
as the UK and US) which have operated more openly without the same interventionist approach to governance. (p.14)  The key concern 
they argue is the need to achieve ‘public governance of the private economy at the international level’ in the wake of declining national 
authority. (p.17) 
62 Mosley, Layna. 2005. Globalization and the State: Still Room to Move? New Political Economy. Vol. 10, N0.3 
63 Ibid. p.361 
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the unique access private investors have had through these agreements, to investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions and impartial international arbitration.64  
 
As a result, the negotiation of IIAs has historically taken place between developed country 
governments, eager to help protect their investors as they venture into foreign markets,65 and 
developing country governments anxious to attract investment.  These agreements take the 
form of investment chapters in preferential trade and investment agreements (PTIAs) or 
stand alone bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  Modern day IIAs aim to ensure among other 
things, non-discriminatory and minimum levels of treatment for investors, the protection of 
investments through guarantees of compensation for legitimate cases of expropriation of 
investor assets, as well as operational flexibility through the free transfer of funds between 
countries.  
 
The negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) Chapter 11 on 
investment represented the first time that such a sophisticated investment protection 
agreement had been negotiated between developed countries.  NAFTA’s Chapter 11 also 
served to highlight the concerns of civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
regarding the rights granted under the agreement, which were seen as giving foreign 
investors rights that unduly constrained national policy autonomy, especially in the areas of 
health, safety and environmental regulation.  More specifically, the private access to 
international arbitration provided for in Chapter 11 resulted in unprecedented challenges to 
Mexican, Canadian and US regulatory measures in these sensitive areas by private investors, 
addressing what they perceived as regulatory takings.66  This in turn raised concerns that 
these challenges could lead to regulatory chill67, as governments curtailed or amended their 
regulatory initiatives in an effort to avoid multi-million dollar lawsuits. This view was further 
reinforced by the increasing number of investor-state dispute challenges arising within 
                                               
64Investor-state dispute settlement provisions allow private corporate investors to sue host governments for breaches of investment 
provisions under PTIAs or BITS. 
65 While the growing number of IIAs argues for their relevance, there is ambiguity as to whether IIAs increase investment to 
developing countries.  Studies by UNCTAD (1989), (Lesher and Miroudot (2007), Selacuse and Sullivan (2005), Neumayer and 
Spess (2004), Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2004), Eggar and Pfaffermayr (2003), Hallward-Dreimeier (2003) , Buthe and Milner 
(2004), Gross and Trevino (2006), Egger and Marlo (2007), Swenson (2005), Yackee (2007), Aisbett (2007) and Rose-Ackerman 
(2008) have looked at this issue and shown mixed results regarding the correlation between BITs and levels of FDI within 
developing countries.  This issue is addressed in Chapter 2 
66 The OECD 2004 Working Paper on International Investment entitled ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate in International 
Investment Law’ outlines that the concept of regulatory taking applies to the ‘misuse of otherwise lawful regulation to deprive an owner 
of the substance of his rights’ and is meant to cover such things as ‘creeping nationalism’. (p.8) 
67 Regulatory Chill is defined by Eric Neumayer in Greening Trade and Investment, as a situation where developed countries might 
either lower environmental standards or fail to raise them for fear that internationally mobile capital will move to countries with lower 
standards (p.68).  Kevin Grey & Duncan Brack in the OECD Report of the Working Party on Global and Structural Policies on 
Environmental Issue in Policy-Based Competition for Investment, outline a situation ‘where countries refrain from enacting stricter 
environmental standards in response to fears of losing a competitive edge’ (p.8).  Kyla Tienhaara argues in The Expropriation of 
Environmental Governance that this notion of regulatory chill has been further extended to address concerns regarding international 
investment arbitration such that regulators with knowledge of investor state challenges to regulatory measures or the threat of such 
challenges will curtail regulations or be reticent to pursue more stringent regulations in these areas.   This extension of the meaning of 
regulatory chill has also been advanced by scholars such as Gray 2002 and Peterson 2004 (p.25) 
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emerging market countries under bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 68, as well as high 
profile IIA challenges to tobacco control regulations in Uruguay and Australia on health 
warnings and the plain packaging of cigarettes. 
 
Just as globalization scholars have considered whether competitive pressure and the threat of 
exit by mobile firms and capital have had constraining influences on national policies, there is 
a view that the threat of litigation through rights provided private actors by IIAs will 
constrain the regulatory ability of the state, leading to regulatory chill.  Sachs and Sauvant are 
among those that have highlighted the fact that the exploding landscape of IIAs can serve to 
‘limit the regulatory flexibility of host countries to pursue not only economic development 
policies but other public policies as well.”69 
 
b. What is this study trying to achieve? 
 
This research seeks to understand the impact of IIAs on national regulatory autonomy, 
whether there has been a ‘regulatory chill’ impact amongst governments who have faced 
challenges to their regulatory measures under IIAs, and whether any chilling effect is more 
likely in a developing versus a developed country environment.  Finally it will look at how 
governments can balance this important objective of providing protection to foreign 
investors, while at the same time maintaining autonomy with respect to their ability to 
regulate in the public interest in areas such as health, safety or the environment.  This 
research will therefore seek to answer the following question:   
 
What has been the impact of international investment agreements on national regulatory 
autonomy in the areas of health, safety and environment?  Is there evidence of a “chilling” 
impact on the regulatory development process? 
 
The assumption of this thesis is that if the regulatory chill hypothesis was to hold or to be 
considered a viable possible outcome of IIA legal challenges, we would expect to find a 
number of observable outcomes in regulator behaviour and regulatory trends.  First, one 
would expect trends in HSE regulation to reflect this chilling impact (through a stagnant or 
weakening regulatory environment or through the degree of uptake in regulatory policy), 
particularly in policy areas where regulatory measures were challenged under IIAs.  Second 
                                               
68 According to the May 2012 UNCTAD report Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 66% of new cases have 
been launched against developing or transition economies.  To date 61 developing countries and 16 countries with economies in 
transition ‘have responded to one or more investment treaty arbitrations’. 4.  ‘Argentina continues to be the most frequent 
respondent (53 cases) followed by Venezuela (34), Ecuador (23) and Mexico (21) 
69 Sachs, Lisa and Karl P. Sauvant. 2009. ‘ BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview’ in: Sachs, Lisa and Karl P. Sauvant. (eds). 2009. 
The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment:  Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows. 
Oxford University Press P xxxvii 
                   35 of 245 
we would expect to find a level of awareness and understanding among HSE regulators about 
the existence and content of IIAs.  Any causal link between IIAs and regulatory chill would 
also need to demonstrate that beyond awareness, that IIAs have an influential role on 
regulators in the HSE regulatory development process.  These expectations regarding 
regulatory trends and regulator awareness will be analysed in a consistent and 
comprehensive way unlike previous studies of regulatory chill which have focussed on 
anecdotal examples and a case-by-case approach. 
 
In order to test the expectations of the research hypothesis, this thesis uses quantitative and 
qualitative tools within a comparative case study analysis.  These will include statistical 
analysis and the qualitative coding and analysis of in-depth interviews and an electronic 
survey, as well as the statistical and qualitative analysis of government information such as 
regulatory databases, policy pronouncements and government reports and studies.  Case 
studies will focus on the impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 on Investment’s impact on the 
regulatory policy development process in Canada in the area of health, safety and the 
environment and second on the impact of IIAs on tobacco control regulation globally.70 
 
This issue is important given the growing levels of international investment, with worldwide 
levels expected to reach $1.8 Trillion by 201571.  Additionally, the proliferation of bilateral 
and regional rules on investment which have followed are arguably relevant to the overall 
trade and investment system.  In this context, this research will contribute to existing 
academic literature and to public policy formation in a number of ways.  It will contribute to 
international relations theories on globalization as outlined earlier, particularly with respect 
to the impact of trade and investment agreements on state regulatory autonomy within both 
developed and developing countries.  It will provide a new angle to existing analysis of IIAs 
and the investor-state disputes arising therein by probing trends in regulation and regulator 
behaviour with a view to addressing conventional wisdom on regulatory chill.  Analysis of this 
issue to date has predominantly focused on exploring the outcome of specific disputes rather 
than their systematic impact on the domestic regulatory regime.  Finally, it will make 
recommendations in the area of trade and investment policy development and negotiations 
including the role of investment provisions and investor-state dispute settlement in future 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.  
                                               
70 Chapter 3 gives a detailed outline of the methodology 
71 UNCTAD World Investment Prospects Survey 2013-2015 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has outlined how globalization has raised concerns about the role of private 
actors in influencing government policy autonomy with scenarios of coerced policy 
convergence and a regulatory race to the bottom.  Although there appears to be limited 
empirical evidence beyond the anecdotal to support this phenomena the view persists among 
policy makers and the general public.  More specifically of relevance to this study, the 
emergence of the modern day investment agreement and its unique enforcement mechanism 
has raised a whole host of issues for signatory governments.  While there are conflicting 
views regarding the effectiveness of these agreements in achieving their stated goals, there 
are equally concerns about their impact.    The remainder of this thesis will seek to determine 
the extent and nature of the impact of IIAs on governments, whether evidence supports the 
possibility of a regulatory chilling effect and whether the impact differs between developed or 
emerging market countries.   
 
More specifically Chapter 2 will look in more detail at IIAs, what they are, what they seek to 
do and specifically the claims made regarding their impact.  Chapter 3 will detail the 
methodological approach that will be taken both in terms of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis, while Chapters 4-6 will outline the case studies of the impact of IIAs on government 
policy autonomy in Canada and globally around the issue of tobacco control.  Finally, Chapter 
7 will analyse the findings across case studies and apply the result of the research to the 
future of investment treaty negotiation and the likely impact for policy makers within the 
context of theories of government policy autonomy under globalization. 
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Chapter 2:  The globalization of investment –IIAs and their 
purported impact on government regulatory autonomy 
 
‘according a private party the right to bring an action in an international tribunal against a 
sovereign country with respect to an investment dispute is a revolutionary innovation that 
now seems to be taken for granted.’  
 
Jesewald Salacuse and Nicholas P. Sullivan72 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A major manifestation of globalization and the integration of markets has been the escalating 
levels of foreign direct investment supported by an increasingly complex institutional 
framework made up of international investment agreements (IIAs) 73.  Where do they come 
from and what do they purport to do?  Why are the public, scholars and public policy 
advocates so concerned about their impact?  This chapter looks at the rationale and history of 
IIAs both in the context of chapters in preferential trade and investment agreements (PTIAs) 
and as stand-alone bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and how they differ across regions in 
terms of content.  Additionally it will look at their content, relevance and effectiveness, 
explore the history of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and also look at the 
growing concerns about the chilling impact of IIAs and particularly NAFTA Chapter 11 on 
health safety and environmental (HSE) regulations.   
 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LANDSCAPE 
 
a. History of investment agreements 
 
Investors have historically sought to ensure legal security with respect to the enforcement of 
their property rights.  With many investors lacking confidence in the legal recourses available 
within the developing host countries in which they were investing, the attraction of modern 
IIAs as a means of ensuring and enforcing this protection has been appealing.  The types of 
provisions found in modern day investment agreements have their origin in international 
agreements from the late eighteenth century.  Vandevelde defines three distinct eras in 
                                               
72
 Salacuse, jeswald W. and Nicholas P. Sullivan.  2005.  ‘Do BITs Really Work:: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Their Grand Bargain.’ Harvard International Law Journal, 46: 67-129 
73 The abbreviation IIAs is used to refer to both Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements (PTIAs) and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs).  IIAs will be used interchangeably with ‘investment agreements’.  This chapter will not address investor-state 
contracts, agreements signed between foreign investors and host states which often contain similar provisions to IIAs. 
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international investment history, namely the colonial era, the postcolonial era and the global 
era.74 
 
The Colonial Era 
 
During the Colonial Era, prior to the Second World War, international agreements were 
mainly focused on establishing trade relations and were not concerned with protecting 
foreign direct investment per se, although some included provisions on the protection of 
property.75 
 
These early agreements, entered into by several states including the UK, US and Japan,76 took 
the form of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) agreements and were established as 
early as the eighteenth century.77  With a primary purpose of establishing trade relations, 
such agreements on occasion had provisions protecting the property of each party in the 
territory of the other.  From time to time they provided for compensation in the case of 
expropriation, for National Treatment, Most Favoured Nation  (MFN) treatment for certain 
business activities, as well as  limited protection for currency transfers. 78 
 
Generally, however, the protection of international investment was achieved through 
customary international law.  The difficulty with this was that there was no common 
agreement that customary international law bestowed a minimum standard on the treatment 
of investments, nor even how such a treatment would be defined.  Many developing countries 
at the time supported the ‘Calvo Doctrine’ which provided that foreign investors should only 
receive the same level of treatment afforded to domestic investors.  Finally, the enforcement 
of customary international law was primarily through the mechanism of espousal which 
required the investor’s home country to take up the claim in diplomatic dealings with the 
offending host country, or through outright military action.  Not surprisingly this had political 
implications and was not an avenue frequently pursued and enforcement was therefore 
weak.79 
 
                                               
74 Vandevelde, Kenneth J.  2005.  ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’. U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 157.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Newcombe, Andrew and Lluis Paradell. 2009. Law and Practice of Investment Treaties. Kluwer Law International. 
77Vandevelde, Kenneth J.  2005.  ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’. U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 157.  
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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The Postcolonial Era 
 
During the Postcolonial Era, according to Vandevelde, three main events ‘shaped the structure 
and content of international investment agreements’.  The first was the creation of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by the allies in 1947 with the goal of trade 
liberalization, but without a mandate in the area of investment.80 While trade negotiations 
were to be handled by this new body, investment protection continued to be dealt with under 
FCN agreements.  The investment provisions in these postcolonial era FCN agreements 
shifted the primary focus away from trade (given it was now being dealt with multilaterally 
under GATT) and saw the strengthening of dispute resolution provisions.81   
 
The second main event according to Vandevelde was the process of decolonialization which 
created newly independent developing countries which feared the exploitation and control 
inherent in foreign direct investment.  This led to policies of protectionism, expropriation and 
import substitution.82   
 
Finally there was ‘the emergence of the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union’.    Both the 
developing and socialist bloc countries together pursued unprecedented levels of 
expropriation and nationalization, triumphing state regulation over a market-based 
approach.  This movement would culminate in the 1970s in a succession of initiatives within 
the United Nations Generally Assembly aimed at recognizing their control over their domestic 
resources and their right to expropriate or nationalize without obligation for compensation.  
The UN General Assembly endorsement for both the New International and Economic Order-
NIEO declaration and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States-CERDS, served to 
exacerbate the tension between capital exporting countries on the one hand and the capital 
importing countries on the other.83  At the same time numerous initiatives by developed 
countries to address their concerns through the establishment of a multilateral framework for 
investment had failed.  The developed country response was the creation of the Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) as a means of dealing with the rising problem of expropriations and 
a desire to receive prompt, adequate, effective and fair market value compensation.84   
 
                                               
80 The Havana Charter of 1948 was a multilateral investment code developed within the  International Trade Organization (ITO) but 
was never ratified.   
81Vandevelde, Kenneth J.  2005.  ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’. U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 157.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid 
84 Ibid. 
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Germany was the first to negotiate an investment agreement, signing its first BIT in 1959 with 
Pakistan.  Many Western European countries followed in the 1960s, Japan in 1976 and finally 
the US in the 1980s (although it launched its BIT program in 1977).85   European countries 
were the most active signing 130 BITs by 1977, well before the US program got underway.86  
These early BITs were consistent, in that they were focussed uniquely on investment and 
negotiated between developed and developing countries.  While developed countries were 
seeking protection for their investments and the developing countries hoping to attract FDI, 
these early BITs were based largely on the earlier FCN agreements.  A key innovation of these 
agreements was in the area of dispute settlement where it was no longer required that 
investors exhaust local legal remedies prior to referring a dispute to international 
arbitration.87 
 
The Global Era 
 
Beginning at the end of the 1980s, the Global Era as defined by Vandevelde was characterized 
by the ‘intermingling of trade and investment provisions in international agreements’.  This 
was achieved with the completion of the Uruguay round of international trade negotiations, 
the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to administer the GATT and the 
conclusion of a number of agreements with investment components, namely the GATS (The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services),TRIMs (Trade Related Investment Measures) and 
TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights).   
 
The GATS investment component arises as a result of commitments to allow trade in a service 
sector through a commercial presence.  With the growing importance of investment in the 
service sector vis-a-vis the manufacturing sector, the GATS has a potentially large impact on 
foreign investment.  The reality is slightly different with the effective coverage of the GATS 
constrained by the very limited commitments made by member states to date.88  As 
Vandevelde explains, TRIMs ‘prohibits the imposition on foreign investment of certain trade 
distorting performance requirements’, while TRIPS ‘obligates the parties to provide certain 
protection for intellectual property, a form of investment’.89 
 
                                               
85Vandevelde, Kenneth J.  2005.  ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’. U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 157. 
86Salacuse, jeswald W. and Nicholas P. Sullivan.  2005.  ‘Do BITs Really Work:: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Their Grand Bargain.’ Harvard International Law Journal, 46: 67-129.  
87Vandevelde, Kenneth J.  2005.  ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’. U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 157.  
88 The impact on foreign investment under GATS is further limited by the structure of the agreement itself.  The ‘positive list’ 
approach commits counties to liberalize only in the areas that they have explicitly listed in the agreement.   
89 Vandevelde, Kenneth J.  2005.  ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’. U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 157.  
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This era also witnessed a huge increase in the number of BITs negotiated as developing 
countries became more open to the benefits of FDI, following the failure of their policies of 
import substitution and the exemplary success of numerous Asian countries which had 
espoused investment and free market policies.  With the limited availability of private lending 
in the wake of the 1980s debt crisis, developing countries looked to FDI as a source of capital.  
The BIT provided a means of signalling both their desire for investment as well as providing 
security regarding their investment climate.90   
 
Another phenomenon of this period has been the emergence of BIT style investment 
provisions in bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements.  While NAFTA was a 
watershed in this regard, a number of countries have been at the forefront of this trend, 
predominantly in Latin America, the Caribbean, North America and Asia.91  
 
The proliferation of investment agreements 
 
While the first BIT was signed in 1959, the number of BITs signed in the 1980s and 1990s 
greatly increased, exploding by the early 2000s.92  While 309 had been concluded by 1988, 
the number reached 2181 by 2002.93   The total number of BITs rose to 2,857 by the end of 
2012.94 The top ten total signatories of BITs up to the end of 2013 were Germany, China, 
Switzerland, UK, Romania, Italy, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg.95 
 
As noted above, countries began to pursue bilateral and regional preferential trade 
agreements which incorporated BIT style investment components, including most notably the 
NAFTA.96  Vendevelde points out that in the ten years following NAFTA, 39% of all 
preferential trade agreements would contain investment provisions.97  339 International 
agreements with investment provisions were concluded by the end of 2012 with the balance 
shifting from bilateral to regional treaty making with respect to investment. 98  Additionally 
more and more of these agreements were being negotiated between developing countries – 
more than one forth by 2006.99  South-South BITs accounted for 26% of all BITs in 2009.100  
                                               
90 Vandevelde, Kenneth J.  2005.  ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’. U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 157 
91The US, Canada, Japan, South Korea and Singapore have been particularly active PTIA programs.     
92 Vandevelde, Kenneth J.  2005.  ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’. U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 157.  
93 Salacuse, jeswald W. And Nicholas P. Sullivan. Do BITs Really Work:: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Grand Bargain.’ ’ Harvard International Law Journal, 46: 67-129. 
94 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2013.  
http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20%28IIA%29/Research-and-Policy-Analysis.aspx  
95 Ibid. p.3 
96Vandevelde, Kenneth J.  2005.  ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’. U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Polivyy 157.  
97 Ibid. 
98 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2013.  
http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20%28IIA%29/Research-and-Policy-Analysis.aspx 
99 Vandevelde, Kenneth J.  2005.  ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’. U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 157.  
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China for example had signed 145 BITs with both developed and developing countries by June 
2013.101 
 
b. Content of investment agreements 
 
Key provisions and their meaning 
 
IIAs are broadly aimed at investment protection, promotion and liberalization achieved by 
ensuring non-discriminatory treatment for foreign investors, ensuring appropriate levels of 
protection and operating flexibility as well as a means of enforcing such commitments.  These 
objectives are achieved through a series of provisions which are standard in most 
agreements.  Generally speaking an investment agreement will include provisions dealing 
with the treatment of investors which is non-discriminatory and provides a minimum 
standard, the protection of the investor aimed at ensuring due process and compensation for 
legitimate expropriation and operational flexibility through provisions on the free transfer of 
funds.  Finally, most IIAs will provide recourse to international arbitration through provisions 
on investor-state dispute settlement. 
 
Definition of investment 
 
The modern IIA raises multiple issues between negotiating countries.  One of the initial 
decisions that countries will face in negotiating an IIA involves the definition of investment 
covered by the agreement.  According to Muchlinski, the aim is ‘to ensure sufficient flexibility 
to encompass not only equity, but also non-equity investments and to allow for the evolution 
of new forms of investment’.102  Decisions need to be made by contracting parties as to the 
limits of coverage of any definition, such as whether or not to include portfolio investment, 
given concerns about its stability.103 
 
Standards of treatment 
 
There are a number of standards of treatment and protection provisions contained in IIAs.  
General Standards of Treatment include national treatment, most favoured nation treatment 
                                                                                                                                         
100 UNCTAD – Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2008-June 2009)p.5 
101 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2013.  
http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20%28IIA%29/Research-and-Policy-Analysis.aspx 
102 Muchlinski, Peter. The Framework of Investment Projection:  The Content of BITS – derived from Peter T. Muchlinkski 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2007). 
103 This has consistently been a concern of developing countries who fear the short term nature of portfolio investment.  The 
concern was exacerbated during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 
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and fair and equitable treatment.  Fair and equitable treatment (FET) is an important though 
ill-defined standard often subsumed in North American style agreements under the minimum 
standard of treatment, and seen as providing ‘a floor below which treatment of foreign 
investors must not fall.’104  According to Newcombe and Paradell this ‘more recent approach 
is to define fair and equitable treatment expressly as the customary international minimum 
standard of treatment applicable to aliens and their property.’105  
 
National treatment is a relative standard aimed at providing foreign investors operating in a 
host country with treatment which is no less favourable to domestic nationals engaged in 
comparable business activity.106  In defining National Treatment, the contracting parties will 
need to establish a number of issues such as whether National Treatment covers the pre or 
post establishment stages of the investment and whether it applies to all levels of 
government.  Because National Treatment involves a comparison between the treatment of 
domestic and foreign investors, there are often issues regarding how to determine what 
constitutes ‘like’ or ‘similar circumstances.’  A final concern might be whether it will be 
subject to exceptions for issues such as ‘national security, public health, industry specific or 
development exceptions’107 
 
The most-favoured nation standard ‘means that a host country must extend to investors from 
one foreign country treatment no less favourable than it accords to investors from any other 
foreign country in like cases.’108  This serves to prevent discrimination and to ensure that all 
foreign investors are treated equally within the host country and allows for equality of 
competitive conditions.  Again, contracting parties will be concerned about whether such a 
provision should be subject to exceptions. 
 
                                               
104
 The IIA tribunal outlined this baseline in S.D. Myers ,Inc.v.Canada (Partial Award, 13 Nov.2000) para 259 
105 Newcombe, Andrew and Lluis Paradell. 2009. Law and Practice of Investment Treaties. Kluwer Law International.  p. 258. In 
the wake of  a number of divergent rulings under NAFTA Chapter 11 which raised concern amongst signatory countries, the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission sought to clarify their intent with respect to provisions dealing with the minimum standard of 
treatment and indirect expropriation. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf  
106United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), National Treatment, UNCTAD Series on issues in 
international investment agreements (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1999) (UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11)  
107 Muchlinski, Peter. The Framework of Investment Projection:  The Content of BITS – derived from Peter T. Muchlinkski 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2007).  
108 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, UNCTAD Series on 
issues in international investment agreements (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1999) (UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10) 
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Protection and operational flexibility 
 
Provisions dealing with protection and operational flexibility include such things as the free 
transfer of funds in relation to the investment out of the host country and compensation for 
losses due to expropriation, armed conflict or internal disorder. 109  
 
The free transfer of funds provisions help ‘ensure that investors can reap the financial 
rewards of a successful investment or exit the host state if an investment is unsuccessful.’ 110 
Any restrictions on this free movement may have a negative impact on the value of the 
investment.  Often of concern will be whether limits should be placed on this with respect to 
balance of payment issues, as well as the time frame, currency and exchange rate.111 
 
The compensation for losses due to armed conflict or internal disorder usually ‘lay down that 
the investor shall be treated in accordance with the national treatment and or MFN standard 
in the matter of such compensation.’112 Compensation for expropriation is one of the most 
controversial provisions in IIAs.  Under international law states have the sovereign right to 
the nationalization or expropriation of property owned by nationals or aliens ‘for economic, 
political, social or other reasons.’ 113The majority of IIAs have provisions which permit the 
expropriation of assets owned by the investor from the other contracting country where this 
is done for a public purpose, under due process of law, without discrimination, and upon the 
payment of compensation.114 Under some agreements, such compensation is often required to 
be ‘prompt adequate and effective’ as well as in accordance with the fair market value of 
assets immediately before expropriation.  Additionally ‘the majority of IIAs cover not only 
direct expropriation but also indirect measures that have the effect of neutralizing the value 
of the investor’s assets, while leaving their formal ownership intact’.  Determining whether an 
indirect expropriation is a legitimate government regulatory measure or a compensable 
taking is controversial and often ill-defined in agreements.  Efforts have been made in the 
North American context to clarify this issue.115  The issue of whether or not to refer to the 
market value when determining compensation has also been an issue, with differing views 
                                               
109 Muchlinski, Peter. The Framework of Investment Projection:  The Content of BITS – derived from Peter T. Muchlinkski 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2007). 
110 Newcombe, Andrew and Lluis Paradell. 2009. Law and Practice of Investment Treaties. Kluwer Law International.  p. 399 
111Muchlinski, Peter. The Framework of Investment Projection:  The Content of BITS – derived from Peter T. Muchlinkski 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2007) 
112 Ibid. 
113 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Expropriation, UNCTAD Series on issues in international 
investment agreements ll (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2012) (UNCTAD/DIA/IA/2011/7) 
114  Newcombe, Andrew and Lluis Paradell. 2009. Law and Practice of Investment Treaties. Kluwer Law International.  p. 321 
115 Muchlinski, Peter. The Framework of Investment Projection:  The Content of BITS – derived from Peter T. Muchlinkski 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2007) 
                   45 of 245 
amongst countries.  Such an issue poses an obvious challenge for state economies such as 
China. 
 
Other specific provisions found in IIAs include provisions protecting the right of entry and 
sojourn of individuals in connection with the investment’, ‘restrictions on the imposition of 
performance requirements on investors by the host country’, ‘provisions asserting that it is 
inappropriate for host countries to seek investment through the lowering of environmental 
and labour standards’ as well as those dealing with health and safety116 and a ‘general 
exceptions clause protecting the rights of the contracting parties to regulate in certain fields’ 
such as health safety and the environment.117 
 
Dispute settlement provisions 
 
Finally, virtually all modern day IIAs have provisions dealing with the settlement of disputes 
under the agreement, both those arising between the contracting parties and disputes 
between the host state and the investor.  With respect to disputes between the contracting 
parties, ‘the usual procedure is for a dispute to be settled by negotiation between the 
contracting countries, or, if this is not possible, to go to arbitration.’118  
 
More contentious are the disputes between the host state and foreign investor which is 
covered in more detail later in this chapter.  According to Muchlinski, the earlier IIAs did not 
cover these types of disputes.  Moreover, some recent BITs have ‘included detailed provisions 
of dispute settlement that seek to tailor procedures to the specific concerns of these 
countries, for more effective and transparent arbitral procedures’.119   
 
Regional variations in IIAs (European vs. North American models) 
 
There have historically been key differences in breadth and depth of coverage afforded by 
IIAs.  Lisa Sachs and Karl P. Sauvant define three broad approaches to IIAs namely the 
                                               
116 These clauses have become standard in IIAs negotiated by Canada and the US and form part of their Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaties 
117 Muchlinski, Peter. The Framework of Investment Projection:  The Content of BITS – derived from Peter T. Muchlinkski 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2007). 
118 Ibid.  Arbitration is usually handled by a tribunal comprised of three members , with one each chosen by each contracting party and 
the final member chosen by the first two panel members.  
119 Ibid. 
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liberalization approach (mainly North America, Japan, Korea), the protection approach 
(European countries), more qualified approach (between developing countries).120 
 
Differences between the North American liberalization approach to IIAs and other mainly 
European IIAs, were that National Treatment and MFN protection were granted at the pre-
establishment phase (granting market access) and restrictions were placed on the use of 
performance requirements.121  Generally market access provisions were subject to 
reservations which limit their coverage.  The European BITs have tended to cover the post-
establishment phase exclusively (and therefore do not deal with market access).  This 
difference has narrowed in recent years with the convergence of approaches towards the 
North American model as seen in the recent EU-Columbia, EU-Chile and EU-Canada 
investment negotiations.122 
 
The final category of IIAs between developing countries, resemble the old European style but 
tend to have more of an emphasis on reservations and exceptions.  They often also require a 
choice to be made between the use of domestic litigation to solve disputes and reference to 
international arbitration. 
 
3. WHAT IS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE AGREEMENTS?  ARE THEY 
RELEVANT? 
 
As previously mentioned, the negotiation of investment protection agreements has 
historically taken place between developed country governments, eager to open new markets 
for their investors while affording appropriate protection in these foreign locations, and 
developing country governments anxious to attract investment.  IIAs have consistently been 
touted as the most appropriate vehicle for achieving these goals of investment protection, 
promotion and liberalization.  However, questions remain as to whether they actually achieve 
these stated objectives.  The following section looks at this issue in some detail.   
                                               
120 Sachs, Lisa and Karl P. Sauvant. 2009. ‘ BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview’ in: Sachs, Lisa and Karl P. Sauvant. 2009. The 
Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Invesment:  Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows. Oxford 
University Press 
121 The provisions restricting the use of performance requirements are very similar to those outlined under the WTO TRIMS 
agreement.  The reason for their inclusion in the more liberalizing IIAs is to subject them to investor-state dispute settlement.  This 
enforcement mechanism is not available under the WTO. 
122European Commission website, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=973  
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a. Do investment agreements have an impact on FDI to developing countries?  Do 
they promote investment? 
 
Review of empirical evidence regarding the impact of BITs on FDI 
 
There have been numerous empirical studies undertaken over the last fifteen years which 
have looked at the impact of BITs on developing countries with a view to determining 
whether they have actually succeeded in promoting investment and raising levels of FDI.  The 
findings have been mixed. 
 
According to a 2009 UNCTAD report which undertook an extensive survey of the literature 
regarding the impact of BITs on FDI, ‘the findings of early empirical studies on the impact of 
BITs on FDI flows were ambiguous, with some showing weak or considerable impact, and one 
or two no impact at all.’  The report goes on to say however that ‘studies published between 
2005 and 2008 – based on much larger data samples, improved econometric models and 
more tests – have shifted the balance towards concurring that BITs do have some influence on 
FDI inflows from developed countries into developing countries.’123  While the UNCTAD 
report seems to come down on the side of a positive impact, this conclusion remains 
questionable.  A handful of recent studies continue to question both the magnitude and 
positive nature of these findings, raising the issue of reverse causality.  The overall conclusion 
is ambiguity with respect to the impact. 
 
A 1998 UNCTAD report124, along with studies by Hallward-Dreimier (2003)125 and Tobin and 
Rose-Ackerman (2005)126 all found little or no evidence that BITS had a positive impact on 
                                               
123 UNCTAD The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries 
2009. p xiii 
124 The 1998 UNCTAD report finds that ‘following the signing of a BIT, it is more likely than not that the host country will 
marginally increase its share in the outward FDI of the home country’.  The effect is usually small.  The response of foreign 
investors is most likely to occur three years following the signing of the BIT.  In UNCTAD’s cross-country comparison of FDI 
determinants, they concluded that ‘BITs appear to play a minor and secondary role in influencing FDI inflows’.  The most 
important determinant is market size. (UNCTAD. 1998. ‘The Impact on Foreign Direct Investment of BITS’  UNCTAD Bilateral 
Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s Chapter IV (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1989).  According to Hallward-
Driemeier ‘An analysis of twenty years of bilateral FDI flows from the OECD to developing countries finds little evidence that 
BITs have stimulated additional investment’.  She finds no evidence that BITs act as substitutes for weak institutions, but rather that 
‘those countries that are reforming and already have reasonably strong domestic institutions are most likely to gain from ratifying a 
treaty.’  She sees BITs acting more as complements to domestic institutions. ( Hallward-Driemeier. M. 2003. ‘Do Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Attract FDI:  Only a Bit....And  They Could Bite’. World Bank Policy Research Paper 3121 – 2003, 
Washington, DC.  
125    According to Hallward-Driemeier ‘An analysis of twenty years of bilateral FDI flows from the OECD to developing countries 
finds little evidence that BITs have stimulated additional investment’.  She finds no evidence that BITs act as substitutes for weak 
institutions, but rather that ‘those countries that are reforming and already have reasonably strong domestic institutions are most 
likely to gain from ratifying a treaty.’  She sees BITs acting more as complements to domestic institutions. ( Hallward-Driemeier. 
M. 2003. ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI:  Only a Bit....And  They Could Bite’. World Bank Policy Research Paper 
3121 – 2003, Washington, DC.  
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FDI.  The second wave of studies from 2004-2008 seemed to solve issues of methodology 
such as poor data or small sample size.  Studies by Buthe and Milner (2004)127, Egger and 
Pfaffermayr (2004)128, Salacuse and Sullivan (2005)129, Neumayer and Spess (2005)130, Gross 
and Trevino (2005)131, Gallagher and Birch (2006)132, Egger and Merlo (2007)133 and a 2008 
study by Rose-Ackerman134 all claimed to demonstrate a positive impact of BITS on FDI.   
 
While on balance the more recent studies have confirmed a positive impact of BITs on FDI, a 
number of studies continue to challenge either the magnitude or causal relationship of this 
outcome.  Swenson (2005), Yackee (2007) and Aisbett (2007) challenged the methodological 
                                                                                                                                         
126Rose-Ackerman and Tobin study looked at the impact of BITS on FDI inflows from 1980-2000 in 63 countries and found that 
‘the number of BITs seems to have little impact on a country’s ability to attract FDI.’  They also found that risky countries appear to 
attract more FDI by signing BITs than their safer counterparts.  Finally they found no statistically significant relationship between 
US BITs and levels of US FDI and therefore conclude that ‘signing a BIT with the United States does not correspond to increased 
FDI inflows’.Tobin, Jennifer and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2004. ‘Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in 
Developing countries:  The Impact of Bilateral investment Treaties’ Yale Law School Center for Law, Economics and Public 
Policy, Research Paper No. 293, June 4, 2004  
127Buthe and Milner undertook a ‘statistical analysis of inward FDI flows into 122 developing countries with a population of more 
than 1 million from 1970-2000’and found that  1) ‘BITs have a substantial effect on FDI that is independent of the relative power of 
the signatories and 2) BITs signed with powerful FDI home states have a substantial additional effect.  In other words, BITs alone 
are a credible commitment mechanism and signing more of them improves the credibility of this commitment since it means more 
countries can punish and monitor behaviour.’  They argue BITs should increase FDI in general and not just through the bilateral 
relationship.  Buthe,( Tim and Helen V. Milner. Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment:  A Political Analysis 
– Revised version of 2004 paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.   
128 Egger and Pfaffermayr undertook ‘an empirical assessment of the impact of BITS on FDI stocks’ and found a ‘significant and 
positive impact of ratified BITs throughout’.  They argue that ‘BITs exert a positive and significant effect on real stocks of outward 
FDI with a lower bound of 15%’.( Egger, Peter and Michael Pfaffermayr.  2004. ‘The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on 
Foreign Direct Investment’. Journal of Comparative Economics.  
129 The Salacuse and Sullivan considered whether BITs signed between the US and a developing country would have a positive 
impact of flows of FDI between the two.  Their study concludes that there is ‘strong evidence that BITs have, to a significant extent, 
attained their stated goal of promoting investment’.  Specifically the authors found that a US BIT is more likely than not to exert a 
strong and positive role in promoting US investment, overall investment and more likely to do so than other OECD BITs. (Salacuse, 
jeswald W. and Nicholas P. Sullivan.  2005.  ‘Do BITs Really Work:: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Grand Bargain.’ Harvard International Law Journal, 46: 67-129.   
130Neumayer and Spess also studied the impact of BITs on FDI over the period of 1970-2001 covering up to 119 countries and 
found ‘a positive effect of BITs on FDI inflows that is consistent and robust’.  ‘The effect is sometimes conditional on institutional 
quality, but is always positive and statistically significantly different from zero at all levels on institutional quality’.  They argue that 
their results provide some evidence that BITs can serve as substitutes for ‘good institutional quality’. (Neumayer, Tim and Laura 
Spess. 2005.   ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?’ World Development,  
33(10): 1567-85.      
131 Grosse and Trevino sought to demonstrate that institutions were important for attracting FDI to the economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE).  They saw BITs as a key element of institutional reform that signalled the regions’ move towards a market-
based economy.  Their study considered whether the number of BITs signed served to lower investor uncertainty in the region and 
resulted in increased levels of FDI.  They found that ‘the number of bilateral investment treaties that CEE countries had signed was 
highly significant in attracting FDI to the region.’  They also argue that BITs, together with enterprise reform and rules on 
repatriation, work together to stimulate FDI.  At the same time factors such as political risk and government corruption levels can 
constrain FDI. (Grosse, Robert and Len J. Trevino. 2005.  ‘New Institutional Economics and FDI Location in Central and Eastern 
Europe’.  Management International Review.     
132 The Gallagher and Birch study of the determinants of FDI in Latin America found that the most important determinants of FDI 
were market size, trade orientation and macro-economic stability.  However, they also found that ‘the total number of BITs that a 
country has signed does have an independent effect and positive effect on FDI flows’.  Contrary to the findings by Salacuse and 
Sullivan however, their analysis showed that a BIT with the US did ‘not independently attract FDI’. (Gallagher, Kevin P. and 
Melissa Birch.  2006. ‘Do Investment Agreements Attract Investment?: Evidence from Latine America.’ Journal of World 
Investment and Trade. 7(6): 961-74.   
133 The Egger and Merlo study looked at the impact of BITs on bilateral stock of FDI over the long-term arguing that previous 
studies were more concerned about analysing effects in the short term.  The authors found ‘that the contemporaneous (short-run) 
impact of BITs is substantially lower than the long-run effect. (Egger, P. and Merlo, V. (2007).  The impact of bilateral investment 
treaties on foreign direct investment. Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier. Vol. 32(4): 788-804. December.) 
134In her 2008 study, Rose-Ackerman suggests that BITs do stimulate FDI inflows but only under certain conditions.  The impact of 
BITs will depend on the overall global BIT regime, given the existence of a competitive environment for attracting investment.  She 
also found that the ‘marginal impact of country’s own BITs on its ability to attract FDI falls as the global coverage of BITs grows’  
Finally she argues that BITs can’t fully compensate for a weak investment environment with the impact greater the better the 
existing economic and legal environment. (Rose-Ackerman, Susan.  2009. ‘The Global BITs Regime and the Domestic 
Environment for Investment’. Chpater 11 in:  Sachs, Lisa and Karl P. Sauvant. 2009. The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment:  Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows. Oxford University Press. p. 311-321)  
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approach of previous studies and all asked whether previous results reflected cases of 
reverse causality. 
 
In her study, Swenson shows a backward-looking element to investment treaties such that 
‘countries that had already received larger stocks of foreign investment were more likely to 
sign BITs than were countries that had been less successful.’  She concludes that this implies 
the signing of BITs was driven by the interests of existing foreign investors.  She goes on to 
argue that the signing of BITs may have either ‘allowed countries to retain investments that 
otherwise might have relocated to another country’ or ‘to hold onto previous investments’.  
Finally, however, she argues that once controls are made for issues such as timing, the 
attractiveness of countries and the type of investor, the data ‘suggests that BIT singing did 
help developing countries attract a larger volume of foreign investment’135 
 
Jason Yackee set out to test the results of the 2005 study by Neumayer and Spess which had 
shown a strong impact of BITs on FDI.  Using a similar model (similar dataset, larger sample 
of years) he is not able to replicate their results.  His results suggest an ‘opposite conditional 
relationship, where BITs are statistically significant predictors of FDI share only for low-risk 
countries and where the magnitude of that effect increases as risk decreases’136 
 
Finally, Aisbett demonstrates that BITs are positively and significantly correlated with FDI 
inflows, but that this appears to be driven by endogeneity rather that any signalling effect of 
BITS.  She believes there is no evidence of BITs effecting FDI and studies that show such an 
effect she believes do not account for the endogeneity of BIT participation.  Her model shows 
‘potential of reverse causality, where a higher growth rate of FDI leads to increased 
probability of BITs being formed’.  She therefore finds no evidence that BITs have an 
impact.137 
 
The last fifteen years of empirical studies provide a relatively ambiguous conclusion with 
respect to the impact of BITs on FDI.  Sachs and Sauvant attribute this divergence to a number 
of possible factors.  Namely, the poor quality of bilateral FDI stock and flow information, the 
nature or type of FDI (where the effect of BITs on location decisions differs by sector), the 
difficulty separating out the causal effect of BITs from the causal effect of other factors such as 
regulatory changes and differences in the strength and effectiveness of BITs (reflecting the 
                                               
135Swenson, Deborah. 2005.  ‘Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITs?’.  U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy.   
136Yackee, Jason.  2007. ‘Do BITs Really Work?:  Revisiting the Empirical Link Between Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct 
Investment’.  Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1054. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Law School.   
137 Aisbett, Emma. 2007.  ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment:  Correlation versus Causation’CUDARE 
Working Paper 1032. Berkeley. University of California.  
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North American vs European model where the liberalizing effect of the North American 
model can have a greater impact in opening previously closed sectors of the economy to FDI).  
They also highlight the importance of economic factors in creating an environment favourable 
to FDI and how their impact will be felt irrespective of whether a BIT has been signed.138   
 
While the majority of studies point in the direction of a positive impact, enough questions are 
raised about the quality of data, the direction of the causal link and differences in 
methodology to suggest a weak or ambiguous outcome. 
 
Review of empirical evidence regarding the impact of PTIAs on FDI 
 
Because they are a more recent phenomena than BITs, PTIAs which include comprehensive 
investment provisions have not been analyzed extensively with a view to establishing their 
impact on FDI.  Additionally, a number of these agreements have been negotiated between 
developed countries and therefore the goal of increasing investment may be secondary to 
other more important trade related objectives.  Having said that, a number of studies have 
considered this issue in the last decade and found a consistently positive impact of PTIAs on 
FDI. 
 
A World Bank study published in 2005, while confirming ‘the importance of traditional 
determinants in attracting FDI’ also went on to conclude that  PTIAs that create larger 
markets also ‘attract more FDI’ such that ‘the interaction between the establishment of a PTIA 
and the resulting enlarged market is ‘significant and positively related to FDI’.   This was not 
the case with countries with small markets, nor did the study find that PTIAs could act as 
substitutes for a poor investment climate 139  A 2006 study which looked at the specific 
provisions of these agreements, by Lesher and Miroudot (2006) found that agreements with 
substantive investment provisions were ‘positively related to both trade and net positive FDI 
flows’.140  
 
A 2009 UNCTAD report looks at early ‘black box’ econometric studies on the impact of PTIAs 
on FDI (studies which consider whether or not a membership within a PTIA had an impact on 
                                               
138 Sachs, Lisa and Karl P. Sauvant. 2009. ‘ BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview’ in: Sachs, Lisa and Karl P. Sauvant. 2009. 
The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Invesment:  Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment 
Flows. Oxford University Press 
139 World Bank (2005). Global Economic Prospects.  Trade, Regionalism and Development.  Washington, D.C. World Bank. as 
quoted in 139 UNCTAD – Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2008-June 2009) p 79 
140 Lesher, M. and Miroudot, S. (2006). Analysis of the economic impact of investment provisions in regional trade agreements.  
OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 36. Paris. OECD. as quoted in 140 UNCTAD – Recent Developments in International 
Investment Agreements (2008-June 2009) p 89 
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FDI, rather than the actual content of the investment provisions), as well as later studies 
which actually analysed the provisions of these agreements and their impact on FDI.  In both 
cases the UNCTAD report suggests that ‘there appears to be consensus in the literature that 
PTIAs lead to further FDI inflows, including in developing countries that are members of 
PTIAs.’141  The UNCTAD report also considered a review of ‘black  box’ studies undertaken by 
Te Velde and Bezemer which concludes that ‘the majority of studies found that most PTIAs 
increased FDI flows from third countries and in some cases also intraregional FDI.’142 
 
b. Do investment agreements protect investors? 
 
Enforcement as evidence 
 
In an effort to understand the degree to which IIAs have achieved their stated goals, it is 
important to consider whether they have been successful at protecting investors.  One simple 
measure of this is to look at the extent to which they are being enforced.   
 
Since 2002 there has been an explosion in the number of investor state dispute settlement 
cases.  While only a few cases were filed between the 1970s-1990s, ‘by the end of 2007, 290 
known International treaty-based arbitration cases had been initiated.’143   The total number 
of treaty–based investor-state dispute settlement cases reached 514 by end of 2012.  Of these 
314 were filed under the ICSID144 Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, 131 
under UNCITRAL145 rules, 27 under the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce ( SCC), and eight 
with the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).146 
 
To date 95 governments have faced arbitration – 61 developing countries, 18 developed and 
16 economies in transition.  There were 244 concluded cases by the end of 2012 with 42% 
decided in favour of the state, 31% in favour of the investor and another 27% settled, with 
limited public availability of the settlement terms.  Argentina tops the list of most claims with 
                                               
141 UNCTAD – Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2008-June 2009) p xiv 
142 Te Velde, D.W. and Bezemer, D. (2004). Regional integration and foreign direct investment in developing countries.  Overseas 
Development Institute, mimeo. as quoted in 142 UNCTAD – Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2008-
June 2009) p 78 
143Sachs, Lisa and Karl P. Sauvant. 2009. ‘ BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview’ in: Sachs, Lisa and Karl P. Sauvant. 2009. 
The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Invesment:  Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment 
Flows. Oxford University Press P xxxix  
144 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
145 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
146 UNCTAD. May 2012. Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement.  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf  
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52147, Venezuela second with 34, Ecuador third with 23, Mexico fourth with 21, Czech 
Republic fifth with 20 followed by Canada with 19 and Egypt with 17.148 
 
Salacuse and Sullivan consider this issue in their 2005 study.  Based on a review of BIT 
provisions and their mechanism for enforcement as well as cases/disputes that have arisen 
under these agreements the authors conclude ‘that BITs have achieved their first goal of 
fostering investment protection.”149   
 
While there is much support for the claim that IIAs protect investors there is growing concern 
that the increase in disputes and the nature of these challenges, specifically their interference 
in the sovereign sphere of domestic policy regulation, need to be better understood and 
addressed.  This is core to the aim of this research and is addressed further at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
Investor awareness 
 
In the context of whether IIAs protect investors, it is interesting therefore to consider to what 
extent investors take these agreements into account when making an investment decision.   
There is not a lot of empirical evidence on this issue and many differences in the 
interpretation of available survey information.   
 
A 2009 UNCTAD report claims that ‘the possibility that BITs impact on FDI flows into 
developing countries is confirmed by investor surveys according to which BITS – and other 
IIAs – are important to transnational corporations (TNCs) in terms of investment protection 
and enhancing stability and predictability for FDI projects.’150  
 
This survey and its conclusions have been criticized by Poulsen (2010) and Sachs (2009) for 
the small sample size of the feedback and the possibility that some executives questioned may 
have overestimated the importance of these agreements ‘in order to encourage the granting 
of such further protections international investment agreements may offer them’. 151   
 
                                               
147 The 48 claims against Argentina have arisen as a result of emergency measures taken by the Argentine government following 
their financial crisis of 2001 
148 UNCTAD. May 2012. Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement.  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf 
149 Salacuse, jeswald W. and Nicholas P. Sullivan.  2005.  ‘Do BITs Really Work:: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Their Grand Bargain.’ Harvard International Law Journal, 46: 67-129.  
150 UNCTAD (2007b) Worldwide survey of foreign affiliates.  Occasional Note. Geneva. 5 November) in UNCTAD The Role of 
International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries 2009 p. xiv 
151 Lisa Sachs, “Bilateral investment treaties and FDI flows.”  World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) 
Newsletter 5 (2009), footnote 5 
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In a very recent contribution to the 2009/2010 Yearbook on International Investment Law 
and Policy, Poulsen looked at the evidence that BITs attract investment by serving as risk-
mitigating instruments from the perspective of investors and political risk insurance 
providers.  He states that the qualitative and quantitative evidence argues against the direct 
or indirect importance of BITs in attracting investment.152 
 
Specifically on the issue of investor awareness he found that ‘the few surveys that do ask 
about BITs appear to support the conclusion that they are not a particularly important factor 
in the establishment phase for the vast majority of foreign investors’ and further that ‘many 
investors are not aware that a BIT is in place at the time of considering an investment, and 
indeed investors remain oblivious until some issue arises when its provisions may be 
relevant’153  
 
Sachs and Sauvant also make the point that the extent to which investors are aware of IIAs 
and are influenced in their investment decisions by the existence of a IIAs is informative.  
According to the authors a June 2007 EIU survey of 602 MNE executives worldwide showed 
that international investment agreements had very low levels of influence on investment 
decisions.  A 2005 World Bank report also demonstrated that many investors were not even 
aware of the existence of investment agreement when making their investment decisions.154  
 
Political risk insurance agency practice  
 
While investors seem to take these agreements into account only in the context of a particular 
dispute, and therefore after they have made their investment decision, it is interesting to 
consider the position taken by political risk insurance agencies.  The main purpose of these 
agencies is to provide insurance against political risk for multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
undertaking FDI in high risk countries and as such one would expect them to take into 
consideration the existence of IIAs which serve a similar purpose.  As Poulsen’s research 
shows, except for in rare circumstances, this is not actually the case.155  
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He argues that many of the risks that are covered through political risk insurance are also 
covered by BITs. These include ‘uncompensated expropriation, breaches of contract, 
restrictions on repatriation of profits and damages due to political violence.’  Given this point 
Poulsen argues that it ‘would only be natural if they took BITs into account when assessing 
the risk of investment projects’.  His findings however do not support this hypothesis.  While 
PRI is often provided by governments, very few countries take the approach of Germany 
which ‘makes investment insurance contingent on the adoption of BITs’.156 
 
The World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), represents according to 
Poulsen ‘the most important public investment insurance program’.  He found that while BITs 
were relevant to MIGA’s underwriting process, they were just one of 57 factors which were 
considered in determining underwriting premium rates.  Interviews with MIGA officials 
suggested that ‘BITs were of marginal importance within MIGA, and of no practical 
importance when covering political risks’.157 
 
‘The conclusion arising from this review is therefore remarkable:  BITs are basically aimed at 
reducing the risk of investing abroad, but the vast majority of public and private agencies that 
price the risk of foreign investments rarely take them into account to any serious extent’158 
 
c. Do investment agreements contribute to the liberalization of international 
investment? 
 
Finally there is the question of whether IIAs achieve the goal of liberalizing investment.  The 
main goal here has been to ‘facilitate the entry and operation of these investments by 
inducing host countries to remove various impediments in their regulatory systems.’159  As 
discussed earlier, this is driven by the nature of investment provisions, both in terms of 
breadth and depth, as well as the extent to which protections are imposed before or after the 
establishment of the investment.  This is where the North American liberalization model 
differs from the old European protection model outlined.  As Salacuse and Sullivan explain, 
because most BITs protect investments at post-establishment phase and admit investments 
only in conformity with their laws, they have not been effective in achieving this goal.160  This 
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difference has narrowed in recent years with the convergence of approaches towards the 
broader breadth and scope of the North American model as seen in the recent EU-Columbia, 
EU-Chile and EU-Canada investment negotiations.161 
 
d. The continued relevance of IIAs? 
 
This section has attempted to look at the relevance and effectiveness of IIAs.  While we have 
outlined the original intent and rationale for these agreements, namely protection, promotion 
and liberalization, the actual empirical evidence seems to suggest that they are perhaps not as 
important as would be expected.   
 
There is some evidence that IIAs effectively protect investments if one considers the content 
of provisions and growing use of the dispute settlement enforcement mechanism.  BITs seem 
to have a weak or ambiguous impact on the promotion of investment into developing 
countries, or rather are not a primary determinant of FDI.  There appears to be a potentially 
more significant impact on FDI when investment provisions are included as part of a PTIA.  It 
is worth noting however that there is only a very limited amount of research which has 
looked at this issue compared to the analysis done on BITs.  On the issue of whether IIAs help 
liberalize investment, the post-establishment nature of the commitments contained in the 
vast majority of IIAs would suggest that they have not been very successful at achieving this 
goal. 
 
International investors do not appear to take them into account when making their 
investment decisions, although they do recognize their value once a dispute arises.  Finally, 
while political risk insurance agencies do not appear to consider them when setting their risk 
premium rates, such a practice would seem to make intuitive sense.  The evidence above begs 
the question:  Are IIAs really all that relevant? 
 
The fact remains that there has been a proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements on 
investment and with worldwide levels of investment expected to reach $1.8 Trillion by 
2015162, these agreements are arguably relevant to the overall trade and investment system.  
Furthermore, their impact on the political and regulatory autonomy of countries that sign 
                                               
161European Commission website, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=973 .  Additionally Canada concluded updated BITs with the Czeck and Slovak 
Republics and Lativia in 2012 and 2011 respectively.  The EU is currently in negotiations towards Free Trade Agreements with 
both the US and Canada which have substantial North American style investment provisions.  Finally, the EU is involved in the 
negotiations on investment under the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) of which the US, Canada and Mexico are sure to have an 
influence. 
162 UNCTAD World Investment Prospects Survey 2013-2015 
                   56 of 245 
them seems to be growing, driven by the increasing use of their unique enforcement 
mechanism.  It is to the issue of enforcement and the ISDS that we will now turn. 
 
4. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
As Salacuse and Sullivan aptly point out, ‘according a private party the right to bring an action 
in an international tribunal against a sovereign country with respect to an investment dispute 
is a revolutionary innovation that now seems to be taken for granted.’  It is unique in the field 
of international trade law.163  This section will look briefly at the history of investor-state 
dispute settlement provisions, how they work in practice and recent trends which are causing 
concern amongst policy makers, academics and NGOs.  
 
a. History of investor-state arbitration 
 
As previously mentioned, historically international investment disputes were settled through 
diplomacy or in rare cases through the intervention of states.  Claims were brought on behalf 
of investors by their home states with investors maintaining very little control.  More 
importantly, host states themselves could refuse to consent to international adjudication.164  
The use of diplomatic protection165 in resolving investment disputes evolved outside the 
colonial relationships of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century’s, which 
themselves benefited from political and military control as well as extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.166  According to Newcombe and Paradell, ‘the existence of extraterritorial 
regimes in Asia and the Far East, but not in Latin America, explains why Latin American states 
are the source of almost all early jurisprudence and cases on diplomatic protection.’167 
 
Numerous attempts by capital exporting states to reach an international consensus on the 
issue of whether ‘foreign nationals and their property were entitled, under customary 
international law, to a minimum standard of treatment’ and belief that the ‘expropriation of 
property required compensation’ met consistently with opposition from capital importing 
countries.168  This opposition crystallized in the adoption of the Calvo Doctrine by many 
developing countries, which asserted that foreign nationals should receive no better 
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treatment than host country nationals.   This polarization of views has been behind the 
numerous failed attempts by capital exporting states to establish multilateral rules on 
investment backed by an effective enforcement mechanism.  The 1929 Draft Convention on 
the Treatment of Foreigners, a joint effort between the League of Nations and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) was the first to fail due to concerns over a broad 
commitment in the area of national treatment.169  The Havana Charter of 1948, a multilateral 
investment code proposed for the International Trade Organization after the Second World 
War was also unsuccessful. 170  
 
In 1959 the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad introduced the concept 
of a modern day investor-state dispute settlement provision.  Once again it failed and was 
subsumed into the 1967 Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
proposed Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.  While this later agreement 
failed it formed the basis of many early European BITs.171   
 
Institutions and procedures for international investment arbitration 
 
Prior and following WWll the use of international arbitration became commonplace in the 
settling of international investment disputes.  These arbitrations generally arose as a result of 
the ‘cancellation or nationalization of oil concessions’ and where created with the consent of 
host and home countries following the emergence of a dispute.172  This growing use of 
international arbitration and difficulties with the enforcement of awards, led to the 
ratification of The New York Convention in 1958 with the goal of restricting the ‘grounds 
upon which local courts may refuse to recognize and enforce awards.’173  As Newcombe and 
Paradell point out, one important aspect of the Convention is that it ‘makes respect of 
arbitration agreements a treaty obligation.’174 
 
Another key step in the ‘international legal framework for foreign investment protection’ was 
the establishment within the World Bank of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1965.175  Its goal was the ‘impartial settlement of 
international investment disputes’ within a neutral environment.176  ICSID, while not a 
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permanent tribunal, provides the ‘legal and organizational framework’ for the disputes 
arising between investors and host states.  It is the primary choice of arbitral body for the 
settlement of disputes alongside other bodies offering ad hoc arbitral proceedings such as the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC) and the International Chamer of Commerce (ICC).    
The New York Convention and ICSID Convention work together to ‘supply an institutional 
structure and procedural paradigm for investor-state arbitration and to authorize the 
recognition and enforcement of awards by domestic courts.’177 
 
Trends in arbitration 
 
As noted previously, investor-state claims have grown exponentially in the last ten years.  At 
the same time a number of trends characterize the more recent investor-state arbitration.  
These include the growing number and size of arbitral awards and the financial burden this is 
creating for developing countries, the phenomena of conflicting awards by arbitral tribunals 
and a growing scepticism amongst developing countries leading to their withdrawal from the 
international investment system.  Underlying all of this is the ongoing concern about the 
impact of IIAs on state autonomy resulting from the nature of arbitration claims which 
challenge government regulatory measures as well as the interpretive freedom given to 
arbitral tribunals.   
 
Sachs and Sauvant note that in 2006 and 2007 a number of awards to investors exceeded 
US$10 million which suggests that the size of awards may be increasing.178  Concerns in 
general about the cost of arbitration are driven by both the size of the awards as well as the 
costs of defending the state. 179 Most recently in 2012 ‘the highest known award of damages in 
the history of investment treaty arbitration featured in Occidental v. Ecuador ll where the 
investor was awarded US$1.77 billion plus pre and post award interest’180   This is not a new 
trend and has been an issue of some concern for a number of years.  Gottwald (2005) 
identifies what he sees as the top three barriers for developing nations participation in the 
international investment arbitration process: ‘a lack of affordable access to legal expertise, a 
lack of transparency in the arbitration process, and uncertainty over the meaning of key 
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treaty rights.’181  On average the cost of an arbitration case is upwards of US$8 million per 
party with legal fees making up 82% of this cost.182 
 
Of additional concern is the trend ‘towards divergent interpretations of treaty obligations’ 
which has led to conflicting awards.183  This issue was raised by Van Harten (2007) as one of 
two worrying aspects of the existing system, namely ‘its invitation to forum-shopping by 
investors and, by implication, its vulnerability to the troubling outcome of conflicting 
awards’.184   Van Harten highlights the case of CME Czech Republic v Czech Republic by way of 
example, in which an arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of the investor under the Netherlands-
Czech Republic BIT and ordered the Czech government to pay $353USD million ten days after 
a parallel hearing saw a tribunal dismiss the same claim brought under the Czech-United 
States BIT.185  Of equal significance was that the award of $353USD million in this case ‘was 
roughly equal to the country’s entire health-care budget.’186 
 
There is a growing concern that developing countries, particularly in Latin America, may be 
feeling that the burdens of investment agreements (in terms of financial costs and loss of 
autonomy) outweigh the benefits and this may lead to scepticism and provide an incentive for 
them to withdraw both from the ICSID convention, as well as to renege on their 
agreements.187 A 2009 UNCTAD report highlights the fact that ‘2008 saw the denunciation of 
11 BITs.’ Ecuador alone denounced nine BITs, mainly with neighbouring Latin American 
countries.  The report speculates that perceived effects of BITS on developing countries’ 
economic development as well as issues of compatibility with domestic laws may play a 
role.188  To date Bolivia (in 2007), Ecuador (in 2010) and Venezuela (in 2012) have all 
withdrawn from the ICSID Convention and Argentina has announced its intention to do so as 
well.189  Perhaps of most concern has been the perceived impact of IIAs on the regulatory 
autonomy of states as a result of the threat of investor-state dispute settlement challenges to 
government measures in the area of health, safety and the environment. 
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5. CONCERNS ABOUT REGULATORY CHILL 
 
As discussed previously the 1994 negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement’s 
(NAFTA) Chapter 11 on investment represented the first time that such a sophisticated 
investment protection agreement had been negotiated between developed countries.  
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 also served to highlight the concerns of civil society and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) regarding the rights granted under the agreement, which 
were seen as giving foreign investors rights that unduly constrained national policy 
autonomy, especially in the areas of health, safety and environmental regulation.  More 
specifically, the private access to international arbitration provided for in Chapter 11 resulted 
in unprecedented challenges to Mexican, Canadian and US regulatory measures in these 
sensitive areas by private investors, addressing what they perceived as regulatory takings.190  
This in turn raised concerns that these challenges could lead to regulatory chill191, as 
governments curtailed or amended their regulatory initiatives in an effort to avoid multi-
million dollar lawsuits. This view was further reinforced by the increasing number of 
investor-state dispute challenges arising within emerging market countries under bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs).192  At the same time, discussions were underway to negotiate a 
multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) under the auspices of the OECD, further 
escalating concerns.  Among the NGO community at the time and in the public press, the MAI 
became known as ‘NAFTA on Steroids’.193 
 
a. Early NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges on HSE regulation 
 
The academic community at the time of the ratification of NAFTA Chapter 11 was aware of 
the potential that the regulatory environment might come under the influence of private 
investors.  Neumayer describes how private investors might use ISDS provisions ‘to knock 
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down existing environmental regulations or to deter countries from enacting future 
environmental regulations which they regard as an undue encroachment into their rights as a 
foreign investor.’ 194  It was the early NAFTA Chapter 11 cases beginning in 1997 which have 
frequently been touted as examples of challenges to government regulatory measures which 
raised the spectre of regulatory chill in the areas of health, safety and the environment.  As 
noted by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) in 1999, it is ‘the 
unexpectedly broad and aggressive use of this process to challenge public policy and public 
welfare measures, including environmental measures in about half the known cases today, 
that has caught governments and observers off guard.  As a consequence, the provisions 
designed to ensure security and predictability for the investors have now created uncertainty 
and unpredictability for environmental (and other) regulators’.195   
 
These early cases included Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada and Methanex 
Corporation v. Government of the United States which involved challenges to regulations 
dealing with the ban of gasoline additives MMT and MTBE respectively, Metalclad Corp v. 
Government of Mexico involving a ban on the export of PCB waste and S. D. Meyers v. 
Government of Canada involving the granting of a permit for the operation of a waste 
management facility.  Together they reflected combined claims for compensation of 
approximately US$1.4 billion and resulted in awards or settlements to private investors in 
three of the four cases worth approximately US$35 million.  Also of relevance however in 
these early cases have been the issue of the legitimacy of government regulatory measures 
and the extent to which this question of legitimacy has impacted both the outcome of the 
cases and the issue of government regulatory autonomy. 
 
Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada 
In April 1997 the Government of Canada passed Bill C-29 banning the import and inter-
provincial trade, though not the use of unleaded gasoline additive and fuel efficiency 
enhancing octane booster methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT). The ban 
was justified by the Canadian Government for health reasons given concerns over manganese 
oxides in tailpipe emissions and possible interference with on-board diagnostic systems, 
though not on the basis of clear scientific evidence. 196 Ethyl Corporation, a US company and 
the sole producer of MMT filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim for USD$347 million in 
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compensation for what it argued were measures tantamount to expropriation197.  At the same 
time that this was unfolding, a number of Canadian provinces successfully challenged the act 
as a violation of the Federal-Provincial agreement on internal trade.  The Government of 
Canada settled the NAFTA claim in July 1998, lifting the ban and paying close to US$13 million 
in compensation.198  While this case appears to be the poster child for regulatory chill, a 
number of factors are worth taking into consideration.  First at the time of award, the 
Government of Canada issued a statement claiming there was no scientific evidence that MMT 
provided a health risk.  Furthermore the ban seemed to originate from pressures by both the 
automobile industry concerned about the impact on diagnostic systems and the Canadian 
agricultural industry anxious to promote the use of ethanol as a fuel additive substitute and 
domestic alternative to MMT. 199  
 
Metalclad Corp v. Government of Mexico  
 
In July 1997, Metalclad a US company filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against the Government 
of Mexico seeking US$96 million in compensation for the seizure of its hazardous waste site in 
Guadalcazar, action it deemed ‘tantamount to expropriation’ of its assets as well as a violation 
of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ as guaranteed under Articles 1101 and 1105 of NAFTA.  
Metalclad claimed it had federal government approval for the creation of a hazardous waste 
confinement unit after it purchased an existing industrial waste site owned by the Mexican 
company Coterin.  The local government had however refused to grant the necessary permits 
and argued that the clean-up of the existing site had not been done to the desired level.200  In 
addition, prior to the seizure, the Governor signed an executive order decreeing a protected 
natural reserve which encompassed Metalclad’s facility site, with the purpose of protecting a 
large variety of cactus species.201  In 2000, the tribunal ruled in favour of the claimant, 
requiring the Government of Mexico to pay $US17 million in compensation for expenses.  
There has been much debate regarding the true intentions of the local Government and the 
possibility that its actions were driven more by a desire to respond to local resident 
resistance ‘acting in classic NIMBY (not in my back yard) fashion’, than efforts to project 
biodiversity.  This belief has been supported by the lack of subsequent action by the local 
government toward the fulfilment of its ecological decree and the findings of two 
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international tribunals which ‘have concluded that secretive and deceptive political decisions 
to mollify NIMBY feelings violated international norms.’202 
 
S. D. Meyers v. Government of Canada 
 
In July 1998, S.D. Myers Inc, a US company issued a Notice of Intent for a Chapter 11 
arbitration against the Government of Canada seeking US$10 million in compensation for the 
temporary ban on the export of PCB waste to the US.  S. D. Myers claimed that the Canadian 
Government’s ban was driven by a desire ‘to protect Canada’s domestic PCB destruction 
company Chem-Securities of Swan Hill, Alberta’ and not by reasons of environmental 
protection.203  The Canadian Environment Minister had previously been quite vocal about this 
issue including her July 1995 response to a parliamentary question in which she declared 
‘that ‘the handling of Canada’s PCBs should be done in Canada by Canadians.’’204  The 
Government of Canada argued that S.D. Myers did not have a valid investment in Canada and 
therefore that the case should be thrown out for lack of jurisdiction.  In November 2000 the 
NAFTA tribunal ruled in favour of S. D. Myers and awarded compensation of CAN $6.05 
million.  The tribunal found that the Government of Canada had breached Article 1102 of 
NAFTA on National Treatment by not affording S. D. Myers the same treatment it afforded its 
own nationals in like circumstances.  With respect to the intent of the Canadian Government 
in imposing the PCB bans, the tribunal argued that these ‘were intended primarily to protect 
the Canadian PCB disposal industry from U.S. competition.  CANADA produced no convincing 
witness testimony to rebut the thrust of the documentary evidence.  The tribunal finds that 
there was no legitimate environmental reason for introducing the ban.’205 
 
Methanex Corporation v. Government of the United States 
 
In March 1999 the Governor of California instructed the California environmental agencies 
through executive order to develop a timetable aimed at eliminating methyl teriary butyl 
ether (MTBE) from gasoline no later than December 2002.  This was a result of concerns over 
the appearance of trace amounts of the substance in California groundwater and a 
commissioned report by the University of California which highlighted the risk of 
contamination to ground water and the potential cancer causing properties of the 
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substance.206  Methanex, a Canadian company issued a Notice of Intent for a Chapter 11 suit in 
June 1999 seeking US$970 million for the ban, which it argued amounted to an expropriation 
of its business.  Methanex disputed claims that MTBE was a human carginogen arguing that if 
used properly it posed no hazards.  Similar to the Ethyl Corporation case, Methanex felt that 
the justification for the ban on health reasons was not supported by sufficient scientific 
evidence and that protectionist issues with respect to the domestic Ethanol industry played a 
role in the government’s decision.207 In the end the NAFTA tribunal found in favour of the 
government, rejecting each of Methanex’s claims on the merits and dismissed the claim due to 
lack of jurisdiction, denying compensation for the claimant.  The tribunal saw the ban on 
MTBE as a good faith policy ‘grounded in reasonable scientific concern about the difficulty of 
cleaning up MTBE contamination of groundwater’, and with no intent to either ‘harm the 
methanol industry or benefit the ethanol industry.’208  Following these developments in 
California, numerous other US states followed suit by banning MTBE, reflecting similar 
environmental contamination concerns.209   
 
The role of legitimacy 
 
While the early years of NAFTA Chapter 11 resulted in an unprecedented number of investor-
state challenges to government regulatory measures in the area of health, safety and the 
environment and raised concerns among public policy makers and HSE advocates about the 
prospects of regulatory chill, the details and outcomes of the cases suggest that this concern 
might have been premature.  This is particularly the case if one considers the issue of 
legitimacy and the extent to which governments might use HSE regulations,‘210as a cover for 
protectionism’ as well as the consideration given issues of legitimacy by arbitral tribunals  
The issue of legitimacy relates to the issue of regulatory independence versus political 
accountability as well as the appropriateness of independent regulation with respect to social 
decisions versus strictly economic based decisions.211  If one considers the two cases 
launched against the Government of Canada (Ethyl Corp and S. D. Myers), it has been argued 
that in each case ‘the challenged environmental measure had no demonstrable environmental 
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merit under Canadian law or policy, and was quickly rescinded.’212  In a similar fashion, the 
actions of the Mexican Government with respect to waste facility sites including that owned 
by Metalclad, point to the use of environmental protection measures as a means of addressing 
community concerns regarding controversial yet not necessarily harmful projects.213   
 
Finally, the Methanex case confirms that NAFTA tribunals will find in favour of governments 
which impose legitimate environmental measures aimed at protecting citizens when 
underscored by scientific evidence.214  The Methanex case is also interesting  with respect to 
the issue of regulatory chill.  The Government of California’s decision to ban MTBE came 
before the settlement in the Ethyl case which also dealt with the ban of a gasoline additive.  
Furthermore, despite the Chapter 11 suit filed by Methanex, a number of other U.S. states 
instigated their own bans on MTBE, demonstrating a lack of deterrence.215  The issue of 
legitimacy is however complicated by the ‘multiple factors influencing a government’ 
including the many private interest groups as well as the role played by science and the 
weight given to decisions based on the precautionary principle.216  
 
b. Recent NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges and beyond 
The enormous increase in the number of IIAs in recent times and a second wave of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 cases dealing with health, safety and environmental issues together with other 
high profile BIT challenges have given rise to new concerns about regulatory chill.  Sachs and 
Sauvant are among those that have highlighted the fact that the exploding landscape of IIAs 
can serve to ‘limit the regulatory flexibility of host countries to pursue not only economic 
development policies but other public policies as well.”217  These recent cases, aimed 
predominantly at Canada touch on issues such as a ban on the sale and use of pesticides with 
Chemtura Corp. v. Government of Canada (award in 2010) and Dow AgroScience LLC v. 
Government of Canada (award in 2011), natural resource regulation with Abitibi Bowater Inc. 
v. Government of Canada (award 2010), a moratorium on hydraulic fracking with Lone Pine 
Resources Inc. v. Government of Canada (notice of intent 2012) and food and drug intellectual 
property regulations with Eli Lilly & Company v. Government of Canada (notice of intent 
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2012).  While a number of these cases remain on-going, mixed results in awards to date have 
led to public debate and concerns about regulatory autonomy.  A further inspection of the 
facts of the cases however, suggest that they should not be cause for concern.   
 
The CAN$130 million dollar settlement paid by the Government of Canada in 2011 to Abitibi 
Bowater is held in contrast to its victory in both the Dow AgroScience and Chemtura cases.  
Abitibi Bowater’s claim arose out of the Province of Newfoundland’s measures to return 
water use and timber rights to the crown and to expropriate lands associated with hydro 
rights.  The company claimed that these ‘arbitrary’ and ‘discriminatory’ measures resulted in 
the expropriation of Abitibi Bowater’s investment in the province ‘including their property 
and facilities’ denying appropriate compensation and the ‘usual appropriate judicial avenues 
of redress’.218  While civil society groups such as The Council of Canadians were quick to 
suggest this ‘effectively privatized Canada's water by allowing foreign investors to assert a 
proprietary claim to water permits and even water in its natural state’,219 a more measured 
perspective has been that this case reflects the proper functioning of the investment 
provisions and that the measures taken by the Newfoundland Government were truly 
discriminatory and egregious. In the case of Dow AgroScience it was the Government of 
Quebec ban of the commercial lawn pesticide additive 2,4-D which led to a NAFTA Chapter 11 
challenge by the US company seeking CAN$2 million in compensation.  The case was settled, 
the measure upheld and no compensation provided to the investor.  The award in the Dow 
AgroScience case, it is argued ‘stands as a strong confirmation that legitimate regulatory 
conduct does not significantly conflict with a state’s investment treaty obligations.’220  
Furthermore the period following the launch of the Dow AgroScience case also saw five 
Canadian provinces also institute their own bans of the pesticide additive 2,4-D221.   
 
At the same time high profile challenges by Philip Morris International to tobacco control 
regulations in Australia through the Hong Kong-Australia BIT and to tobacco health warnings 
in Uruguay through the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT have moved concerns about the impact on 
government regulatory autonomy beyond North America.222   
 
                                               
218Abitibi Bowater Inc. v. Government of Canada – Notice of Intent, April 2009. http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/AbitibiBowater.aspx?lang=eng  
219 Council of Canadians website, March 2011 - AbitibiBowater NAFTA settlement has privatized Canadian water, trade committee 
hears: http://www.canadians.org/media/trade/2011/08-Mar-11.html  
220 Moloo, Rahim and Justin Jacinto argue in Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment Treaties 
in the Berkeley Journal of International Law (2011:29:1), p.63 
221 In addition to Quebec’s cosmetic pesticde ban which led to the 2008 NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute by DowAgroScience, the 
provinces of Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island have all banned the use of 2,4-D and the province of 
Alberta also prohits the chemical in pesticide and herbicide mixtures according the the David Suzuki Foundation and Equiterre 
2001 report ‘Pesticide Free? Oui! Found at:  
http://www.davidsuzuki.org/publications/downloads/2011/Bilan_reglementations_pesticides_2011_EN_VF.pdf 
222 These cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 6 
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The impact of a ‘threat’ of an IIA ISDS dispute 
 
It is frequently claimed that the simple ‘threat of IIA litigation’ can have a chilling impact on 
government regulation.  Kyla Tienhaara looks at a number of cases involving developing 
countries where she claims the threat of a BIT challenge led to the chilling of regulation.  She 
considers four mining related cases where a threat of arbitration had an impact on local 
environmental regulation and resulted in a possible chilling in Ghana, Indonesia and Costa 
Rica. 
 
The first case involved the Government of Indonesia establishing a forestry law banning open 
pit mining in protected areas because of alleged concerns regarding its environmental 
impacts.  A number of companies which held existing contracts for the development of such 
mines threatened the government with international arbitration under investment treaties 
held by their parent companies, due to concerns that the prohibition would result in a form of 
expropriation.  In the end a number of companies received exemptions from the ban.223  In the 
case of Ghana, the government established a moratorium on mining activities in Ghana’s 
protected forests in 1996 despite the fact that a number of mining companies had already 
undertaken substantial exploration activity and were interested in proceeding further.  In the 
wake of potential threats of arbitration, the government ‘allowed five companies to carry out 
mine operations within the forests, subject to specific environmental guidelines.’224  Finally, 
she highlights two cases in Costa Rica, one involving open pit mining and the other offshore 
oil exploration.  The first involved threats of arbitration by a Canadian company facing 
difficulty with environmental approvals following a moratorium on open pit mining, but was 
eventually allowed to develop its mine.  The second involved a US company which had a 
number of its land concessions annulled and also encountered difficulties receiving 
environmental approvals.  Its ISDS claim was eventually withdrawn.225   
 
While the cases outlined by Tienhaara highlight examples of the threat of arbitration 
potentially leading to changes or exemptions from environmental regulations, they also raise 
a number of important questions.  Were these environmental measures legitimate?  To what 
extent was the threat of ISDS simply cases of BITs serving their purpose and investors taking 
advantage of the provisions to address the negative impact of random policies or an ever 
changing regulatory environment in countries with weak institutions?  More broadly, is most 
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of the evidence of regulatory chill strictly anecdotal and too difficult to measure?  Finally, 
rather than a case by case anecdotal approach, is there a more systematic way to determine 
the impact of IIAs on government regulatory autonomy?  
 
Neumayer makes the case that evidence of regulatory chill or proof that environmental 
standards have not been raised, is virtually impossible to gather because it involves the 
collection of evidence of something that has not taken place.  He therefore claims that 
anecdotal evidence is most useful in determining the validity of a hypothesis of regulatory 
chill and goes on to give examples of chill in the traditional sense of the meaning. 226  Those 
scholars who have extended the meaning of regulatory chill to the case of IIAs and the impact 
of ISDS provisions approach the issue in a similar way, identifying anecdotal evidence of such 
a phenomena.  The most commonly used example of a threatened investor-state claim under 
NAFTA leading to the chilling of regulation is the case of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company’s 
lobbying of the Canadian Government in an effort to prevent the introduction of plain 
packaging legislation in 1994.  The company’s arguments to the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Health which was considering the issue, revolved around claims that such a 
policy ‘would constitute an illegal expropriation of its trademark’ and lead to a threat of 
NAFTA dispute for hundreds of millions in compensation. 227   In the end, while the Committee 
recommended the adoption of plain packaging despite the threat of litigation, the policy was 
not pursued and was eventually dropped.  David Schneiderman, who has written extensively 
on this issue, argues that the threat of a NAFTA Challenge was an influencing factor228 despite 
the fact that other factors played a role in the Government’s decisions, not least of which were 
the domestic legal challenges to existing tobacco control legislation which were deemed 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
Revival of concerns through recent trade and investment negotiations 
 
As outlined above, it is difficult to draw conclusions of regulatory chill from the outcome of 
cases to date however many argue that the mere existence of challenges to government 
measures or even the threat of such challenges is enough to raise concern.  Academic 
scholarship on the issue of regulatory chill has to date focussed on an analysis of IIA ISDS 
                                               
226 Neumayer, Eric. 2001. Greening Trade and Investment: Environmental Protection Without Protectionism. Earthscan 
Publications Limited. P. 69.  The traditional meaning of regulatory chill according to Neumayer is a situation where developed 
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Liberman with Glyn Ayres. Edward Elgar. p. 200-213  
228 Schneiderman, David. 2008. Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization:  Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise. 
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cases and their outcomes.  Despite lack of clear evidence or the existence of strictly anecdotal 
examples, popular opinion, health and environmental  advocates remain concerned.  In recent 
years the concern over the impact of IIAs and particularly the potential chilling impact of ISDS 
provisions have been brought to the fore by trade and investment negotiations towards the 
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the US-EU (TTIP) Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, the Canada-EU (CETA) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement as well 
as the recent completion of the Canada-China (FIPA) Foreign Investment Protection 
Agreement.  The US Government 2012 revision of its model (BIT) Bilateral Investment 
Treaty229 as well as current efforts by the US government to secure (TPA) Trade Promotion 
Authority or ‘Fast Track’ negotiating authority as it is commonly known, have also been a 
catalyst for the rehashing of concerns regarding the impact of IIAs. 
 
The key arguments tend to revolve around the belief that these agreements (IIAs) are unfair 
and biased against governments and the public and that negotiators are being led by 
corporate interests, that the ISDS tribunals which sit outside the jurisdiction of member states 
with no due process or openness and the fear that a successful claim or even the threat of a 
claim against a government regulatory measure could lead to the chilling of that measure. 
 
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
 
The negotiations towards a Trans Pacific Partnership comprising Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United 
States, and Vietnam has been attracting criticism from numerous popular press, civil society 
and legal quarters on the agreement’s investment provisions and inclusion of an ISDS 
mechanism. 
 
Perspectives from the popular press are personified by Mark Weisbrot’s Op-Ed in The 
Guardian on November 19 2013 in which he argued in the context of the Trans Pacific 
Partnership that ‘laws to protect the environment, food safety, consumers (from monopoly 
pricing) and other public interest concerns can now be traded away in ‘trade’ negotiations’.230  
Lori Wallach, director of US based Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch and a familiar figure on 
                                               
229After campaigning on a platform critical of international trade and investment agreements including NAFTA, the Obama 
administration launched a review of the US Model BIT in June 2009. Views were polarized between labour and environmental 
groups pressing for substantial changes particularly to the investor-state arbitration provisions and business groups looking for 
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increases in transparency, public participation and requirements for the exhaustion of local remedies among other things. Mark 
Kantor, ‘ The new US model BIT: not so very different from the old version’, Global Arbitration Review, April 20, 2012. 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30488/the-new-us-model-bit-not-so-different-old-version 
230 Mark Weisbrot, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership treaty is the complete opposite of ‘free trade’’, November 19, 2013 accessed 
November 22, 2013: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/19/trans-pacific-partnership-corporate-usurp-congress  
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the anti- globalization front calls the TPP ‘NAFTA on steroids’, the term formally coined for 
the failed OECD MAI negotiations of 1999.  In a January 2014 interview Wallach claimed that 
in the 20 years of NAFTA Chapter 11, over $400 million has been paid out under investor-
state law suits and that this is leading to a ‘chilling effect, because on average it costs $8–10 
million dollars to fight a Chapter 11 suit, and even if the country wins, it has to pay those 
costs.’231A petition sent to governments involved in the negotiation of the TPP and signed by a 
large number of respected jurists from Australia, New Zealand, the USA, Canada, Peru and 
Chile in May 2012 called for the rejection of the ISDS mechanism claiming that awards 
granted through investment chapters have demonstrated ‘overly expansive interpretations’ 
and that ‘some of these interpretations have prioritized the protection of the property and 
economic interests of transnational corporations over the right of states to regulate and the 
sovereign right of nations to govern their own affairs.’232   
 
(TTIP) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (US-EU) and (CETA) Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (Canada-EU) 
 
There has been opposition by civil society groups, parliamentarians and within the public 
press to the EU government’s negotiation of trade and investment agreements with both 
Canada (CETA) and the USA (TTIP) launched 2012 and 2013 respectively. 
 
A group of more than 100 civil society groups including social (Council of Canadians) aid 
(Oxfam), environment (Greenpeace) and labour (United Steelworkers) groups from Europe, 
Canada and the US signed a statement on November 25, 2013 calling for the investment 
chapter to be removed from the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
between the EU and Canada.  Among their claims were that the CETA would ‘strictly limit 
government regulation of services, investment, natural resources, environmental protection 
and public safety’ and that ‘the very presence of ISDS puts a ‘chill’ on environmental policy.’  
They argue that this is due to the absence of a screen for precautionary measures dealing with 
the environment, public health or resource conservation.  The statement goes on to ask ‘is it 
because Canada and the EU want to put a chill on effective climate policy?’233  A similar letter, 
signed by over 200 organisations across the US and EU was written to the US Trade 
Representative Ambassador Michael Froman and European Trade Commissioner Karel de 
Gucht in December 2013 expressing opposition to the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism in the 
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TTIP.234  A February 17 2014 editorial in the Financial Times describes how antitrade 
campaigners have seized on the ISDS provisions of the TTIP as a risk to country sovereignty.  
The editorial highlights that despite the existence of ISDS clauses for the last 50 years ‘this has 
been portrayed as a vehicle for increasingly aggressive multinationals to water down 
regulations and laws through arbitration.’235 
 
Canada-China Foreign Investment Protection Agreement 
 
The recent completion of the Canada-China Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA) 
similarly attracted an uproar following its September 2012 signing.  Views were voiced by 
legal scholars, civil society groups and the popular press.  Opponents of the agreement argued 
that China’s investors can ‘contest and bypass or be compensated regarding compliance with 
Canadian standards’236  or that the legal costs of investor state rulings are steep and that 
governments therefore faced incentives to avoid these liabilities such that they ‘might prefer 
to pull back from proposed decisions in closed-door discussions with the investor and his 
lawyers, rather than assume the cost and risks of litigating investor claims.’237   
 
Civil society groups and parliamentarians were equally vocal.  The Canadian Environmental 
Law Association in their comments in response to the Federal Government’s Final Strategic 
Environmental Assessment of the Canada-China FIPA argued that ‘environmental and 
sustainable development concerns from investment protection agreements include a 
regulatory chill on environmental protection measures as a result of the additional legal 
rights it grants to Chinese investors in Canada, including the right to sue for indirect 
expropriation.’  Furthermore the group claimed that ‘the threat of being sued for measures 
that limit the profits of foreign investors could reasonably deter governments from 
undertaking a wide array of legitimate environmental protection measures.’  As such the 
group called on the government to follow the lead of Australia and refuse to negotiate 
investment agreements with ISDS provisions.238   
 
Evoking the Australian Government’s position with respect to ISDS was a common theme 
with Parliamentarians and civil society groups concerned about regulatory chill.  Elizabeth 
May, the Green Party of Canada Member of Parliament in her submission on the Canada-China 
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FIPA Environmental Assessment hearing argued that ‘the chilling effect of the Ethyl 
Corporation and S.D. Myers (cases) were profound’ and that they ‘have resulted in failures of 
the Canadian government to regulate and/or ban toxic substances that they would have in the 
pre-Chapter 11 era.’239  The Council of Canadians, a long time vocal opponent of IIAs and ISDS 
provisions claims on their website that the Canada-China FIPA ‘will give Chinese firms in 
Canada and Canadian firms in China 31 years of ‘protection’ from environmental, human 
rights or resource conservation measures they don’t like.’  240 
 
Australia Government policy regarding ISDS 
 
Many opponents of IIAs and the rights bestowed on private investors point to the Australian 
government’s announcement that it would no longer include ISDS provisions in its 
investment treaty negotiations as a model approach for concerned governments. In the April 
2011 Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading Our Way to More Jobs and 
Prosperity, the Australian Government was clear that it would discontinue the inclusion of 
ISDS procedures in trade agreements because it could no longer ‘support provisions that 
would constrain the ability of the Australian Government to make laws on social, 
environmental and economic matters in circumstances where those laws do not discriminate 
between domestic and foreign businesses.’  The statement went on to confirm that the 
‘Government has not and will not accept provisions that limit its capacity to put health 
warnings or plain packaging requirements on tobacco products or its ability to continue the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.’241  Interestingly, however the Australian Government 
seems to have moved away from this position and reverted to a case by case assessment of 
the inclusion of ISDS.  At the conclusion of the Korea-Australia FTA (KAFTA) negotiations in 
December 2013, the government released a Key Outcomes fact sheet which confirmed that 
the FTA was to include an ISDS mechanism but that ‘the Government has ensured the 
inclusion of appropriate carve-outs and safeguards in important areas such as public welfare, 
health and the environment.’242  Furthermore as a negotiating party in the TPP, Australia will 
certainly feel pressure from countries such as Canada, US, Mexico and Peru to negotiate a 
comprehensive investment chapter including an ISDS mechanism. 
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c. The consensus on regulatory chill? 
While legal scholars, civil society groups and the public press continue to raise concerns 
about the potential chilling impact of IIAs and ISDS provisions, particularly under NAFTA 
Chapter 11, the majority of scholars have looked at the merits of IIA investment disputes and 
found little evidence of potential for regulatory chill beyond a handful of anecdotal examples 
in both developed and developing countries.  As Neumayer argues there has been little 
concrete evidence to support the claim for regulatory chill either with respect to 
internationally mobile capital or ISDS challenges under IIAs, however he allows that when 
anecdotal evidence is considered, the potential for chill exists and moreover the threat of an 
ISDS challenge, as Tienhaara has arguably demonstrated243, might have a greater impact than 
the actual cases reviewed.  Furthermore he argues that any actual impact from cases to date 
might take time to manifest, suggesting that trends in HSE regulations are likely to reflect any 
possible chilling impact only months or even years after they reach public consciousness244   
 
Beyond a case by case consideration of this question, a more fundamental approach for 
consideration of this issue seems necessary and represents a gap in research to date.  Coe and 
Rubins address this issue while questioning the rationale of what they term the regulatory 
chill thesis.   ‘The regulatory chill thesis is, of course, difficult to prove or disprove. First, it 
assumes that regulators are aware of international law, but are they?  On the one hand, it is 
likely that legislators often attempt to acquaint themselves with the international 
ramifications of contemplated measures likely to affect foreign enterprises.  Indeed, with the 
unprecedented public awareness of investor –state arbitration and the recent burgeoning of 
the associated docket, regulators may be more conscious of the prospect of liability than ever 
before.  Nevertheless, there is still no shortage of State action clearly uninformed by the 
dictates of international law.’245 
 
d. Addressing the gap on regulatory chill 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this research aims to probe and address concerns regarding the 
potential chilling impact of IIAS.  It aims to do so by addressing the gaps in empirical work 
done to date.  To date the empirical work has focussed on ISDS challenges and the outcomes 
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of individual cases as well as looking at anecdotal evidence of potential chill on the back of 
‘threats’ of investment arbitration.246  This research will focus on the issue of regulatory chill 
by looking at trends in HSE regulations and the role of ISDS disputes on the regulatory 
development process.  The assumption of this thesis is that if the regulatory chill hypothesis 
was to hold or to be considered a viable possible outcome of IIA legal challenges, we would 
expect to find a number of observable outcomes in regulator behaviour and regulatory trends.   
First, one would expect trends in HSE regulation to reflect this chilling impact (through a 
stagnant or weakening regulatory environment or through the degree of uptake in regulatory 
policy), particularly in policy areas where regulatory measures were challenged under IIAs.  
Second we would expect to find a level of awareness and understanding among HSE 
regulators about the existence and content of IIAs.  Any causal link between IIAs and 
regulatory chill would also need to demonstrate that beyond awareness, that IIAs have an 
influential role on regulators in the HSE regulatory development process. 
 
Expectation 1 – We would expect HSE regulatory trends to reflect regulatory chill through a stagnant 
or weakening regulatory environment in the wake of IIA challenges 
Expectation 2 – We would expect senior HSE regulators to be aware of IIAs and their implications, 
and to take them into consideration in the regulatory development process 
 
The rationale for these expectations rests in the fact that regulatory chill presupposes 
behaviour on the part of regulators, namely that they will curtail regulations or be more 
reticent to pursue more stringent regulations due to the threat of litigation.  It is only by 
analysing the extent to which this has happened consistently (through trends in regulation) 
as well as the degree to which regulator actions are deliberate and reflect full knowledge of 
IIAs and their impact, can we build a comprehensive picture of the regulatory chill 
phenomenon.   
 
These two expectations of the hypothesis will guide the analysis of case studies of the 
Canadian regulatory environment under NAFTA Chapter 11 and of tobacco control 
regulations globally. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
As outlined in this Chapter, the emergence of the modern day investment agreement and its 
unique enforcement mechanism has raised a whole host of issues for signatory governments.  
While there are conflicting views regarding the effectiveness of these agreements in achieving 
their stated goals, there are equally concerns about their impact.  Proponents of chill point to 
countless examples of the influence of private actors on the regulatory autonomy of 
governments whether it is through past or on-going NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges or the use 
of ISDS mechanisms in the tobacco industry challenges to tobacco control regulation.  They 
raise the spectre of the influence in the context of on-going regional and bilateral trade 
negotiations calling for the exclusion of the ISDS mechanism and point to Australia’s lead in 
this regard. 
 
This issue will be explored in more detail in the remainder of this thesis as we seek to 
determine the extent and nature of the impact of IIAs on governments, whether there is 
support for the hypothesis of regulatory chill and whether this differs among developing or 
developed countries.  Chapter three will outline in detail the methodological approach to be 
taken. 
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Chapter 3:  Concepts and methods: The research design  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a theory in political economy that argues that globalization has a negative impact on 
the policy autonomy of governments.  Chapter 1, outlined how this issue has been looked at 
with respect to the influence of the ‘threat of exit of MNEs’ or of financial markets on social 
welfare policies, on the regulatory race to the bottom or on regulatory convergence.  One 
strand of this theory as outlined in Chapter 2, hypothesises that international investment 
agreements (IIAs) have a constraining and dampening effect on domestic health, safety and 
environmental (HSE) regulations because of the legal trade challenges that have arisen 
against such regulations (for example under NAFTA’s Chapter 11 on investment or through 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) against governments which have pursued aggressive 
tobacco control regulations).   This research will address this issue by seeking to answer the 
following question: 
 
What has been the impact of international investment agreements on national regulatory 
autonomy in the areas of health, safety and environment?  Is there evidence of a “chilling” 
impact on the regulatory development process? 
 
2. THE BASIC METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
In order to test the expectations of the hypothesis on regulatory chill, this thesis uses 
quantitative and qualitative tools within a comparative case study analysis.  These will 
include statistical analysis and the qualitative coding and analysis of in-depth interviews and 
an electronic survey of HSE regulators, as well as the statistical and qualitative analysis of 
government information such as regulatory databases, policy pronouncements and 
government reports and studies.  Figure 1 below provides an overview of the methodological 
approach and the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative date. 
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Diagram 1 – Methodological approach  
 
 
 
3. THE CASE STUDY SELECTION 
 
Two case studies were selected for this research.  The main case study looks at Canada’s HSE 
regulatory environment prior to and during a period of intensive legal challenge under 
NAFTA Chapter 11 on investment.  The second, supporting case study looks at global tobacco 
control regulation at a time when tobacco industry litigation under IIAs has become more 
prevalent.  
 
According to Gerring, a case study is defined ‘as an intensive study of a single unit with an aim 
to generalize across a larger set of units.’247  The cases for this research were selected on the 
basis of their ability to provide results which might be more broadly generalized.  
Additionally, they represent both a broad look at HSE regulations (Canada) and a more 
focussed look at a single issue (tobacco).  They were also chosen for their ability to provide 
perspectives from both developed and developing countries regarding the impact of IIAs on 
HSE regulation.  
                                               
247 Gerring, John. 2004. “What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?”  The American Political Science Review. Vol. 98, No. 2, 
May 2004, p34 
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a. Case Study 1 – The Canadian regulatory environment 
 
This is the primary case study.  The rationale for selecting the Canadian regulatory 
environment is twofold.  First Canada is a developed country with a comprehensive approach 
to both international trade policy and HSE regulation.  In the area of trade and investment, 
Canada is a member of the WTO and the NAFTA and is signatory to numerous high level 
bilateral trade treaties and bilateral investment treaties.  At the same time Canada is at the 
forefront of HSE regulation both in terms of its domestic agenda as well as international 
leadership.   
 
Second Canada has had unique experience at the interface between the international trade 
and investment and HSE regulatory world through the many NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges it 
has faced to regulation since the agreement entered into force in 1995.  Canada has faced 28 
of the 66 cases brought under NAFTA Chapter 11 over the course of the last 20 years, with the 
largest number of HSE challenges of any other country248.  The nature of these challenges and 
the timeframe during which they have taken place provides a compelling environment for 
testing the hypothesis for regulatory chill.  
 
This case study will look at trends in HSE regulation over the last fifteen years as well as seek 
to understand the role of international trade and investment on the regulatory development 
process in an attempt to test the expectations which underlie the hypothesis on regulatory 
chill.   
 
As outlined in Figure 1, the Canada Case Study will test the expectations in the following way 
 
Expectation 1 – We would expect HSE regulatory trends to reflect regulatory chill (through a stagnant or 
weakening regulatory environment) in the wake of IIA challenges 
 
If there has been a chilling of HSE regulations as a result of IIAs, we would expect to see a 
trend of falling standards or of little increase in the comprehensiveness or stringency of HSE 
regulations over the last two decades and particularly in the last ten years (period during 
which NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges to HSE regulations in Canada have occurred) 
 
                                               
248 European Commmission. ‘Fact Sheet – Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlements in EU Agreements’. 
November 2013 
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The HSE regulatory trend will be analysed using the Canada Gazette database of regulations 
with the findings supported by the views of Canadian regulators through in-depth interviews 
and an electronic survey.  
Expectation 2 – We would expect senior HSE regulators to be aware of IIAs and their implications, and to 
take them into consideration in the regulatory development process 
 
With respect to expectation two we would expect to see a clear awareness among regulators 
of Canada’s international trade commitments and specifically IIAs such as NAFTA Chapter 11 
(versus other broader trade commitments like WTO SPS or TBT) including the potential for 
ISDS challenges and the cost (financial and social) of such challenges.  A significant emphasis 
(ranked in the top half of influencing factors) placed on the role of international trade 
commitments as a factor influencing the regulatory development process (including changes 
to, or new regulations, or the issuing of licences or permits under regulatory authority).  
Additionally the expectation is that this would be heightened where a particular regulator has 
faced a NAFTA Chapter 11 challenge to a measure within their remit. 
 
The role of international trade and investment  in the HSE regulatory development process 
will be analysed through the in-depth interviews with Canadian regulators and a broader 
based electronic survey.  
b. Cast Study 2 – Global tobacco control regulation  
 
This is a secondary and supportive case study which will be used as a point of comparison 
with the Canada Case Study and as a means of looking at the issue of regulatory chill from 
both a global perspective and with respect to the differences between developed and 
developing countries.   
 
The rationale for selecting global tobacco control regulation is twofold.  First tobacco control 
is an area of HSE regulation which is unique with respect to the level of international activity 
and coordination.  Since the ratification of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) it has been an area of regulation that has seen widespread uptake by 
countries worldwide.  As such it will allow us to look at the issue of regulatory chill from a 
global perspective as well as providing a developing country perspective. 
 
Second the tobacco industry is among the most litigious and has in recent years resorted to 
the use of trade and investment rules as a means through which it might challenge regulation 
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in this area.  In particular the investor-state challenges which have arisen under IIAs against 
countries such as Australia and Uruguay provide a compelling environment for testing any 
possible cross border chilling impact.    
 
This case study will look at trends in tobacco control regulation over the last decade as well as 
seek to understand the role of international trade and investment on the regulatory 
development process in an attempt to test the expectations which underlie the hypothesis on 
regulatory chill.   
 
The case study will test the expectations in the following way 
 
Expectation 1 – We would expect tobacco control regulatory trends to reflect regulatory chill (through 
the level of uptake in key tobacco control measures) in the wake of IIA challenges 
 
If there has been a chilling of tobacco control regulations as a result of IIAs, we would expect 
to see little uptake globally and regionally of the kinds of tobacco control regulations that 
have been subject to IIA challenges in countries such as Australia and Uruguay (increasing 
restrictions on advertising and promotion, plain packaging and health warnings including 
pictograms) 
 
The trend in tobacco control regulation will be analysed using the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control’s (FCTC) country reporting system249 and analysis 
undertaken by third parties.  The findings will be supported by the views of tobacco control 
regulators through in-depth interviews and an electronic survey. 
Expectation 2 – We would expect senior tobacco control regulators to be aware of IIAs and their 
implications, and to take them into consideration in the regulatory development process 
 
If there has been a chilling of tobacco control regulations as a result of IIAs, we would expect 
to see a clear awareness of IIAs and their potential impact (e.g.: costly litigation vehicle for 
governments to defend regulations) as well as a strong emphasis on the role of international 
trade, but particularly IIAs as an influencing factor in tobacco control regulatory development 
and decision making.  We would also expect to hear vocalized concern regarding 
developments in Australia and Uruguay and a stated ‘wait and see’ attitude on these specific 
policies. 
                                               
249
 The WHO FCTC is described in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
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The role of international trade and investment in the tobacco control regulatory development 
process will be analysed through the in-depth interviews with global regulators and a 
broader based electronic survey.  
 
4. GOVERNMENT DATA ANALYSIS 
a. Regulatory trends through Canada Gazette analysis 
 
In an effort to understand trends in HSE regulations we undertook an analysis of the Canada 
Gazette.  The Canada Gazette has been the official publication of the Government of Canada 
since 1841 with on-line availability of all bi-weekly versions between 1998 and 2013.250  Part 
1 of the Canada Gazette outlines all proposed regulations prior to a period of public 
consultation while Part 2 outlines those official regulations which will become law. 
 
This analysis was aimed at understanding trends in Canadian HSE regulations between 1998 
and 2013 both in terms of proposed regulation and adopted regulation as well as any 
correlation between changes in regulation and NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes.  A comprehensive 
database was created in Excel of all HSE regulatory proposals from Gazette 1 and all adopted 
HSE regulations from Gazette 2 over this period.  This included the date of the proposal or 
official regulation, the sponsoring government department, the Act under which the 
regulation would fall and the regulation itself.  In developing the database on Gazette 1, a 
further column was added outlining whether the proposal was a new regulation, a change to 
an existing regulation or the repeal of an existing regulation.  The process involved a detailed 
review of thousands of published regulatory proposals in the Canada Gazette 1, as well as 
adopted regulations in the Canada Gazette 2, between 1998 and 2013 with a view to 
identifying those with a particular focus on health, safety or the environment.  These 
numbered 757 in the case of regulatory proposals and 1579 in the case of actual adopted 
regulations or regulatory changes.  Appendix 1 shows the databases compiled using raw data 
from Gazette 1 and 2.  This analysis was aimed at understanding the quantity of proposed and 
adopted regulations by subject area (health, safety or environment) and across federal 
departments but more importantly whether these new regulations or regulatory changes 
                                               
250 The Canada Gazette - http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
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resulted in an increase or decrease in regulatory stringency and comprehensiveness.251 This 
data was then coded for statistical analysis using SPSS software.252   
 
Descriptive statistics allowed us to understand the trends in regulations across the individual 
areas of health, safety and the environment, by department as well as by the nature of the 
regulation in the case of Gazette 1.  It also allowed us to understand the general direction of 
adopted regulations from Gazette 2 with respect to increasing, decreasing or neutral 
changes.253    Finally these trends were plotted against NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes (both with 
respect to the date of the filing of a Notice of Intent as well as Final Award).  Using logistic 
regression, an analysis was undertaken to understand any correlation between these 
regulatory trends and NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes on HSE measures.254   
 
b. Tobacco control regulatory initiatives through FCTC country reports 
 
In an effort to understand the level of uptake of controversial tobacco control regulations 
across countries and regions we undertook an analysis of the WHO FCTC country reports.  
The WHO FCTC requires each Party to submit to the Conference of the Parties (COP), through 
the Convention Secretariat, periodic reports on its implementation of the Convention 
measures.  This analysis was aimed at understanding the extent to which Parties had 
implemented regulatory measures dealing with packaging and labelling of tobacco products 
(Article 11) and tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (Article 13).255 
 
A database was created in Excel from the reports filed by 131 parties to the Convention in 
2011 and 2013 outlining the country name, region and whether or not they had implanted 
                                               
251 Aimed at addressing the first expectation of the hypothesis on regulatory chill: Expectation 1:  We would expect HSE regulatory 
trends to reflect regulatory chill (through a stagnant or weakening regulatory environment) in the wake of IIA challenges. 
252 Appendix x outlines the coding table for this analysis 
253 For the purposes of this analysis a regulatory decrease refers to a decrease in the comprehensiveness or stringency of regulations or 
involves the elimination of regulations.  More concretely this would include regulations that exempt a substance after a review or 
scientific advance, moves control of an activity or substance from criminal law to regulation, changes a substance from prescription to 
non-prescription status, increases the allowable level of a restricted or controlled substance or generally reduces the burden of regulatory 
requirements on industry.  Examples of this might include a move away from the criminalization of marihuana to allow for its medicinal 
use in certain circumstances, exempting power assisted bicycles from federal safety standards, the elimination of a requirement for 
environmental assessments on all projects which are deemed ‘unlikely to cause more than minor adverse environmental effects or pose 
more than minor environmental risks  A regulatory increase refers to an increase in the comprehensiveness or stringency of regulations 
by adding regulatory coverage to a new substance or a new area of activity.  This might involve measures which increase the protection 
of the environment and human health or general increases in the burden of compliance for industry.  Examples of this would include new 
regulations dealing with hand held radiation devices, those aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions through greater emission control 
standards, the setting of Maximum Residue Limits (MRL) for controlled substances or the prohibition of a toxic substance for use and 
sale in Canada.  A neutral regulatory change refers to regulations where it is assumed the stringency and comprehensiveness of the 
regulation does not change, and might include non-substantive regulatory amendments, changes in fees or tariffs, clarifications to 
regulations or allowing for new uses of an existing registered substance.  Examples of this would include changes to fishing or hunting 
season dates and catch allowances in fishery conservation, changes to pilotage tariffs, the consolidation of Asbestos measures across 
many disparate Acts or general regulatory changes aimed at achieving greater efficiency, modernization, involving the shifting of cost 
burden or a move to cost sharing arrangements. 
254 Chapter 4 outlines the findings of this analysis 
255 A detailed outline of the role and evolution of the FCTC and the content of Articles 11 and 13 is provided in Chapter 6 
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some of the specific aspects of Article 11 and Article 13.  This data was then coded for 
statistical analysis using SPSS software.  Appendix 2 shows the database created out of raw 
FCTC data.  Descriptive statistics and cross tabulations allowed us to understand the trends 
by region with respect to the uptake of regulations in the areas of health warnings and 
packaging and labelling. 
 
Other supporting information and third party analysis 
 
Both the Canada Case study and the Tobacco Control case study were supported by the 
analysis of government information.  In particular departmental policy statements and 
reports provided background on domestic Canadian regulatory initiatives, while independent 
analysis by the OECD, Conference Board of Canada and the Canadian Cancer Society helped us 
understand trends in regulations both in Canada and worldwide.   
 
5. QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS WITH REGULATORS 
 
A key component of the analysis involved in-depth interviews with senior Canadian federal 
HSE regulators and senior tobacco control regulators globally.  This section outlines the 
approach and structure of the interviews as well as the qualitative coding and statistical 
analysis that was used to analyse the resulting data. 
 
a. Approach and structure of in-depth interviews 
 
Canadian interviews 
 
During June, September and October 2012, a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews 
were held with fifty officials at the Section Head, Director and Director General levels, across 
the Canadian federal government departments and agencies listed in Table 1.256 
 
                                               
256 Appendix 3 provides a list of all federal Canadian regulators interviewed.  Interviews were not held with regulators from NEB, 
NRCA or DFINA however the first two were represented in the on-line survey. 
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Table 1: Federal HSE regulatory department and agencies 
 
Federal Departments and Agencies 
Health Canada (HC) 
Environment Canada (EC) 
Transport Canada (TC) 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) 
Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSCD) 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFSA) 
Pest Management Regulatory Agency (PMRA) 
 
The vast majority of people contacted agreed to be interviewed for this research, with a 95% 
positive response rate among those contacted.257 Access was facilitated by the researcher’s 
previous role as an international trade negotiator with the Canadian Government.  Appendix 
3 outlines the list of regulators interviews by department. 
 
The main objective of the interviews was to understand how HSE regulations have changed 
over the last two decades and whether they have become more or less comprehensive and 
stringent and the evidence that would support either assertion, the key factors which 
influence or drive regulatory decision making, the extent to which Canada’s trade 
commitments play a role in influencing regulatory decision making, which trade 
commitments have the most impact or create the most concern (WTO, IIAs, FTAs), the extent 
of regulator awareness of IIAs, particularly NAFTA Chapter 11 and its possible implications 
for regulation and whether this awareness is borne from experience with a NAFTA Chapter 
11 case. 
 
Appendix 4 provides a copy of the questions used to guide the interviews.  Interviews were on 
average one hour in duration and were not recorded given widespread concerns about 
confidentiality amongst regulators and in order to encourage them to speak freely.  Concise 
notes were taken and the interviews were written up shortly after their completion with key 
issues clarified through email exchanges by way of follow-up. 
 
                                               
257 Regulators were identified via the Government Electronic Directory (GEDs) which provides a full electronic database of 
government of Canada employees as well as through web searches and personal contacts. 
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The interview notes were then subject to qualitative coding as a means to determine 
systematically what respondents were saying regarding the stringency and 
comprehensiveness of health safety and environmental regulations in Canada over the last 
decade as well as the factors which influence the regulatory development process, including 
the role of international trade and investment.  The analysis used Descriptive Coding which is 
a coding practice that ‘summarizes in a word or short phrase’258the core content of an 
interview transcript , Process Coding  also known as Action Coding which is useful for 
understanding actions ‘taken in response to situations or problems’ 259as well as examples 
and quotes to illustrate or support the views of interviewees.   A table was developed in Excel 
outlining examples, Descriptive and Process Coding outcomes and also facilitating the 
calculation of descriptive statistics.  Categories were developed from the long list of initial 
codes and these categories were further grouped into the primary themes of the data which is 
outlined in Chapters 4 and 5.   These themes were reinforced by the examples from 
interviewees.260  Appendix 5 provides the qualitative coding analysis of interview transcripts. 
Tobacco interviews 
 
Interviews were conducted with senior global tobacco control regulators from eleven 
countries, representing five regions primarily during the fifth session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP5) of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC)261.  The FCTC conference took place in Seoul, Republic of Korea, from 12 to 17 
November 2012. The session was attended by the delegations of more than 140 Parties, seven 
States that are not Party to the Convention and 18 intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations accredited as observers.  Representatives were interviewed from the following 
countries listed in Table 2. 
 
                                               
258 Saldana, Johnny (2013).  The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. Second Edition, Sage, p.88 
259Ibid, p. 96  
260 See Appendix5 for the full analysis table with codes and categories.  Chapter 4 and 5 outline the findings of the in-depth 
interviews. 
261 In the case of Canada and the UK, the in-depth interviews were held in Ottawa in April and June 2012 and London in January 
2013 respectively. 
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Table 2: List of countries interviewed at the WHO FCTC conference in Seoul, Korea 
 
Countries 
Canada 
Finland 
Malta 
Norway 
New Zealand 
Panama 
Singapore 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Yemen 
 
This case study represents a second and supportive case study and as such the quantity of 
interviews are relatively smaller in number than those conducted for the primary case study 
on Canada.   Appendix 6 lists regulators interviewed.   
 
The main objective of the interviews was to understand the progress made in key areas of 
tobacco control regulation (such as bans on advertising and promotion, the use of health 
warnings on packaging and the possible adoption of plain packaging regulations), specifically, 
what respondent countries were doing to meet their commitments to Article 11 and 13 of the 
FCTC, whether they were considering plain packaging and the factors influencing their 
decision in this regard, the extent to which the litigation faced by Australia on the issue of 
plain packaging was affecting their decision making, more generally, the key factors which 
influence or drive regulatory decision making, the extent to which trade commitments play a 
role in influencing regulatory decision making, the extent of regulator awareness of IIAs and 
their possible implications for regulation and whether this awareness is borne from 
experience with a BIT challenge to their government or neighbouring governments. 
 
Appendix 7 provides a copy of the questions used to guide the interviews.  Interviews were 
not recorded given widespread concerns about confidentiality amongst regulators and in 
order to encourage them to speak freely.  Concise notes were taken and the interviews were 
written up shortly after their completion with key issues clarified through email exchanges by 
way of follow-up. 
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The interview notes were then subject to qualitative coding as outlined earlier, as a means to 
determine systematically what respondents were saying regarding the impact of BITs on 
tobacco control regulations.  Appendix 8 outlines the codes identified. 
 
6. ELECTRONIC SURVEY OF REGULATORS 
 
Complementing the in-depth interviews was an electronic survey of a broader range of HSE 
regulators and tobacco control regulators with greater representation among developing 
countries.  These surveys were conducted using Qualtrics software and subsequently 
analysed qualitatively through qualitative coding and statistically through the use of SPSS 
software.  This section outlines the approach and content of the surveys as well as details of 
the qualitative coding and statistical analysis that was used to analyse the resulting data. 
 
a. Approach and content of electronic survey 
 
Canadian survey 
 
In addition to understanding how HSE regulations have changed since the signing of NAFTA 
(through interviews, an analysis of the regulatory Gazette process and independent 
assessments produced by international bodies such as the OECD), it was important to 
understand to what extent regulators themselves are aware of Canada’s international trade 
and investment commitments and the extent to which they consider them in making their 
regulatory decisions.   
This survey was focussed on achieving this understanding in an effort to measure the degree 
of regulatory involvement and decision making of each respondent, the regulator’s awareness 
of trade commitments, the regulator’s differentiation between trade and investment 
commitments , the degree of influence of trade commitments and the extent to which this 
differs by role or seniority, the factors influencing regulatory policy and their relative weights, 
the role trade plays in the regulatory development process, personal experience of regulators 
with NAFTA disputes and the extent to which this affects awareness and impact. 
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Sample 
 
The survey population consisted of HSE regulators and policy makers from Manager through 
to Director General level within the federal government.  As it is possible in this case to define 
the entire population of interest, this survey was directed at all members of this population 
and not done on the basis of sampling, although a number of assumptions were made in 
defining the population. A HSE regulatory body was defined as a body whose regulatory 
responsibilities govern the development, licensing, monitoring and evaluation stages in the 
sphere of HSE.  HSE regulators and policy makers were defined as those government officials 
with a clear policy or regulatory responsibility as well as those with decision making power.  
Regulatory responsibility was determined by the specific focus of work.  Regulator for the 
purpose of this study refers to those individuals whose activity (policy development, 
licensing, evaluating, monitoring enforcing) influences at any point of the life cycle of a 
product (sale, manufacturing, labelling, packing).  Decision making responsibility is relevant 
but this study will also be seeking to differentiate views and knowledge of those developing 
regulations and those making decisions on regulatory policy.  In total 395 regulators were 
contacted for this survey.  140 or 35% of regulators responded and 114 or 29% of regulators 
provided complete responses.262 
 
The survey was geared to Director General, Director, Head of Section and Manager within the 
relevant Departments and Agencies.  In many cases the identification of survey recipients has 
been guided by the advice of the Director Generals and Directors of the relevant 
organizations.  Table 3 provides a breakdown of survey respondents showing the broad 
coverage of responses across regulators at the Section Head, Director and Director General 
levels. 
                                               
262 This response rate is in line with expectations.  A 2000 meta study by Cook et al suggests that the mean response rate for the 56 
surveys represented in 39 studies with no missing data on 16 variables was 34.6%.  This study also suggests that one can ‘expect 
between a 25% and 30% response rate from an email survey when no follow-up takes place’ and that this can be increased with the 
use of follow-up. (Cook, Colleen and Fred Heath and Russell L. Thompson, ‘A Meta-Analysis of Response Rates in Web or 
Internet Based Surveys’, Educational and Psychological Measurement’ Vol. 60, No. 6 December 2000, 821-836, Sage 
Publications) 
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Table 3: Canadian federal regulator survey respondents by title 
 
1.  Which title most approximates your position within your Department or Agency? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Director General   
 
20 14% 
2 Director   
 
56 39% 
3 Head of Section   
 
29 20% 
4 Manager   
 
22 15% 
5 Other   
 
15 11% 
 Total  142 100% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
Those regulators that completed the survey had broad regulatory responsibility across the 
areas of regulatory policy development and planning, regulatory authorization (such as 
licencing), monitoring and evaluation.  Table 4 below shows the breakdown of 
responsibilities. 
Table 4: Area of responsibility of Canadian regulatory survey respondents 
 
2.  Where in the regulatory process do you spend your time?  You can identify more than 
one. 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
Regulatory policy 
development and 
planning 
  
 
84 59% 
2 
Developing regulatory 
changes or new 
regulations 
  
 
73 51% 
3 
Regulatory authorization 
(e.g.: licensing) 
  
 
41 29% 
4 
Monitoring regulatory 
compliance 
  
 
42 30% 
5 
Evaluating regulatory 
effectiveness 
  
 
38 27% 
6 Other   
 
26 18% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
Those regulatory bodies included in the survey were identical to those for the in-depth 
interviews with the addition of Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and the National Energy 
Board (NEB).  A very comprehensive database of survey respondents was compiled in order 
to track responses by tile and government department.  
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Content and conduct of the survey 
 
The survey aimed to describe the respondents and their attitudes and experiences with 
respect to the interface between Canada’s international trade commitments and the 
development of regulation.  The survey focused on the current views and experiences of 
regulators though it captured historical behaviour commensurate with the length of service in 
a particular role. 
 
The electronic survey was developed using Qualtrics software.  It comprised 15 open and 
closed questions and took respondents on average 15 minutes to complete.  The survey was 
self-administered and was sent electronically to the identified list of recipients by email on a 
rolling basis.  The survey software allowed for the tracking of responses from commencement 
to completion.  Given the challenges involved in achieving high response rates, every effort 
was made to follow-up with respondents to encourage participation through email 
reminders.  Efforts were also made to gain support and sponsorship throughout the 
organizations to bring internal pressure to bear on participation rates.  The in-depth 
interviews conducted prior to this were also aimed at gaining support for completion within 
each federal department.  Appendix 9 shows the survey questionnaire. 
 
Qualitative coding was used to analyse the qualitative responses received.  Statistical analysis 
was used to analyse the remainder of the survey data.  With the help of SPSS software a 
number of logistic regressions and cross tabulations were undertaken to assess the 
relationship between variables with a view to drawing some generalizable outcomes.263  
Appendix 10 shows the qualitative coding analysis. 
 
Tobacco Control survey 
 
As with the Canadian Regulator survey this survey was aimed at complementing the in-depth 
interviews that were held with regulators on the margins of the FCTC conference in Korea.  
The main goal of the survey was to understand the key factors which influence or drive 
regulatory decision making, whether trade agreements and IIAs were influencing factors, 
whether regulators were considering plain packaging and the factors influencing their 
decision in this regard, the extent to which the litigation faced by Australia on the issue of 
plain packaging affected their decision making and whether they faced legal action from the 
tobacco industry. 
                                               
263 The statistical methods used in the quantitative analysis are covered in detail in Section 7. 
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Sample 
 
The survey population consisted of tobacco control regulators worldwide.  The respondents 
were identified from the list of 2012 WHO FCTC participants where contact details were 
available or internet searchable.  All those that could be identified were included in the 
survey. 120 regulators were contacted and 28 or 23% responded fully.  The survey was 
conducted in two stages, an initial test phase of 5 respondents and a more fulsome second 
stage which yielded 23 respondents.  There were 28 countries represented in the survey 
across North America, Latin America & Caribbean, Australasia, Europe, Africa and the Middle 
East.  Tables 5 and 6 outline the titles and areas of regulatory responsibility of survey 
respondents. 
 
Table 5: Distribution of titles by tobacco control survey respondents 
1.  What title most approximates your role? 
# Answer  
 
% 
1 Director   
 
26% 
2 Head of Section   
 
9% 
3 Special Adviser   
 
4% 
4 
Tobacco Control 
Focal Point 
  
 
52% 
5 Other   
 
9% 
 Total  100% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators– Report May 22 2013 
 
Table 6: Distribution of responsibilities by tobacco control survey respondents 
2.  In the area of tobacco control, where in the regulatory process do you spend your time?  
You can identify more than one. 
# Answer  
 
% 
1 
Regulatory policy 
development and 
planning 
  
 
78% 
2 
Developing 
regulatory changes 
or new regulations 
  
 
74% 
3 
Monitoring 
regulatory 
compliance 
  
 
57% 
4 
Evaluating regulatory 
effectiveness 
  
 
35% 
5 Other   
 
4% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
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Content and conduct of the survey 
 
The survey was comprised of 10 open and closed questions, and took respondents on average 
10 minutes to complete.  The survey was self-administered and was sent electronically to the 
identified list of recipients on a rolling basis.  The electronic survey was developed using 
Qualtrics software which allowed for individual tracking numbers.  Given the challenges 
involved in achieving high response rates, every effort was made to follow-up with 
respondents to encourage participation through email reminders.  Appendix 11 shows the 
survey questions. 
 
In line with the Canadian Regulator survey, qualitative coding was used to analyse the 
qualitative responses received.  Statistical analysis was used to analyse the remainder of the 
survey date.  With the help of SPSS software a number of logistic regressions and cross 
tabulations were undertaken to assess the relationship between variables with a view to 
drawing some generalizable outcomes.  
 
7. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DATABASE AND SURVEY DATA 
 
A number of quantitative techniques and statistical software packages were used to analyse 
the data collected through the analysis of the Canada Gazette, the FCTC Country Report 
information and the electronic survey data from both the Canadian Federal Regulator Survey 
and the Global Tobacco Control Survey.  
 
a. Electronic Survey Data and Statistical Software 
 
The two electronic surveys conducted for this thesis were undertaken using the Qualtics 
survey software.  Qualtrics is a leading survey supplier and used extensively in academic 
research worldwide.  The data was collected directly from recipients, with each respondent 
assigned an individual tracking number which facilitated follow-up. 
 
The statistical analysis packaged used for this thesis was SPSS.  The data collected through the 
survey was downloaded directly into SPSS and coded for the analysis.  Data from the Canada 
Gazette database and FCTC database that were created in Excel were also downloaded into 
SPSS for analysis.  The data from all three sources were analysed through the use of 
descriptive statistics, cross tabulations and logistic regressions.    
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Statistical analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics were used to run frequencies and look for missing data.  They were also 
used to show trends in the data on HSE regulations as well as responses to the survey 
questions.  Cross tabulations were run in order to understand the relationship between 
variables in the data as well as the relationship between different responses in the survey.   
 
Due to the categorical nature of the date, logistic regression was undertaken with a view to 
understanding correlations between variables in the Canada Federal Regulator Survey.  It was 
also used to understand the correlation between regulatory trends emanating from the 
Gazette analysis against NAFTA chapter 11 disputes.  In the case of survey date, Binary 
logistic regression was used for the analysis of survey data while Multinomial logistic 
regression was used for the analysis of the Gazette and NAFTA Chapter 11 data.  264 
 
8. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
 
While every attempt was made to achieve a triangulation of data both primary and secondary 
in the design of this research, a number of challenges remained. 
 
Definitions 
 
There are a number of challenges with respect to definitions which must be considered in 
undertaking this research.  Because much of the methodology is qualitative in nature it relies 
quite heavily on subjective interpretations of meaning.  There are a number of terms which 
have been defined which are open to interpretation.   
 
First and foremost is the definition of regulatory chill.  Regulatory Chill is defined by Eric 
Neumayer in Greening Trade and Investment, as a situation where developed countries might 
either lower environmental standards or fail to raise them for fear that internationally mobile 
capital will move to countries with lower standards.265  Kevin Grey & Duncan Brack in the 
OECD Report of the Working Party on Global and Structural Policies on Environmental Issue 
in Policy-Based Competition for Investment, outline a situation ‘where countries refrain from 
enacting stricter environmental standards in response to fears of losing a competitive 
                                               
264 Logistic regression is a probabilistic statistical classification model which is used to determine the relationship between a 
categorical dependant variable and one or more independent variable. 
265 Neumayer, Eric. 2001. Greening Trade and Investment – Environmental Protection Without Protectionism. Earthscan Publications 
Ltd. p. 68 
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edge’.266  Kyla Tienhaara argues in The Expropriation of Environmental Governance that this 
notion of regulatory chill has been further extended to address concerns regarding 
international investment arbitration such that regulators with knowledge of investor state 
challenges to regulatory measures or the threat of such challenges will curtail regulations or 
be reticent to pursue more stringent regulations in these areas.   This extension of the 
meaning of regulatory chill has also been advanced by scholars such as Gray 2002 and 
Peterson 2004.267   
 
Other terms which require a great degree of subjectivity in their definition yet which have a 
big impact on the quality of the analysis include regulatory stringency, comprehensiveness, 
increases in regulation, decreases in regulation or a neutral change in regulation.   For the 
purposes of this analysis a regulatory decrease for the purposes of this study refers to a 
decrease in the comprehensiveness or stringency of regulations or involves the elimination of 
regulations.  More concretely this would include regulatory changes that exempt a substance 
after a review or scientific advance, move control of an activity or substance from criminal 
law to regulation, change a substance from prescription to non-prescription status, increase 
the allowable level of a restricted or controlled substance or generally reduce the burden of 
regulatory requirements on industry.  Examples of this might include a move away from the 
criminalization of marihuana to allow for its medicinal use in certain circumstances, 
exempting power assisted bicycles from federal safety standards, the elimination of a 
requirement for environmental assessments on all projects which are deemed ‘unlikely to 
cause more than minor adverse environmental effects or pose more than minor 
environmental risks’268   
 
A regulatory increase for the purposes of this study refers to an increase in the 
comprehensiveness or stringency of regulations achieved by expanding the scope of 
regulatory coverage to include new substances or areas of activity or by increasing the depth 
and complexity of compliance requirements.  This might involve measures which increase the 
protection of the environment and human health or general increases in the burden of 
compliance for industry.  Examples of this would include new regulations dealing with hand 
held radiation devices, those aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions through greater 
                                               
266 Grey, Kevin and Duncan Brack. 2002. OECD Report of the Working Party on Global and Structural Policies - Environmental Issue in 
Policy-Based Competition for Investment. P.8 
267 Tienhaara, Kyla. 2009. The Expropriation of Environmental Governance – Protecting Foreign Investors at the Expense of Public 
Policy. Cambridge University Press. p.25 
268 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. 2007 . Federal Screenings:  An Analysis Based on Information from the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Registry Internet Site. http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/Content/4/5/0/4507E796-2D92-47B9-9DC1-
52F691619A8E/Federal_Screenings-eng.pdf 
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emission control standards, the setting of Maximum Residue Limits (MRL) for controlled 
substances or the prohibition of a toxic substance for use and sale in Canada.   
 
A neutral regulatory change for the purposes of this study refers to regulations where it is 
assumed the stringency and comprehensiveness of the regulation does not change, and might 
include non-substantive regulatory amendments, changes in fees or tariffs, clarifications to 
regulations or allowing for new uses of an existing registered substance.  Examples of this 
would include changes to fishing or hunting season dates and catch allowances in fishery 
conservation, changes to pilotage tariffs, the consolidation of Asbestos measures across many 
disparate Acts or general regulatory changes aimed at achieving greater efficiency, and 
modernization, often involving the shifting of cost burdens or a move to cost sharing 
arrangements.  
 
Federal government focus 
 
As mentioned previously, the focus of the research for the Canadian case study was at the 
federal level of government.  Given the shared jurisdiction on HSE regulation between federal 
and provincial levels of government this provides only one perspective on this issue, albeit a 
key one.  This issue is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
Access to information 
 
Finally the success of this research has been predicated on gaining access to the information 
necessary to undertake the analysis.  While it proved quite easy to gain access to senior 
regulators in Canada this proved more challenging globally on tobacco control.  The 
secondary importance of this case study reflects this data challenge.   
 
Chapters 4 and 5 will outline the findings of the Canada Case Study while Chapter 6 will 
outline the findings of the Tobacco Control Case Study. 
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Chapter 4:  Case Study 1:  The Canadian regulatory 
environment – The trends in HSE regulations 
 
‘The chilling effect of the Ethyl Corporation and S. D. Myers cases were profound and have 
resulted in failures of the Canadian Government to regulate and or ban toxic substances they 
would have in the pre-Chapter 11 era.’ 
 
Elizabeth May – Member of Parliament, Green Party of Canada269 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A ban on pesticides for commercial lawn use, on the export of PCB waste, on the import and 
trade of a purportedly toxic gasoline additive, as well as a moratorium on hydraulic fracking 
have one important thing in common.  These regulations have all resulted in legal challenges 
against the Government of Canada by private investors through the ISDS provisions of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 and are among the numerous challenges to HSE regulations which have led to 
growing concerns about the possible chilling impact of IIAs.  The unprecedented volume of 
challenges to Canadian HSE measures since the inception of NAFTA in 1995, make Canada an 
ideal test case for the hypothesis on regulatory chill. 
 
The next two chapters outline the findings in this Case Study on Canada, with this Chapter 
addressing the first ‘expectation’ regarding regulatory trends.  Chapter 5 looks at the ‘second’ 
expectation regarding the influence of trade and investment on the regulatory development 
process in Canada, while Chapter 6 addresses this question under Case Study 2: Tobacco 
Control Regulation – A global look at investment and regulation. 
 
Methodological overview of Case Study 1270 
 
In April, June and September 2012 in-depth face-to-face interviews were conducted with over 
fifty senior federal health, safety and environmental regulators in Canada.  The purpose of the 
interviews was to gain an understanding of the influences on the regulatory development 
process and particularly the role played by Canada’s international trade and investment 
commitments.  At the same time, the objective was to understand how HSE regulations had 
                                               
269 Submission by Elizabeth May to the Trade Agreements and NAFTA Secretariat, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 
on the Environmental Assessment for the Canada-China Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement.  November 10, 
2012 
270 Chapter 3 provides a detailed outline of the methodology 
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changed over the last 10 years and whether federal regulators felt that HSE regulations were 
becoming more or less stringent and comprehensive during this period.271 
   
From January to March 2013 an extensive online survey was conducted of a more diverse 
selection of Canadian federal regulators in the areas of health, safety and the environment 
with a view to probing similar themes to those addressed in the in-depth interviews.  In this 
case a broader group of regulators were reached and 140 responded with 114 full responses 
received.  The views of regulators that have emerged from these interviews together with 
those outlined in the survey findings, and the outcome of a quantitative analysis of actual HSE 
regulations in Canada between 1998 and 2013272 provide a triangulation of data to test the 
expectations of the hypothesis on regulatory chill.   
 
This chapter will first provide an understanding of the regulatory environment in Canada 
with respect to the federal provincial division of powers on HSE regulations, the process for 
regulatory development as well as current trends in regulatory reform.  Second it will outline 
the international trade and investment environment and particularly the ways in which 
Canadian HSE regulators have faced challenges to their regulatory measures under NAFTA 
Chapter 11 on Investment.  This will then provide the Canadian context for the testing of the 
first ‘expectation’ on trends in regulation as well as the role of international trade and 
investment dealt with in Chapter 5. 
 
2. CURRENT CANADIAN CONTEXT 
 
a. The regulatory environment in Canada 
 
Canada is a Federal State in which the development of regulations is the shared jurisdiction of 
the federal and provincial governments.  Furthermore the provincial legislatures delegate 
some of their powers to municipal governments on these matters.273 
   
                                               
271 Stringency of regulations refers to the requirements for a greater depth of science to demonstrate acceptability of risk, while 
comprehensiveness of regulations refers to the expanding scope of regulations including the regulation of emerging areas. 
272 This analysis was conducted using the Canada Gazette 1 and 2 database of proposed and adopted regulations. 
http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html. Data was coded and analysed using SPSS software 
273 Privy Council Office, Government of Canada. http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/aia/index.asp?lang=eng&page=federal&sub=legis&doc=env-eng.htm.  Examples of areas of municipal responsibility 
include water and sewage services, garbage collection and city parks. 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/about/parliament/senatoreugeneforsey/touchpoints/touchpoints_content-e.html 
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The Federal Provincial division of powers 
 
The Constitution Acts of 1867 to 1982 confer on the federal government the authority ‘to 
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada’ except for matters under 
exclusive provincial jurisdiction. 274 There are a number of areas of shared jurisdiction as 
outlined in Table 1 below.  Most importantly for the purposes of this research are the areas of 
health, safety and environment.  A well-structured system of intergovernmental cooperation 
is an important aspect of addressing the challenges of duplication and overlap in jurisdiction 
as well as the harmonization of regulatory reform initiatives.  While such a system is well 
entrenched in Canada through regular intergovernmental initiatives such as 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial First Ministers meetings as well as meetings between 
ministers and other senior officials, difficulties persist, not least of which on matters of 
international trade and investment related to jurisdiction.  These issues are dealt with later in 
this chapter.  
 
Table 1: Regulatory powers across levels of government 
Economic and social sectors Federal Provincial 
Telecommunications √ - 
Electricity √ √ 
Gas - √ 
Financial Services √ √ 
Postal Services √ - 
Inter-city buses - √ 
Inter-provincial √ - 
Trucking √ √ 
Rail transport √ √ 
Air transport √ - 
Agriculture √ √ 
Water use √ √ 
Regulated professions and trades √ √ 
Infrastructure investment √ √ 
Pharmaceuticals √ √ 
Health care √ √ 
Road safety √ √ 
Aviation safety √ - 
Water treatment √ √ 
                                               
274 The Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982 ss. 91 and 92. 
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Environment √ √ 
Consumer protection and privacy √ √ 
Immigration selection systems √ - 
Gambling √ √ 
Education √ √ 
Training √ √ 
Care of the Aged √ √ 
Unemployment and Social Security √ - 
Product Safety and Labelling √ √ 
Occupational Health and Safety √ √ 
Source:  Privy Council Office, Government of Canada as outlined in the OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform:  Canada275 
 
Health, safety and environmental regulations in Canada 
 
Within the shared jurisdiction, at the federal level there are twelve primary departments and 
agencies with a remit for HSE.  These are listed in Table 2 below.   
 
In the area of the environment, the federal government regulates in the areas of 
environmental protection, pollution prevention, biodiversity and conservation and 
sustainable development.  Some specific examples of this include the prohibition of activities 
which are harmful to the environment through the Canadian Environment Protection Act, the 
regulation of the environment of fish as well as the activities of ships through the Fisheries 
Act and the regulation of international and domestic transportation through the 
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act.276 
 
In the area of health and safety, the federal government, through its ‘peace, order and good 
government’ power regulates public health matters which would be of national concern or 
constitute a national emergency.277  While the provinces have jurisdiction over the delivery of 
health care services, the federal government regulates ‘the safety of workers in federally-
regulated industries, such as banking, transportation and communications’.  Additionally they 
have jurisdiction over areas of criminal law or ‘conduct dangerous to health, such as the use 
of narcotics and tobacco, and the regulation of hazardous products.’278 
                                               
275 OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform:  Canada – ISBN 92-64-19908 X – OECD 2002 
276 Privy Council Office, Government of Canada. http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/aia/index.asp?lang=eng&page=federal&sub=legis&doc=env-eng.htm   
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid. 
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Table 2: Federal HSE regulatory department and agencies 
Federal Departments and Agencies with HSE regulatory remit 
Health Canada (HC) 
Environment Canada (EC) 
Transport Canada (TC) 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) 
Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSCD) 
Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFSA) 
National Energy Board (NEB) 
Pest Management Regulatory Agency (PMRA) 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) 
 
The federal process for regulatory development 
 
The federal process for regulatory development involves a number of key stages from 
inception through to regulation.  A key component of this process, as outlined in Diagram 1, is 
the mechanism for public consultation afforded by the publication of proposals and final 
regulations in the Canada Gazette parts 1 and 2. 
 
After a regulatory proposal has been approved by the Cabinet Minister responsible, it is 
published in the Canada Gazette 1 and undergoes public scrutiny during a period of 30-75 
days.  The regulatory proposal is then updated as a result of the feedback received through 
public consultations, once again approved by the Minister in its final form, recommended by 
Treasury Board for Governor General (GIC) approval and if approved, it is registered and 
published in the Canada Gazette ll. 
 
The Canada Gazette thus maintains a detailed electronic record of all regulatory proposals, 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statements (RIAs)279 and approved regulations from 1998 to 
current day.  These regulations, along with their RIAs are published on a quarterly basis and 
provide a rich source of data for understanding trends in Canadian HSE regulation. 
 
                                               
279 Regulatory Impact Analysis Statements (RIAs) describes the regulation, it’s anticipated outcome with respect to a cost-benefit 
analysis, the process and outcome of consultation and issues of implementation, compliance and enforcement 
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Diagram 1 – The Canadian regulatory process 280 
 
Source:  Treasury Board Secretariat, Government of Canada 
 
Current domestic initiatives driving regulation 
 
The Canadian Government has been very focussed on regulatory reform over the last ten 
years.  This has been partially driven by global trends among OECD countries towards 
regulatory efficiency, but also a desire to both modernize the regulatory environment and 
increase links and ease of doing business with the United States, an important trading 
partner.  A number of key initiatives have characterized this focus and were top of mind 
among health, safety and environmental regulators during the face-to-face in-depth 
interviews. 
Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulations:  In 2003 the External Advisory Committee on 
Smart Regulation was created with the objective of modernizing Canada’s regulatory approach 
and led in 2007 to a series of recommendations for change under the Cabinet Directive on 
Streamlining Regulations (CDSR).  The main focus of the CDSR was to create ‘a more effective, 
efficient and accountable regulatory system’.281 
Regulatory Cooperation Council:  The Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC) was created on 
February 4, 2011 with the goal of aligning regulatory approaches between Canada and the 
                                               
280 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.  http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rtrap-parfa/gfrpg-gperf/gfrpg-gperf02-eng.asp#t8 
281 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat background note on the Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulations. http://www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/report/orp/2011/cdsr-dcrr01-eng.asp#tphp 
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United States in the areas of agriculture, food, transportation, health, personal care products, 
workplace chemicals, environment, nanomaterial and reducing the burden on small 
business.282 
Red Tape Reduction Action Plan:  Through the Red Tape Reduction Action Plan, launched in 
2012 in response to an extensive consultation with business, ‘the Government of Canada has 
made cutting red tape a key priority.’ The focus of the Action Plan is reducing burdens on 
business in the areas of tax, transport and trade while also making it easier to do business and 
improving service and predictability.   These goals have been pursued while at the same time 
preserving the health and safety of Canadians.283 
 
b. The international trade and investment environment  
 
Canada is an active participant in international trade and investment, and is signatory to 
many agreements at the multilateral (WTO), regional (NAFTA) and bilateral levels (FTA, 
FIPAs284).285  These trade and investment agreements involve Canada making international 
commitments with a particular or potential focus on regulation across a wide set of areas 
including intellectual property (IP), finance, technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS) and investment.286  Adhering to internationally agreed rules 
which govern or guide the development of domestic regulation raises some challenges where 
the goals and practices of Canada and its trading partners might differ (for example on food 
or transport safety standards, on financial sector regulations, or on efforts to preserve 
domestic sectors of cultural significance).  It is however the commitments on international 
investment, particularly at the regional level under NAFTA Chapter 11 which have been the 
subject of greatest concern with respect to regulation, and as outlined in Chapter 2 they have 
resulted in numerous investor-state challenges287 to HSE measures and raised the prospect of 
regulatory chill.288 
 
                                               
282 Canada’s Economic Action Plan. http://actionplan.gc.ca/page/rcc-ccr/about-regulatory-cooperation-
council?wb48617274=F196FB7F 
283 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rtrap-parfa/index-eng.asp 
284 Foreign Investment Protection Agreements are Canada’s bilateral investment treaties 
285 Canada currently has 25 FIPAs in force, has concluded FIPA negotiations with another 15 countries between 2008 and 2013 and 
is currently negotiating with 10 countries which includes Burkino Faso, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Tunisia and Vietnam.  They also have FTAs with investment chapters concluded or signed with 11 countries 
which includes NAFTA and on-going negotiations with another 10 on a bilateral basis and is an active participant in the TPP 
negotiations.  
286 Chapter 2 outlines the IIA landscape 
287 Chapter 2 defines investor state dispute settlement and its role in IIAs 
288 Chapter 2 outlines the arguments of the NGO and academic community around regulatory chill 
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HSE challenges under NAFTA Chapter 11 
 
To date Canada has faced 28 investor state dispute challenges out of 66 under NAFTA Chapter 
11289, a large number of which have been on HSE measures (as outlined in tables 3 and 4).  
NAFTA remains one of the most used investor-state dispute settlement instruments and 
certainly the one that has given greatest cause for concern with respect to challenges to HSE 
regulatory measures.  The NAFTA Chapter 11 investment disputes outlined in Table 3 show 
challenges to Canadian regulatory measures dealing with PCB waste, gasoline additives, the 
toxicity of pesticides and natural resource management across the federal departments of 
Health, Environment, Fisheries and Oceans, Natural Resources, The Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency as well as the Pest Management Review Agency.  These disputes also 
highlight the complexity of the shared federal and provincial jurisdiction for HSE regulations 
and the role played by the many levels of government under Canada’s federal system.   It is 
important to note that ‘the obligations under the NAFTA are assumed by the federal 
governments of Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. Therefore, these governments would be 
respondent in any dispute arising from alleged breaches of the Agreement’290, whether the 
alleged breaches originate at the federal, provincial, territorial or municipal levels of 
government.  We see this shared jurisdiction reflected across the disputes highlighted in 
tables 3 and 4. 
 
The disputes outlined below also give rise to the difficult question of whether a regulatory 
measure constitutes a legitimate HSE regulation or a veiled protectionist or discriminatory 
measure.291  Finally they highlight potential costs of an investor state challenge for the 
Government.  Two early cases against Canada, that of Ethyl Corporation v. Government of 
Canada and S.D. Meyers v. Government of Canada together resulted in over $25CAN million 
dollars in settlement money being paid to US investors. 
 
While the outcomes of these NAFTA disputes and the legitimacy of these regulatory measures 
as public policy instruments, as well as the right of investors to protection against 
discrimination or egregious treatment have been the subject of much study, very little work 
                                               
289 European Commission. ‘Fact Sheet – Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlements in EU Agreements’. 
November 2013 
290 Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Government of Canada: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/Mun-FAQs.aspx?lang=eng 
291 The issue of legitimacy is discussed in Chapter 2 and relates to the issue of regulatory independence versus political 
accountability as well as the appropriateness of independent regulation with respect to social decisions versus strictly economic 
based decisions.  This is explored in greater detail in Tony Posser’s Book The Regulatory Enterprise:  Government, Regulation and 
Legitimacy. 2010. Oxford University Press 
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has been done to consider their impact on regulatory development in the areas of HSE, 
particularly in the context of allegations of chill.        
 
Table 3 – Completed HSE ISDS challenges under NAFTA Chapter 11 
Completed NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes against Government of Canada 
Dispute Department/ 
type of 
dispute 
 
Measure Notice 
of Intent 
Award Nature of 
Award 
Outcome 
CAN$ 
Ethyl Corp. v. 
Government of 
Canada 
Health Canada 
 
HEALTH 
Regulation of gasoline 
additives: Ban on import and 
inter-provincial trade of 
unleaded gasoline additive 
methylcyclopentadienyl 
manganee tricarbonyl (MMT).  
MMT is a suspected 
neurotoxin 
Sept 
1997 
June 
1998 
found for 
Investor 
$20 million 
Government 
repealed the 
ban 
S. D. Myers v. 
Government of 
Canada 
Environment 
Canada 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
PCB waste export and import 
regulations: Temporary ban on 
export of toxic PCB waste 
July 1998 Dec 
2002 
found for 
Investor 
$6.05 million 
Chemtura Corp. 
v. Government 
of Canada 
PMRA-Health 
Canada 
Province of 
Ontario 
 
HEALTH 
Regulation of pesticides:  Ban 
on sale and use of crop 
pesticide and fungicide 
Lindane 
Nov 2001 Aug 
2010 
found for 
Government 
Investor paid 
arbitration 
cost ($688k) 
and 50% of 
Government 
costs 
($5.7million) 
V.G. Gallo v. 
Government of 
Canada 
Environment 
Canada 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
Waste disposal regulations: 
Provincial government blocks 
proposed landfill on site of 
decommissioned open-pit 
mine 
Oct 2006 Sept 
2011 
found for 
Government 
$450,000 cost 
Dow 
AgroScience 
LLC v. 
Government of 
Canada 
PMRA-Health 
Canada 
Province of 
Quebec 
 
HEALTH 
Regulation of pesticides: 
Quebec provincial ban on sale 
and certain uses of lawn 
pesticides containing 2.4-D 
Aug 2008 May 
2011 
Settled - 
Government 
 No 
compensation, 
withdrawal of 
Notice of 
Arbitration, 
measure 
upheld 
Abitibi Bowater 
Inc. v. 
Government of 
Canada 
Natural 
Resources 
Canada 
Province of 
Newfoundland 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
Natural resource regulation: 
Quebec Provincial measures to 
return water use and timber 
rights to crown and 
expropriate lands associated 
with hydro rights 
Apr 2009 Dec 
2010 
Settled - 
Investor 
Settlement of 
$130 million 
St Mary’s VCNA 
v. Government 
of Canada 
Environment 
Canada 
Province of 
Ontario 
 
ENIRONMENT 
Provincial land use regulation: 
measure taken by Ontario 
Government affecting proposal 
to convert agricultural lands 
into aggregate quarry. ($275 
million in compensation 
sought) 
May 
2011 
Mar 
2013 
Settled-
Government 
No 
compensation, 
withdrawal of 
Notice of 
Arbitration 
Source: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Government of Canada database of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes against 
Canada: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng 
 
Table 4 below outlines those HSE NAFTA Chapter 11 investment disputes that remain on-
going.  There has been an increasing trend towards such investment challenges in the HSE 
sphere with investor-state challenges to predominantly provincial government measures 
dealing with food and drug patents, land use regulations, natural energy sources and 
environmental management.  The on-going ISDS disputes listed in table 4 below account for 
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$2.21 billion in compensation sought by private investors under challenges to HSE measures 
in Canada today. 
 
Table 4 – On-going HSE ISDS challenges under NAFTA Chapter 11 
On-going NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes against Government of Canada 
Dispute Department Measure Notice of 
Intent 
Status 
Mobil 
Investments 
Canada Inc. v. 
Government of 
Canada 
Natural Resources 
Canada/ 
Environment 
Canada 
Province of 
Newfoundland 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
Oil and Gas Performance Requirements:  Canada-
Newfoundland offshore Petroleum Board placed 
requirements on Exon Mobil to Pay millions in 
R&D with respect to Hibernia & Terra Nova Oil 
fields ($40 million in damages sought) 
Aug 2007 Awaiting final 
award.  
Decision on 
liability in 
2012 found for 
the investor 
Clayton/ Bilcon v. 
Government of 
Canada 
 
CEAA 
DFO 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
Environmental Assessment Regulations: 
Provincial and federal environmental reviews 
resulting in Basalt quarry and marine terminal 
rejected due to adverse environmental impacts. 
($188USD Million in compensation sought) 
Feb 2008 On-going 
Mesa Power 
Group LLC v. 
Government of 
Canada 
 
Environment 
Canada 
Province of Ontario  
ENVIRONMENT 
Contract award criteria and approval process of 
the Food-in Tariff Program (FIT) under the 
Ontario Green Energy Act for wind farms to 
provide renewable electric power. ($775 million 
in compensation sought) 
July 2011 On-going 
Lone Pine 
Resources Inc. v. 
Government of 
Canada 
 
Environment 
Canada 
Province of Quebec 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
Environmental management regulations: 
Provincial measure revoking oil and gas 
exploration permits following partial moratorium 
on hydraulic fracking in Quebec. ($250 million in 
compensation sought) 
Nov  2012 On-going 
Windstream 
Energy LLC v. 
Government of 
Canada 
 
Environment 
Canada 
Province of Ontario 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
Environmental management regulations: Off shore 
wind farm project put on hold following a 
Provincial moratorium on off shore wind farms. 
($475 million in compensation sought) 
Oct 2012 On-going 
Eli Lilly & 
Company v. 
Government of 
Canada 
 
Health Canada 
 
HEALTH 
Food & drug and intellectual property regulations: 
Invalidation of the Strattera and Zprexa pharma 
patents because drugs no longer met clinical trial 
thresholds. ($500 million in compensation sought) 
Nov 2012 
(original) 
 
June 2013 
(new) 
On-going 
Source: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Government of Canada database of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes 
against Canada: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-
diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng292 
 
 
The key question is whether the trade and investment challenges outlined above are 
impacting the development of HSE regulations in Canada regardless of whether they have 
been resolved or remain ongoing.  Has the commencement of a NAFTA dispute in the areas of 
HSE or the eventual outcome of the dispute had an impact on either the trends in regulation 
in this area or on the regulators themselves?  The first ‘expectation’ of the hypothesis on 
regulatory chill regarding trends in HSE regulations will be tested, including an exploration of 
any relationship these trends in regulation might have with NAFTA disputes, then in Chapter 
                                               
292 The case of Sunbelt v. Government of Canada has not been included in this table as no valid claim was ever filed 
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5 the second ‘expectation’ regarding the impact of trade and investment on the regulatory 
development process and the awareness of federal regulators will be examined, as well as the 
importance they place on such disputes. 
 
3. TESTING EXPECTATION 1: TRENDS IN HSE REGULATION OVER LAST DECADE 
 
Expectation 1 – We would expect HSE regulatory trends to reflect regulatory chill (through a 
stagnant or weakening regulatory environment) in the wake of IIA challenges 
 
In an effort to understand the trends in HSE regulations over the last decade we have looked 
at the record of proposed and adopted HSE regulations as published in the Canada Gazette 
between 1998 and 2013293, the views of experienced senior federal regulators as expressed 
through the face-to-face interviews and electronic survey as well as the independent 
assessments of international organizations such as the OECD and an independent Canadian 
research organization.294   
 
Interestingly there was a downward trend in the growth rate of HSE regulations proposed 
and adopted over the period in question, although this trend is slightly less marked among 
actual regulations adopted.  This decrease demonstrates that the Canadian Government was 
introducing fewer new regulations or changes in regulations which is in line with a growing 
trend in regulatory reform and streamlining.  At the same time however, there was some 
evidence that environment and health disputes under NAFTA were correlated with lower 
numbers of environmental regulations in a couple of the years analysed.  Consistent with the 
data and input from all three sources, the analysis also shows that trends in HSE regulations 
reflected an increase in the stringency and comprehensiveness of those regulations, even in 
those areas which have been hardest hit by trade and investment challenges under NAFTA 
Chapter 11 on investment suggesting that the empirical evidence does not support the 
regulatory chill hypothesis.  The analysis and findings are outlined in detail below. 
                                               
293 This regulatory analysis did not include within the definition of HSE regulation, those regulations dealing with aboriginal land 
claims, federal-provincial equalization payments for health care, regulations dealing with issues of security such as firearms, 
terrorism, air security or sex offences.  These were deemed outside the scope of the analysis 
294 While any comprehensive analysis of HSE regulation would entail coverage of both federal and provincial regulation, this case study 
is focussed solely at the federal level.  This decision was made in an effort to ensure a manageable scope for this research given time and 
cost restrictions, the lead role played by the Federal Government on international trade as sole respondent in investor-stat disputes, and 
by the superior level of access that would be possible at the federal level of government.  This is addressed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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a. Trends in HSE regulations between 1998-2013 
 
The analysis of the Canada Gazette process involved a detailed review of thousands of 
published regulatory proposals in the Canada Gazette 1, as well as adopted regulations in the 
Canada Gazette 2, between 1998 and 2013 with a view to identifying those with a particular 
focus on health, safety or the environment.  These numbered 757 in the case of regulatory 
proposals and 1579 in the case of actual adopted regulations or regulatory changes.  This 
analysis was aimed at understanding the quantity of proposed and adopted regulations by 
subject area (health, safety or environment) and across federal departments but more 
importantly whether these new regulations or regulatory changes resulted in an increase or 
decrease in regulatory stringency and comprehensiveness.295 
 
A regulatory decrease for the purposes of this study refers to a decrease in the 
comprehensiveness or stringency of regulations or involves the elimination of regulations.  
More concretely this would include regulatory changes which exempt a substance after a 
review or scientific advance, move control of an activity or substance from criminal law to 
regulation, change a substance from prescription to non-prescription status, increase the 
allowable level of a restricted or controlled substance or generally reduce the burden of 
regulatory requirements on industry.  Examples of this might include a move away from the 
criminalization of marihuana to allow for its medicinal use in certain circumstances, 
exempting power assisted bicycles from federal safety standards, the elimination of a 
requirement for environmental assessments on all projects which are deemed ‘unlikely to 
cause more than minor adverse environmental effects or pose more than minor 
environmental risks’296 
 
A regulatory increase for the purposes of this study refers to an increase in the 
comprehensiveness or stringency of regulations achieved by expanding the scope of 
regulatory coverage to include new substances or areas of activity or by increasing the depth 
and complexity of compliance requirements.  This might involve measures which increase the 
protection of the environment and human health or general increases in the burden of 
compliance for industry.  Examples of this would include new regulations dealing with hand 
held radiation devices, those aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions through greater 
                                               
295 Aimed at addressing the first expectation of the hypothesis on regulatory chill: Expectation 1:  We would expect HSE regulatory 
trends to reflect regulatory chill (through a stagnant or weakening regulatory environment) in the wake of IIA challenges. 
296 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. 2007 . Federal Screenings:  An Analysis Based on Information from the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Registry Internet Site. http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/Content/4/5/0/4507E796-2D92-47B9-9DC1-
52F691619A8E/Federal_Screenings-eng.pdf 
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emission control standards, the setting of Maximum Residue Limits (MRL) for controlled 
substances or the prohibition of a toxic substance for use and sale in Canada. 
 
A neutral regulatory change for the purposes of this study refers to regulations where it is 
assumed the stringency and comprehensiveness of the regulation does not change, and might 
include non-substantive regulatory amendments, changes in fees or tariffs, clarifications to 
regulations or allowing for new uses of an existing registered substance.  Examples of this 
would include changes to fishing or hunting season dates and catch allowances in fishery 
conservation, changes to pilotage tariffs, the consolidation of Asbestos measures across many 
disparate Acts or general regulatory changes aimed at achieving greater efficiency, and 
modernization, often involving the shifting of cost burdens or a move to cost sharing 
arrangements.  
 
This analysis does not suggest that an increase in regulation is preferable to a decrease or 
place more value on one trend over the other.  It is ideologically possible to argue that 
decreasing or increasing regulation is beneficial for a variety of reasons.  Certainly a reduction 
in regulatory burden on business will reduce its cost of operation and allow for a more 
competitive and attractive Canadian investment climate.  Equally an increase in regulation 
aimed at protecting human health, such as in the case of tobacco control, would arguably have 
long term downward costs on the Canadian health care system by reducing smoking rates and 
the incidence of smoking related diseases.  The main purpose of this analysis is not to 
attribute value but rather to understand the trend as one possible indicator of regulatory 
chill.  Regulatory chill presupposes regulating less, reducing the stringency and 
comprehensiveness of regulations but also doing so out of fear for the consequences 
(whether it be the flight of FDI or the impact of litigation) 
 
Canada Gazette 1 – Proposed regulations or regulatory changes 
 
As previously mentioned, after a regulatory proposal has been approved by the Cabinet 
Minister responsible, it is published in the Canada Gazette 1 and undergoes public scrutiny 
during a period of 30-75 days.  This data is therefore considered a predictor of regulations to 
be adopted and reflects transparency in the regulatory development process.  All regulatory 
proposals in Gazette 1 were reviewed in this analysis and 757 were identified for inclusion in 
this HSE regulatory proposal database.297 
                                               
297 Appendix 1 is the Gazette 1 HSE Regulatory Proposal database created through the analysis of all regulatory proposals between 
1998-2012. 
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The analysis revealed a number of things regarding trends in HSE regulations.  First, the 
analysis of the Canada Gazette 1 HSE regulatory proposals split out across environmental, 
health and safety proposals as outlined in Diagram 2 below.  Proposed new or amended 
environmental regulations were the most numerous of all three types over the period studied, 
totalling 363 or 49%, followed by health at 250 or 34% and safety at 123 or 17%.  
 
Diagram 2 – Trends in HSE regulatory proposals across fields- Canada Gazette1 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 1298 
 
Additionally the majority of these proposals were concentrated across the key federal 
departments of Environment, Health, Transport, Fisheries and Oceans and the Food 
Inspection Agency.   
 
Finally as outlined in Diagram 3 below, the regulatory proposals were most commonly 
amendments to existing regulations followed by new regulatory proposals and a small 
category of regulatory repeals. 299 
 
                                               
298 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1 http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
299 Regulatory amendments involve a change to existing regulations and may involve either an increase or decrease in stringency 
and comprehensiveness, a new regulatory proposal involves regulating areas that have not previously been regulated while a 
regulatory repeal involves the removal of existing regulation.  This analysis of regulatory proposals does not attribute trends of 
increasing, decreasing or neutral regulatory change.  This is done under the Gazette 2 analysis. 
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Diagram 3 – Trends in HSE regulatory proposals by type- Canada Gazette1 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 1300 
 
Interestingly, year on year changes in regulatory proposals showed a decreasing trend in the 
growth rate of new regulations or regulatory amendments across all three fields of HSE. 
(Diagram 4)  The reduction in the growth rate or volume of proposed new regulations or 
regulatory changes may be partially explained by global and domestic trends towards less 
regulation and the shift by governments towards other instruments of public policy such as 
flexible less prescriptive regulation, co-regulation or self-regulation, market or incentive 
based approaches and education.301 
 
Diagram4– Trend line in HSE regulatory proposals by type- Canada Gazette1 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 1302 
                                               
300 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
301 OECD Report on Alternatives to Traditional Regulation 
302 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
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Canada Gazette 2 and NAFTA Investor State Dispute cases 
 
The analysis of Gazette two was aimed at understanding which HSE regulations were actually 
adopted during this same period, the extent to which there was a measurable relationship 
between the government’s proposals and actual regulations and whether adopted regulations 
or changes to regulations resulted in an increase or decrease in regulatory stringency and 
comprehensiveness or simply had a more neutral impact on regulation policy in these areas.  
All new regulations or regulatory changes from Gazette 2 from 1998-2013 were reviewed in 
detail and 1579 regulations were identified for the creation of this HSE database.303  
 
Not surprisingly the analysis of Gazette 2 showed a similar breakdown to Gazette 1 between 
regulation type (HSE) and department of origination with similar trends towards less year-
on-year new or amended HSE regulation.  Diagrams 5 through 7 show these trends with the 
federal departments of Health accounting for 31%, Environment 28%, Transport (safety) 
23%, Food Inspection (health) and Fisheries and Oceans (environment) 9% respectively. 
 
Diagram 5 – Departmental breakdown of HSE Regulation – Canada Gazette 2 
  
Analysis of Canada Gazette 2304 
 
When all regulations were categorized by health, safety or environmental type it is clear that 
environmental regulations were most numerous at 661, followed by health at 554 and safety 
at 364.  Again there was a downward trend in growth rate of new regulations or regulatory 
changes from a high of 113 regulations in 1998 to 63 in 2013, with the period between 1998 
                                               
303 Appendix 1 is the Gazette 2 HSE Regulatory Proposal database created through the analysis of all regulatory proposals between 
1998-2012. 
304 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
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and 2005 averaging 112 regulations per year while the period between 2006-2-13 averaging 
only 85 regulations per year.  As mentioned earlier, this downward trend seen in Diagram 7.   
It is not possible to determine definitively the causes of such a declining trend but we will be 
guided by the interviews held with senior government regulators who identified the trend in 
Canada during this period to regulate differently with an emphasis on modernization.  This 
trend towards the streamlining of regulations and modernization efforts aimed at reducing 
red tape and the regulatory burden on industry is likely a key driver.  Other factors may 
however have played a role such as a reduced imperative to introduce new regulations given 
the strong regulatory base Canada had already established through its regulatory 
development initiatives in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.   
 
Diagram 6 – Trends in HSE regulations by type – Canada Gazette 2 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 2305 
 
Diagram 7– Trend line in HSE regulations by federal department – Canada Gazette 2 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 2306 
                                               
305 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
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Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the correlation between proposed and 
adopted HSE regulations and whether the proposed regulations under Gazette 1 were 
predictors of the adopted regulations under Gazette 2.  The model as a whole was statistically 
significant and contained three types of regulations across the period of 1998-2012 as 
independent variables (Environment G1, Health G1 and Safety G1).  The model showed a 
positive correlation between proposed and adopted regulations in most years with odds 
ratios ranging from 0.996-4.551, suggesting that adopted HSE regulations were between 1 
and 4.5 times likely to result from proposed HSE regulations.  The independent variable 
Health G1 showed a statistically significant contribution to the model in 2005 and 2006.  The 
difficulty of reflecting the time lag between proposal and adoption might also have had an 
impact on the results.307  While this correlation was to be expected it demonstrates broadly 
that proposed regulations, following periods of public consultation were consistently 
adopted.  Furthermore the greater number of adopted to proposed regulations during this 
period reinforces this trend. 
 
Most interesting to the findings on the Gazette 2 analysis, was the fact that the analysis 
showed that the trends in adopted regulatory changes under Gazette 2 have been towards 
neutral regulatory change (58%) or regulatory increases (36%) with 566 regulations, 
representing increases in regulations and 912 showing a more neutral change.   
 
Diagram 8 – Composition of adopted HSE regulations – Canada Gazette 2 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 2308 
                                                                                                                                         
306 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
307 SPSS multinomial logistic regression was undertaken.  The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, X2 
(48, N=1580) = 97.26, p<.001 indicating that the model was able to determine either a positive or negative correlation between the 
adopted and proposed regulations.  The model as a whole explained between 6% (Cox and Snell R square) and 7% (Nagelkerke R 
square) of the variability based on type of regulation. 
308 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
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This shows that while the trends in the growth rate of HSE regulations were declining, the 
stringency and comprehensiveness of regulations were remaining constant or increasing.  
Diagram 8 above illustrates. 
 
When the regulatory trends are broken down across the three areas of health, safety and the 
environment we observe a number of factors.  First, the ratio between high levels of neutral 
regulatory change and regulatory increases in general remained constant across all three 
areas of HSE throughout the period.  Furthermore, while the growth rate of HSE regulations 
fell from 1998 levels by 2013 (by half for health & safety regulations, tough slightly less than 
half for environmental regulations), many of the intervening years continued to show 
consistent and relatively high levels of growth in regulation.  Diagrams 9-16 below illustrate 
this point across all three regulation types.   
 
Trends in environmental regulations 
 
Trends in environmental regulations as illustrated by diagrams 9 & 10 showed a high level of 
regulatory activity in 1999, 2001 and most significantly 2003 driven by amendments to the 
domestic substances list under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) including 
the identification and regulation of toxic substances, regulations aimed at reducing vehicle 
emissions and wildlife, migratory birds and fisheries preservation regulations.  
 
During this same period 1998-2013 there were a substantial number of NAFTA Chapter 11 
Investor State Dispute challenges to HSE regulations in Canada.  As outlined previously in 
table 3 & 4, measures dealing with PCB waste, gasoline additives, the toxicity of pesticides and 
issues of natural resource management and environmental assessment were among those 
challenged during this period. 
 
On the environment NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes were launched from 1998 with S.D. Meyers 
v. Government of Canada tabling the first Notice of Intent over the Government of Canada’s 
temporary ban on the export of toxic TCB waste. 309  Diagram 9 plots the tabling of Notice of 
Intents for eight environmental investment challenges310 as well as five environmental 
investment Awards three of which found in favour of the investor (in 1998 with S. D. Myers, 
                                               
309 S.D. Meyers Inc v. Government of Canada Notice of Intent 1998. http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/myers-01.pdf 
310 These included S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada (1998), V.G. Gallo v. Government of Canada (2006), Abitibi Bowater 
Inc. v. Government of Canada (2009), St. Mary’s VCNA v. Government of Canada (2011), Mobil Investments Canada Inc. v. 
Government of Canada (2007), Clayton/Bilcon v. Government of Canada (2008), Mesa Power Group LLC v. Government of 
Canada (2011),  Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Government of Canada (2012), Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada 
(2012). http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng  
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2010 with Abitibi Bowater, and 2012 with Mobil Investments decision on liability).311  These 
are outlined against the trend in environmental regulations with respect to growth rates in 
regulation (in Diagram 9) and their continued comprehensiveness and stringency (in 
Diagram 10).  We would expect the impact of the disputes to have a time lag of between one 
year and eighteen months which would give time for regulators to both absorb the 
information regarding the dispute and to take it into consideration when developing new 
regulations or making regulatory changes in the future. 
 
Diagram 9 – Trends in Environmental regulations & NAFTA disputes - Canada Gazette 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 2312 
 
The period between 1998 and 2002 reflects the filing of the Notice of Intent in the S.D. Myers 
case and subsequent award in favour of the investor.  There does not appear to be any 
marked change in regulation volume or comprehensiveness or stringency during that time.  
While there is actually a peak in activity in 2003, the volume of environmental regulations 
and their level of stringency and comprehensiveness remain constant through to 2013 with 
the exception of a dip in the trend for increased stringency of regulations in 2002, 2004 and 
most notably 2007. 
                                               
311 These included S. D. Myers v. Government of Canada (2002) for the investor, V.G. Gallo v. Government of Canada (2011) for 
the Government and Abitibi Bowater Inc. v. Government of Canada (2010) settled for the investor and Mobil Investments where an 
award on liability was issued for the investor. http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-
domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng  
312 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
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Diagram 10 – Stringency and comprehensiveness of environmental regulations – Canada Gazette 2 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 2313 
 
Direct logistic regression was performed to asses whether there was more likely to be an 
increase or decrease in the growth rate of environmental regulations on the back of a NAFTA 
Chapter 11 ISDS challenge to environmental measures (as denoted in this analysis by the 
filing of a NOI or arbitral award).  The model as a whole was statistically significant as a 
predictor and contained two independent variables, one reflecting the presence or absence of 
an environmental dispute and the other the year between 1998-2013.  The model suggested 
an inverse relationship between ISDS disputes and the adoption of regulations on the 
environment in most years and in health in some years during this period.  At the same time a 
statistically significant impact is shown by NAFTA Chapter 11 ISDS challenges to 
environmental measures in two of the of the fifteen years suggesting that the presence of an 
environmental ISDS challenge would decrease the probabliity of environmental regulations 
being adopted in 2002 and 2007.  The odds ratios in these cases were low however at or 
below 0.5.314 Futhermore the analysis suggests that a NAFTA Chapter 11 ISDS challenge on 
environmental measures was also 3 times more likely to increase the probablility of health 
regulations being adopted in 2013.  Table 5 illustrates shows the statistically significant 
findings. 
 
                                               
313 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
314 SPSS multinomial logistic regression was undertaken.  The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, X2 
(32, N=1580) = 58.93, p<.003 indicating the model was able to distinguish whether the existence of an ISDS dispute on the 
environment was relevant to the adoption of environmental or health regulation during the period 1998-2013.  The model as a 
whole explained between 3.7% (Cox and Snell R square) and 4.2% (Nagelkerke R square) of the variability based on the existence 
or not of an ISDS dispute. 
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Table 5 – Multinomial logistic regression predicting impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 environmental disputes 
on adopted environmental and health regulations between 1998-2013  
 
Environment 
Regulations 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP (B) 
Lower Upper 
2002 -.849 .397 4.573 1 .032 .428 .196 .932 
2007 -1.115 .404 7.614 1 .006 .328 .149 .724 
 
Health Regulations B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP (B) 
Lower Upper 
2013 1.236 .544 5.165 1 .023 3.442 1.185 9.997 
 
This result would suggest that there may be a correlation between a NAFTA Chapter 11 
environmental dispute and the growth rate of environmental regulations adopted.  
Interestingly, 2002 and 2007 are years which show a particularly low growth rate of 
regulations as well as lower levels of stringency and comprehensiveness in regulations being 
adopted.  Additionally, 2007 appears to be the year where the number of environmental 
regulations with decreasing stringency and comprehensiveness were highest.  The first 
period in 2002 is the year of the award in the S.D. Myers case, following the initial notice of 
intent in 1998.  The second period in 2007 following the filing of the notice of intent in the 
V.G. Gallo case but was prior to the launch of quite a large series of cases.  While it is difficult 
to determine the magnitude of the impact, there is nevertheless a statistically significant 
correlation worth considering.  It certainly raises the potential that these disputes were 
having a dampening effect on regulatory development at certain points over the period in 
question.  This does not negate the fact that overall trends in environmental regulation have 
consistently been towards a more stringent and comprehensive set of measures.  The impact 
on health regulations will be addressed below. 
 
Trends in health regulations 
 
Trends in health regulations as illustrated by Diagrams 11 & 12 showed consistently high 
levels of growth in regulation between 2000-2005 dropping off thereafter.  This increased 
regulatory growth reflected the establishment of maximum residue levels (MRLs) for 
multiple substances under the Food and Drug Act by the Pest Management Control Agency, 
establishing new uses for already approved substances, changes in the prescription status of 
controlled drugs as well as regulations dealing with hazardous products and changes to food 
inspection regulations dealing with meat, poultry and plants. 
 
                   118 of 245 
During this early period Canada faced numerous NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor State Dispute 
challenges to health measures beginning with the case of Ethyl Copr. V. Government of 
Canada in 1997 dealing with the ban on import and interprovincial trade of unleaded gasoline 
additive methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT),315 and was followed in 2001 
by Chemtura Corp. v. Government of Canada banning the pesticide Lindane from commercial 
lawn use.316   
 
Diagram 11 – Trends in health regulations & NAFTA disputes - Canada Gazette 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 2317 
Note:  The first NOI was in 1997 for Ethyl Corporation v.  Government of Canada 
 
Diagram 11 above plots the tabling of Notice of Intents for five health ISDS challenges 
including one that was launched in 1997318 as well as four awards, one of which found in 
favour of the investor (1998 with Ethyl Corporation). 319  These are outlined against the trend 
in health regulations with respect to levels of regulation and their continued 
comprehensiveness and stringency. 
                                               
315 Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada. Notice of Intent 1997. http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ethyl-01.pdf  
316 Chemtura Corp. v Government of Canada. Notice of Intent. 2001. http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/ethyl.aspx?lang=eng  
317 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
318 These included Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada (1996), Chemtura Corp. v. Government of Canada (2001), Dow 
AgroScience LLC v. Government of Canada (2008), Eli Lilly & Company v. Government of Canada (2012) 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng  
319 These included Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada (1998) for the investor, Chemtura Corp. v. Government of Canada (2010) 
for the government, Dow AgroScience LLC v. Government of Canada (2011) settled for the government.  
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng 
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Diagram 12 – Stringency and comprehensiveness of health regulations – Canada Gazette 2 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 2320 
 
Again, it is assumed that any influencing impact one might observe between the tabling of a 
Notice of Intent or Award from a NAFTA Chapter 11 challenge and a chilling in regulations 
would take a period of time (probably at least a year).  Our expectation is that regulators will 
develop awareness of this issue as it unfolds and begin to take it into consideration in their 
development of future regulation.  We can observe a slight dip in the volume of health 
regulations in 1999 and an overall lower trend in volume from 2006-2013.  The level of 
regulatory increase remains relatively constant however as illustrated in Diagram 12.  When 
regulatory trends are further split out in health by the federal departments and agencies 
dealing with health issues - Health Canada and the Pest Management Review Agency we see a 
more stark trend in dropping regulatory growth rates and levels of stringency and 
comprehensiveness within the PRMA (which faced two ISDS NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges) 
from 2006-2013 and in 2001-2002 within HC.  Diagrams 13 and 14 below illustrate.  Again, 
the declining trend in regulatory growth is partly due to the Government’s push towards 
modernization and efficiency mentioned earlier.  The drop in the case of the PMRA may also 
reflect the cyclical nature of the regulatory development process.  There does appear to be 
some relationship between the timing and number of disputes and changes in regulatory 
growth levels.  This will be examined through further statistical analysis. 
 
                                               
320 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
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Diagram 13 – Trends in PMRA regulations & NAFTA disputes – Canada Gazette 2 
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Diagram 14 – Trends in HC regulations & NAFTA disputes – Canada Gazette 2 
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As with environmental disputes, direct logistic regression was performed to asses whether 
there was more likely to be a decrease in health regulations on the back of a NAFTA Chapter 
11 challenge to health measures (as denoted in this analysis by the filing of a NOI or arbitral 
award).  Once again the model as a whole was statistically significant as a predictor and 
showed an inverse relationship between ISDS disputes on health and the adoption of 
environmental regulations in most years, and the adoption of health regulations in only five of 
                                               
321 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
322 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
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the thirteen years.  The model contained two independent variables, one reflecting the 
presence or absence of a health dispute and the other the year between 1998-2013.  Similar 
to the results shown for environmental disputes, there was a statistically significant impact 
shown by NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges to health measures on adopted health regulations in 
2013, suggesting that for every incidence of a NAFTA Chapter 11 challenge on a health 
measure, there was a 3.5 times probability of the adoption of health regulations in that year.  
In other words there was a positive correlation between NAFTA ISDS disputes and the 
adoption of health regulations.  This finding serves to further weaken the hypothesis on 
regulatory chill. 
 
At the same time however, there was also statistically significant impact shown by NAFTA 
Chapter 11 challenges to health measures on adopted environmental regulations, suggesting 
that the presence of trade dispute on health was likely to decease the probabliity of 
environmental regulations for the same two years  2002 and 2007.  The odds ratios in these 
two cases were low, at or below 0.5.323  Table 6 illustrates. 
 
Table 6 – Multinomial logistic regression predicting impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 health disputes on 
adopted environmental and health regulations between 1998-2013  
 
Environment 
Regulations 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP (B) 
Lower Upper 
2002 -.849 .397 4.574 1 .032 .428 .196 .932 
2007 -1.116 .404 7.630 1 .006 .328 .149 .723 
 
Health Regulations B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP (B) 
Lower Upper 
2013 1.252 .543 5.322 1 .021 3.496 1.207 10.127 
 
As with the earlier analysis, this result appears to reinforce the correlation between a NAFTA 
Chapter 11 dispute and the volume of environmental regulations adopted.  This does raise 
some questions however regarding how NAFTA disputes against measures from one 
department (health) could increase the probability of a decrease in regulations in another 
(environment).  This is made all the more perplexing given that those same health measures 
appear to be having the opposite impact within the health department, spurring an increase 
in the development of health regulations.  Nevertheless, the findings with respect to 
environmental regulations is worth noting and can be considered in the context of 
                                               
323 SPSS multinomial logistic regression was undertaken.  The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, X2 
(32, N=1580) = 58.35, p<.002 indicating the model was able to distinguish whether the existence of an ISDS dispute on health was 
relevant to the adoption of environmental or health regulation during the period 1998-2013.  The model as a whole explained 
between 3.7% (Cox and Snell R square) and 4.2% (Nagelkerke R square) of the variability based on the existence or not of an ISDS 
dispute. 
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information received through the in-depth interviews and survey responses by senior federal 
Canadian regulators in the remainder of this chapter and in Chapter 5. 
 
Trends in safety regulations 
 
Finally, trends in safety regulations showed increased levels of regulation in 2002, 2003 and 
2007 driven predominantly by improvements to motor vehicle safety regulations aimed at 
addressing new safety concerns and harmonizing with US standards as well as shipping 
safety, the transport of dangerous goods and arctic water pollution prevention. 
 
Diagram 15 – Trends in safety regulations- Canada Gazette 2  
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 2324 
 
The trends in safety regulations follow a similar pattern to those on environment and health 
both in terms of regulation growth rates and trends in regulatory increases versus neutral 
regulatory changes and provide a helpful counterfactual given the absence of NAFTA Chapter 
11 challenges to safety measures during this period. 
                                               
324 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
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Diagram 16 – Stringency and comprehensiveness of safety regulations – Canada Gazette 2 
 
Analysis of Canada Gazette 2325 
 
The key findings of this analysis are that the trends in HSE regulations have been towards 
fewer new regulations year on year but with neutral or increasing stringency and 
comprehensiveness of regulations across all main departments, with the majority of proposed 
regulations making it into law.  At the same time there appeared to be some correlation 
between the adoption of environment and health regulations and the filing of NOI or Awards 
under NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes during this period suggesting a possible influencing factor, 
particularly in the area of environmental regulations.  The views of regulators are probed in 
section two and will help provide the necessary qualitative information to understand the 
trends we are seeing in Canada between 1998 and 2013. 
 
b. Perspectives from Federal Regulators 
 
In addition to the analysis of proposed and adopted HSE regulations under the Canada 
Gazette, a large and representative group of senior Canadian federal regulators were asked 
through both survey and in-depth interviews, their views regarding trends in regulations 
over the last decade.  Together they confirmed the trend in increased stringency of 
regulations and provided a concrete explanation of the influencing factors. 
 
In the face-to-face interviews, regulators were asked how they felt regulations had changed in 
their area of expertise over the last ten years and whether they felt these regulations had 
become more or less stringent or comprehensive, where stringent referred to the 
                                               
325 Data is from Treasury Board archives of Gazette 1: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/archives-eng.html 
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requirements for a greater depth of science to demonstrate acceptability of risk and 
comprehensive referred to the number of emerging areas being regulated.  Interviewees were 
also asked to give examples to illustrate their answers.   
 
The largest group of regulators in these interviews felt that regulations had become more 
stringent.  A few regulators felt that regulations had remained static while a substantial group 
argued that regulations were neither more nor less stringent and comprehensive but rather 
that the Canadian government was regulating differently.  The focus, particularly in more 
recent years has been on ensuring the continuity of health, safety and environmental 
regulation yet with an effort to ensure smarter regulations and fewer burdens on industry.  
Finally in some cases it was felt there had been substantial regulatory change involving the 
establishment of a new act (Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012), a complete 
regulatory overhaul (Chemical Management Plan) or even the establishment of aggressive 
future regulatory targets (on Green House Gas emissions).   
 
The results of the online survey showed similar trends when regulators were asked whether 
regulations had become more or less stringent and more or less comprehensive.   
 
Table 7 – Regulators’ views on trends in the comprehensiveness of HSE Regulations over last decade 
3.  To the best of your knowledge, would you say that regulation within your area of expertise 
has become more or less comprehensive in its coverage over the last decade (where 
comprehensive refers to the number of emerging areas being regulated)? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
More 
comprehensive 
  
 
91 67% 
2 
Less 
comprehensive 
  
 
22 16% 
3 Other   
 
22 16% 
 Total  135 100% 
Source: Qualtrics survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report 22 May 2013 
 
As Table 7 indicates, 67%, the majority of the 135 survey respondents believe that 
regulations have become more comprehensive in terms of the number of areas being 
regulated over the last decade while 16% felt they had remained constant.   
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Table 9 – Regulators’ views on trends in the stringency of HSE Regulations over last decade 
4.  To the best of your knowledge, would you say that regulation in your area of expertise has 
become more or less stringent over the last decade (where stringent refers to the requirements 
for a greater depth of science to demonstrate acceptability of risk)? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 More stringent   
 
80 59% 
2 Less stringent   
 
28 21% 
3 Other   
 
27 20% 
 Total  135 100% 
Source:  Qualtrics survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report 22 May 2013 
 
Similarly 59% of respondents felt that regulations had become more stringent in terms of 
greater depth of science to demonstrate acceptability of risk, with 20% suggesting they had 
remained constant.  In both cases less than a fifth felt regulations felt they had become either 
less comprehensive or less stringent.  Roughly one fifth of regulators also argued that 
governments were regulating differently. 
 
The drivers for increases in regulatory stringency and comprehensiveness 
 
Regulators identified a number of drivers responsible for increases in regulatory stringency 
and comprehensives.  The primary reasons which emerged from the face-to-face interviews 
were consistent with those identified in the Federal Regulator Survey analysis.   The main 
drivers for changes or increases in regulatory stringency and comprehensiveness were the 
fact that new areas were now being regulated, that there were deeper science requirements, a 
strong international influence, increasing public scrutiny and demands, and a push for 
harmonization of regulations with the US.  These factors sat alongside the trend for regulatory 
efficiency and modernization, which was seen as a factor impacting the changing nature of 
how government regulates in Canada.326 
 
New areas being regulated 
Over the last decade regulators told us new areas have emerged which require a regulatory 
response (the use of new hand held radiation devices, the emergence of e-waste and new 
vehicle safety requirements are a case in point).  Interviewees cited the broader nature of 
regulations and the increased comprehensiveness of coverage. In the online survey, a third of 
recipients argued that this was the case.    
                                               
326 Appendix 6 includes details of the qualitative coding of the Canadian Federal Regulator Interviews 
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By way of illustration, regulators argued that this was the ‘first time the government (is) 
regulating air emissions’ and that ‘regulations cover new areas’ and that ‘increased species 
and chemicals (were) being managed through regulation’.327 
 
Deeper Science Requirements 
 
Regulators argued that deeper science requirements were a factor leading to greater 
stringency and comprehensiveness of requirements.  They cited the increased depth of 
analysis and science required as well as the role played by technological advances in many 
areas of health, safety and the environment and the subsequent increases in complexity. 
In the online survey, over 15% of respondents argued that deeper science requirements were 
a factor leading to greater stringency and comprehensiveness of requirements.  They cited 
greater evidence and knowledge requirements, a science driven focus and the quality of data 
as key factors. 
 
Regulators argued that ‘scientific understanding of hazard and risk (has) become deeper’, 
that ‘regulations reflect current capacity of science’, that there were ‘more science-based 
decisions’ or the ‘increasing need for more evidence’.328 
 
International influence 
The role of international standard setting bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Control (IPCC), Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and CODEX (the 
World Health Organization (WHO) organization on international food standards) have been a 
factor impacting increases in comprehensiveness and stringency in regulations.  Canada is an 
active participant in these global bodies on issues such as climate control, tobacco control and 
food safety standards to name a few.  Additionally, international influence was responsible for 
the tightening of regulations in the area of nuclear safety as a result of world events such as 
the conflict in Iraq, 9/11 and the Fukushima nuclear incident.329  In line with survey 
respondents, 10% of respondents highlighted this as a key influence on the scope and scale of 
regulation. 
 
Regulators argued that there were ‘more links to external standards’ or that ‘regulations are 
dictated by international treaty’.330 
                                               
327
 Interview transcripts with Canadian Federal Regulators 2012 – non attributable comments for reasons of confidentiality 
328 Ibid 
329 Ibid 
330 Ibid 
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Public scrutiny and demands 
A small category to emerge was the issue of public scrutiny and the subsequent demands on 
regulators to address safety and environmental concerns.  There was a feeling of greater 
public scrutiny and stakeholder involvement in the identification of new regulations or 
regulatory changes. 
Arguments raised by regulators in this area were that there is ‘increased attention by the 
general public’ or that the ‘public also demands very safe products.’331 
 
Harmonization 
While survey respondents did highlight the importance of cooperation with the US through 
harmonization, the regulators interviewed face-to-face placed a greater emphasis on this 
factor.  Initiatives such as the Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC) were seen as very 
significant influences on regulatory development.  The need to align regulations with the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the specific example of Green House Gase (GHG) 
regulations were highlighted as key factors.  Concern over the potential loss of sovereignty 
resulting from the increased difficulty of pursuing ‘made in Canada’ responses was also 
raised. 
 
Regulatory Efficiency and Modernization 
Government wide initiatives on regulatory efficiency and modernization have resulted in 
more focussed regulation as a counterbalance to other pressures already mentioned and was 
highlighted by the largest group of interviewees with over half of those interviewed identify 
this as a key factor (compared with over 15% of survey respondents).  The government’s shift 
from process to output based regulations, the cost/benefit focus, the use of alternative control 
mechanisms as well as the movement to smarter focussed regulations were all key factors.  
Together these changes in regulatory approaches demonstrate how the government is 
regulating differently or reflects what some regulators in the online survey saw as a 
downward trend.  This also explains how regulations could reduce in number yet increase in 
stringency and comprehensiveness as seen in the analysis of regulatory trends under the 
Canada Gazette. 
 
Regulators suggested that ‘Environmental assessment is more focussed’ and that the 
government ‘no longer require assessments for smaller scale projects’.  ‘Clarity of 
                                               
331 Interview transcripts with Canadian Federal Regulators 2012 – non attributable comments for reasons of confidentiality 
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requirements’ and ‘flexibility for the regulated community’ were both comments illustrative 
of this trend. 
 
There were a number of key areas which were highlighted as examples of how regulations 
have changed over the last decade through aggressive initiatives by the federal government to 
address concerns in the areas of HSE as well as to modernize the existing regulatory 
framework. 
 
Canadian Federal Regulatory Initiatives 
Chemical Management Plan:  The Chemical Management plan launched 2006, is a joint Health Canada and 
Environment Canada initiative was Canada’s response to the United Nations Environment Program’s (UNEP) 
strategic approach to chemicals management.  The goal of the program is to assess and manage 23,000 chemicals 
in use in Canada and in particular under the Challenge Initiative to look at 200 high priority chemicals and 
undertake a re-evaluation.  Another key feature of the initiative are the greater powers established to revoke or 
grant chemical registration. 
New Environmental Assessment Act:  The establishment of The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 
(CEAA 2012) involved a full modernization  of the regulatory system aimed at responsible resource management.  
A key aspect of the new act has been a move to focus exclusively on large natural resource projects which are most 
likely to cause an environmental impact and to discontinue the evaluation of projects which were deemed ‘unlikely 
to cause more than minor adverse environmental effects or pose more than minor environmental risks’ 332, 
currently 90% of all environmental assessments. 
Tobacco Control Act and new regulations:  Canada has been a world leader in the area of tobacco control 
regulations.  Steps have included the adoption of The Tobacco Product Control Act of 1988 to deal with 
advertising, reporting and labelling, the adoption of The Tobacco Sales to Young Persons Act in 1994, The New 
Tobacco Act in 1997 and the adoption of pictoral health warnings in 2000 and increases in health warnings to 75% 
of total packaging in 2004. 
US EPA alignment on GHG emissions:  The Canadian government has been very active alongside the US in dealing 
with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  With respect to tailpipe emissions for vehicles, regulations set the level of 
contaminants that have to be met and require more aggressive action on the part of producers to develop 
technology to reduce these contaminants.  On greenhouse gases the goal is a doubling of the level of reduction in 
the economy by 2025.  Internationally Canada has been involved with the UN World Forum for harmonization of 
vehicle regulations which in its 1998 agreement added vehicle emissions.  
 
Unlike the online survey, none of the regulators interviewed argued that regulations had 
become less stringent or comprehensive.  There was much focus on the fact that they were 
regulating differently both in terms of the output based focus of regulations and efforts to 
ensure they were applied in the most efficient manner. 
 
                                               
332 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. 2007 . Federal Screenings:  An Analysis Based on Information from the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Registry Internet Site. http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/Content/4/5/0/4507E796-2D92-47B9-9DC1-
52F691619A8E/Federal_Screenings-eng.pdf 
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c. Perspectives from international or independent agencies 
 
This analysis of regulatory trends also looked to the assessment of the international 
community regarding Canada’s regulatory performance in the area of HSE.  While there was 
no perfect analysis of performance, a number of studies provide both an international and 
independent domestic perspective. 
 
The OECD undertakes a Review of Regulatory Reform of member countries on a rolling basis, 
aimed at improving domestic regulatory quality.  A review of the Canadian regulatory 
environment was undertaken in 2002.  While somewhat dated, the review highlights Canada’s 
world class transparency and public consultation process (through its Regulatory Impact 
Analyses - RIAs), its practice of balancing social and competitiveness goals, as well as the 
challenges of regulated areas of shared federal provincial jurisdiction.  The OECD also 
highlights Canada’s early focus on regulatory reform, suggesting that ‘unlike most OECD 
countries, Canada shows a declining trend in the growth rate of new legislation and 
regulation’.    While this report was undertaken at the beginning of the period of relevance for 
this analysis it is worth noting that it includes all areas of economic and social regulation and 
according to the OECD this trend  must be mitigated by the fact that it incorporates the 
consolidation of regulatory instruments and the growing use of performance based 
standards.333  However, this declining trend in the growth rate of new legislation and 
regulation is consistent with the continuing trend found in the Canada Gazette analysis 
outlined earlier, and serves as a counterfactual for the analysis of regulatory trends.  The 10 
year period covered by the OECD report 1992-2002 shows declining trends in the growth of 
new legislation during a period where NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes had not yet commenced. 
 
In 2004 the OECD also undertook an Environmental Performance Review of Canada aimed at 
assessing progress made since its last review in 1995.  While again quite dated the OECD does 
find that ‘since the mid-1990s Canada has made significant improvements in its 
environmental policies’,334 highlighting improvements to the legislative framework through 
the 1999 Canadian Environmental Protection Act coupled with effective policies for 
compliance and enforcement as well as mechanisms for public communication.  The report 
also praises Canada’s record of co-operation on the environment both internationally and at 
the regional level but argues that it has not been effective at translating the international 
commitments into action as a result of the challenges of federal provincial shared 
                                               
333 OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform Canada.  OECD 2002. P 32. 
334 OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Canada. OECD 2004 
                   130 of 245 
responsibility and cuts to budgets.  Overall these reports do not tell us enough about the 
trends in health, safety and environmental regulation both because of their dated nature as 
well as their focus on regulatory management or outcomes rather than regulatory trends. 
 
Perhaps of more direct relevance, the Conference Board of Canada, an independent research 
organization in Canada produces report cards on Canada’s environmental and health 
performance against 16 peer countries through a multi-year research program.  On the 
environment in 2012, while Canada received a ‘C’ grade overall, ranking 15th out of the 17 
countries analysed, its performance improved between 1990 and 2009 across “ten indicators 
in the overall Environment report card, stayed the same for one indicator, and worsened for 
two indicators”335  Table 9 below shows the trend across air quality, waste, water, 
biodiversity and conservation, natural resource management and climate change and energy 
efficiency.  This suggests that while Canada’s relative position against other states was weak, 
it has made progress on the quality of its environmental program over the last two decades.  
How quality of its environmental program relates to levels of regulatory stringency and 
comprehensiveness is difficult to determine definitively but would suggest an increase rather 
than decrease.  This analysis, covering the ten year period before as well as the ten years after 
the commencement of NAFTA Chapter 11 ISDS challenges to government environmental 
measures also serves to illustrate the counterfactual and does not seem to have changed the 
upward trend in environmental regulatory quality. 
 
Table 9 – Conference Board of Canada Environmental Report Card 
                                               
335 Conference Board of Canada Environment Report Card. http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/details/environment.aspx 
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On health, Canada receives a ‘B’ grade ranking 10th among the 17 peer countries.  While there 
are a number of areas of poor performance, the Conference Board of Canada claims that ‘on 
balance, fewer Canadians are dying today from the diseases benchmarked here than they did 
in the 1960s and 1970s’ (see table 10)336.  Furthermore, Canada performs ahead of its peer 
group in a number of key areas related to life expectancy and mortality due to disease is 
perhaps also reflective of the trend in neutral regulatory change highlighted in the Canada 
Gazette analysis.  Perhaps a highlight of regulatory efficiency is demonstrated by Canada’s 
leading performance on the risk factors of tobacco and alcohol consumption.  Reference is 
made to tobacco control regulation which has led to Canada registering among the lowest 
proportion of smokers among OECD countries.   
 
Table 10 – Conference Board of Canada Health Report Card 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In testing the first ‘expectation’ regarding the regulatory chilling impact of IIAs on HSE 
regulations in Canada we looked at a number of primary and secondary sources in an effort to 
achieve a triangulation of data.  Overall while the analysis found a downward trend in the 
                                               
 
336 Conference Board of Canada Health Report Card.  http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/details/health.aspx 
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growth rate of new HSE regulations but an increasing trend in the stringency and 
comprehensiveness of regulations in health safety and environment.  We did however find 
some evidence of a trend of stagnant or weakening regulations in the wake of NAFTA Chapter 
11 challenges in the case of environmental regulations which serves as a factor mitigating our 
overall results. 
 
An analysis of the Canada Gazette 1 and Canada Gazette 2 shows a declining trend in the 
growth rate of new regulations or regulatory changes, but an increasing trend in the 
stringency and comprehensiveness of regulations in health safety and environment.  The 
analysis showed that the trends in adopted regulatory changes under Gazette 2 have been 
towards neutral regulatory change (58%) or regulatory increases (36%) with 566 
regulations representing increases in regulations and 912 showing a more neutral change. 
  
There was at the same time some evidence of a statistical correlation between Chapter 11 
disputes on environment and health measures and the adoption of environment and health 
regulations during a few of the years between 1998-2013.   There was a statistically 
significant impact shown by NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges to environmental or health 
measures in two of the of the fifteen years suggesting that the presence of an investment 
dispute on the environment and health was likely to decease the probabliity of the adoption 
of environmental regulations in 2002 and 2007.  This raised the potential that these NAFTA 
disputes were having a dampening effect on regulators during the period in question.  At the 
same time however, a NAFTA Chapter 11 challenge on environmental or health measures was 
also likely to increase the probablility of the adoption of health regulations in 2013.  This 
positive correlation suggests it was not a concern in the development of health regulations. 
This has interesting implications regarding the impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 and will be 
explored further in Chapter 5 through the in-depth interviews and survey of Federal 
Canadian regulators. 
 
Senior Federal HSE regulators in Canada believe that regulations in HSE have generally been 
increasing in stringency and comprehensiveness driven by new areas now being regulated, 
deeper science requirements, a strong international influence, increasing public scrutiny and 
demands, and the push for harmonization of regulations with the US.  Alongside this trend, a 
desire for regulatory efficiency and modernization has also resulted in a different way of 
regulating (a partial explanation for declining trends in the growth rate of regulations). 
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While not providing a clear perspective on trends in regulation the OECD confirms the 
Canadian focus on regulatory reform and a different way of regulating and highlights 
Canada’s improvement in environmental policies as a reflection of increased stringency and 
comprehensiveness.  Canada also receives praise for its steady performance on health and the 
environment from the Conference Board of Canada. 
 
Chapter 5 will test the second ‘expectation’ of the hypothesis on regulatory chill through an 
analysis of the regulatory development process and the role that trade and investment plays 
within that process. 
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Chapter 5:  Case Study 1:  The Canadian regulatory 
environment – The role of international trade and 
investment 
 
 
‘The regulatory chill thesis is of course difficult to prove or disprove.  First, it assumes that 
regulators are aware of international law, but are they?’ 
 
Jack Coe and Noah Rubins337 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter outlined how trends in HSE regulatory development in Canada over the 
last decade have been towards more stringent and comprehensive HSE regulations 
addressing the first expectation on regulatory chill.  In an effort to understand the regulatory 
impact of these agreements, we are also concerned with regulator awareness of IIAs and the 
possibility of an investor-state challenge, and the extent to which HSE regulators take these 
into consideration in the regulatory development process.  An analysis of the in-depth 
interviews and electronic survey of federal HSE regulators provide some valuable insights on 
these issues and allow us to address the second ‘expectation’ which underlies the hypothesis 
on regulatory chill. 
 
2. THE KEY DRIVERS OF REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
In trying to understand the role played by Canada’s international trade and investment 
commitments in influencing the regulatory development process, the in-depth interviews 
with regulators and the electronic survey began by probing the main influences. 
 
a. The main influences on the regulatory development process 
 
During the in-depth interviews, regulators were asked to outline and discuss the primary 
factors which influenced their regulatory development process.  The main influencing factors 
                                               
337 Coe, Jack and Noah Rubins. 2005. Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context and Contributions. In International 
Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law, 
edited by Todd Weiler, 597-667. London: Cameron May.  
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for them were responding to health, safety and environmental needs, to advances in science 
and technology, to stakeholder expectations, to domestic streamlining and modernization 
initiatives, complying and harmonizing with international standards and commitments, and 
facilitating international trade.338 
 
Responding to health, safety and environmental needs 
 
A primary driver of regulatory development involved regulators responding to the health and 
safety needs of the population as set out in the mandates of each federal department.    The 
focus varied across the various departments between an emphasis on safety (such as in the 
case of Transport Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, or the Canadian 
Nuclear Safety Commission), on health (across Health Canada, the Pest Management Review 
Agency and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency) or the environment (across Environment 
Canada, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency and Fisheries and Oceans Canada).  
Regulatory development was driven by existing gaps in protection, assessed levels of risk or 
responding to an existing need. 
 
This driver was seen as the primary one by many of the regulators interviewed.  ‘First and 
foremost is the determination of the health issue’339 was how one regulator described the 
influences.   
 
Responding to advances in science and technology 
 
While the overall health, safety or environmental mandate was a key driver, so to was the 
need for regulators to be seen responding to advances in science, emerging scientific data, 
technology and innovation when developing regulations or amending existing regulations. 
 
Complying and harmonizing with international standards and commitments 
 
Regulators identified the need to comply with international standards and commitments as a 
driver of domestic regulatory development.  This included everything from aligning 
regulations with standards set by the international community, responding to international 
trends and generally adhering to international commitments such as those established 
through technical barriers to trade (TBT) or sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreements.  
Similarly, they identified the importance of harmonizing regulations with the US and 
                                               
338 Quantitative coding of interview data was undertaken in order to identify the key categories and themes outlined here.  Appendix 
6 provides the coding and categories resulting from this analysis 
339Canadian Federal Regulator Interview transcripts – un-attributable quote due to confidentiality   
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internationally.  The recent Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC) was seen as an influential 
force in this regard.  As one regulator put it ‘The bedrock is US regulation’.340   
 
Additionally, it was often difficult to justify a different regulatory approach given the size of 
the Canadian market.  One senior health regulator explained how they are consistently 
challenged in this regard ‘Why are we not adopting a US or European solution?  We have 
some latitude to exercise our sovereignty but the question is always whether this is really 
needed.  What are the key differences with other major trading partners that would 
necessitate such a unique approach.’341 
 
Responding to stakeholder expectations 
 
Responding to stakeholder expectations was another factor impacting the regulatory 
development process.  This included incorporating or aligning with the expectations of the 
provinces, responding to Non-Governmental Organizations as well as consumers or the 
general public.  Formal mechanisms have been put in place to solicit feedback from 
stakeholders as part of the regulatory development process. 
 
Responding to domestic streamlining and modernization initiatives 
 
Responding to the various domestic streamlining and modernization initiatives that have 
been the cornerstone of the Federal Government’s agenda was identified as another 
influencing factor in regulatory development.  As outlined previously these originated with 
the Cabinet Directive on Smart Regulations as a response to the OECD’s analysis of Canadian 
regulations in 2002 and more recently the Red Tape Reduction Task Force which has 
spawned policies such as the One-for-One initiative within a comprehensive government 
response. 342   
 
This was very much top of mind in the discussion with senior regulators and had resulted in 
the development of regulations which took into account the cost-benefit equation, improving 
efficiency, streamlining, more focus on outcome based versus prescriptive regulations and a 
                                               
340 Canadian Federal Regulator Interview transcripts – un-attributable quote due to confidentiality   
341 Ibid 
342 The One-for-One Rule ‘will require regulators to offset new administrative burden costs imposed on business with equal 
reductions in administrative burden from the stock of existing regulations.  They will also have to remove a regulation when a new 
one increases administrative burden costs on business.  Canada will be the first country to give such a rule the weight of legislation.’ 
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. Red Tape Reduction Action Plan 2012. 
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general push to modernize where regulations were seen as outdated.  As one regulator put it 
‘There is a desire not to impose onerous costs’343. 
 
Facilitating international trade 
 
Finally, facilitating international trade was identified as an influencing factor in the regulatory 
development process.  The focus here was very much on maintaining competitiveness and 
continuing to ensure market access through regulations which did not impose undue burdens 
on industry or to the free flow of goods and services with Canada’s trading partners.  At this 
early stage of interviews, regulators did not raise the issue of international trade and 
investment commitments or international trade and investment disputes through their own 
volition, as factors of relevance to the process.   
   
In addition to face-to-face interviews, an electronic survey was used to capture views on this 
issue.  Table 1 below outlines the findings. 
 
 Table 1 – Factors influencing the regulatory development process 
6.  When developing new regulations, changes to existing regulations, providing regulatory 
authorization or making decisions on evaluation and monitoring, there are a number of key 
drivers in your decision making process.  Please rank the influences below, where 1 indicates the 
most influential and 8 the least. 
# Answer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
Respo
nses 
1 
The public environmental, health or 
safety need 
85 
21 11 1 3 4 0 0 126 
2 
Science or technological advances in 
the field 
10 
36 
15 
17 
20 6 19 2 126 
3 
Canada's international trade and 
investment commitments 
6 11 12 24 15 20 31 6 126 
4 
The views of key industry stakeholders 
or proponents 
3 25 22 25 25 16 7 2 126 
5 
The views of other stakeholders such as 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) or the public 
1 9 22 12 27 28 20 6 126 
6 
Global trends such as the work of 
international bodies 
4 13 
30 
16 13 22 21 6 126 
7 
Domestic initiatives such as efforts at 
regulatory streamlining or red tape 
reduction 
19 18 17 27 12 17 13 2 126 
8 Other 10 5 4 2 3 5 2 93 126 
 Total 138 138 133 
12
4 
118 118 113 117 - 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
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When this broader group of regulators were asked a very similar question, the electronic 
survey yielded quite consistent results with public environmental, health or safety needs 
ranking as the key driver of regulatory development by 85 or 61% of regulators.  This was 
followed by science or technological advances in the field and global trends such as the work 
of international bodies.  As Table 1 below shows, Canada’s international trade and investment 
commitments ranked last for 25% of regulators surveyed, with close to 50% placing it in the 
bottom half of decision making influences. 
 
3. TESTING EXPECTATION 2:  THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT IN THE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
 
Of primary interest in this analysis is understanding the specific role that international trade 
and investment commitments play in the regulatory development process and gauging the 
level of awareness of regulators with respect to these commitments and particularly NAFTA 
Chapter 11. 
 
a. The role of international trade and investment in the regulatory development process 
 
Regulators were asked to outline and discuss how specifically they considered international 
trade in the regulatory development process.  This was obviously key to the research 
question regarding the impact of trade and investment agreements on HSE regulation.  By 
probing the ways in which regulators consider Canada’s international trade and investment 
commitments in the regulatory development process, the goal was to understand the level of 
impact in general and how litigation under bilateral investment agreements or NAFTA was 
specifically of relevance.  The goal was also to determine the level of awareness that existed 
among regulators about the potential impact of these international investment agreements 
such as NAFTA Chapter 11 and whether they made a distinction when discussing ‘trade’ 
between the goal of ensuring trade facilitation and ensuring market access, versus the 
avoidance of disputes or even between the different types of trade and investment 
commitments to which Canada is signatory.   
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Table 2 – Regulators’ views on the relevance of trade and investment commitments 
7.  To what extent do you consider Canada's trade and investment commitments as relevant to 
the regulatory process? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Very much   
 
39 31% 
2 Some   
 
61 48% 
3 not very much   
 
22 17% 
4 not at all   
 
4 3% 
 Total  126 100% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
While Canada’s trade and investment commitments ranked low vis-à-vis all other factors 
influencing the regulatory development process (as outlined in Section B), when regulators 
were asked the extent to which they consider Canada’s trade and investment commitments as 
relevant to the regulatory process in more absolute terms, Table 2 above shows that 31% said 
‘very much’, 48% said ‘some’ while 20% said either ‘not very much’ or ‘not at all’.  This varied 
marginally by level of seniority with the most senior regulators at the Director General level 
evenly split between these three responses and the remaining regulators from Director, 
Section Head, Manager or the more technical non managerial grades, all most likely to give 
‘some’ consideration to trade and investment commitments.344  This is perhaps not surprising 
as one might expect these types of issues to be more top of mind the more senior the 
regulator.  The next section outlines how specifically this was a consideration. 
 
Specific ways in which regulators consider trade and investment 
 
Regulators where asked in the electronic survey to identify under what situations Canada’s 
trade and investments commitments were of most concern and were asked to identify all 
those which they felt were relevant.   
                                               
344
 SPSS cross-tabulation indicates that 56.5% Directors, 48.1% Section Heads, 47.4% Managers and 46.7% Other responded 
‘some’ to this question. 
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Table 3 – Regulators’ views on the role played by trade and investment commitments 
8.  When are Canada's trade and investment commitments of most concern to you?  Which 
of the following describe how trade plays a role in your decision making?  You can identify 
as many as are  
# Answer   Response % 
1 When a trade agreement is being negotiated 
by Canada (to ensure any new commitments 
are compatible with existing regulations) 
  
 45 36% 
2 
In balancing the economic cost-benefits of a 
regulatory decision, in order to avoid a barrier 
to trade or to the free commercial flow of 
goods and investment 
  
 
61 49% 
3 To ensure that any new regulation would not 
lead to a trade dispute or litigation from 
international investors 
  
 45 36% 
4 
As part of the Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Statement (RIAS) which necessitates 
consideration of trade and investment 
implications of any new regulation 
  
 
62 50% 
5 In identifying regulatory alternatives for 
addressing a public need 
  
 50 40% 
6 They are rarely of concern   
 
25 20% 
7 Other    10 8% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
Table 3 shows that between 40%-50% felt that trade and investment commitments were of 
concern a) as part of the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAs) which necessitates 
consideration of trade and investment implications of any new regulation, b) In balancing the 
economic cost-benefits of a regulatory decision, in order to avoid a barrier to trade or to the 
free commercial flow of goods and investment, and c) in identifying regulatory alternatives 
for addressing a public need.  Only 36% felt that these agreements were of concern when a 
trade agreement is being negotiated or to ensure that any new regulation would not lead to a 
trade dispute or litigation from international investors while 20% thought they were rarely of 
concern. 
 
This begins to give us some insight into the ways ‘trade and investment’ are perceived by 
regulators in their daily work.  Outlining similar themes, during in-depth interviews 
regulators argued that trade and investment commitments were most relevant with respect 
to their efforts at harmonizing regulations with trade partners, ensuring international 
transparency and disclosure as well as compatibility with international trade commitments, 
avoiding the creation of barriers to trade and avoiding international trade and investment 
disputes.  Many regulators also claimed they did not consider trade and investment in any 
way when developing regulations.  345 
                                               
345 Quantitative coding of interview data was undertaken in order to identify the key categories and themes outlined here.  Appendix 
5 provides the coding and categories resulting from this analysis 
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Harmonizing with trade partners 
There are strong pressures for regulators to ensure they are harmonizing regulations with 
Canada’s key trading partners.  This driver in the regulatory development process was most 
frequently mentioned by interviewees and was the main way in which they were likely to 
consider ‘trade and investment’ as relevant. 
Two senior environmental regulators argued that ‘FTAs matter most’ and that ‘the 
willingness to regulate, both the forum and actual regulations is driven by what the US is 
doing’.  Additionally it was suggested from the food inspection domain that ‘they need more 
than a good reason to do something different in regulation’.  One transport regulator 
suggested that there was a ‘high degree of attention on making things compliant with the US’. 
 
Ensuring international transparency and disclosure 
The process of notification under regional and multilateral SPS and TBT agreements was seen 
as a primary means by which international trade and investment was a regular consideration 
in the regulatory development process.   Notification provisions require regulators to advise 
the trade bodies (such as NAFTA and the WTO) of any proposed changes to their regulations 
in those areas which could have an impact on trade.  The purpose is to ensure transparency 
and predictability and forms part of the commitments to which member countries have 
signed up to.  Second to harmonization this was the most commonly raised way that trade 
played a role for the majority of regulators. 
 
As an environmental regulator indicated the ‘biggest trade concern is notification’.  
Additionally, one health regulator argued, the ‘real desire to is to be as open as we can’.346  
 
Ensuring compatibility with new and existing trade and investment commitments 
Another way in which international trade and investment played a role in the regulatory 
development process was with respect to ensuring compatibility with both new and existing 
trade and investment commitments.  In the case of trade agreements, a number of regulators 
indicated that they would often become involved in the trade negotiation process in an effort 
to ensure that Canada did not commit to standards which were lower than existing domestic 
standards.  With respect to Canada’s existing commitments, regulators felt it was important to 
ensure any new regulations were consistent with SPS and TBT agreements to which Canada 
was signatory. 
                                               
346 Canadian Federal Regulator Interview transcripts – un-attributable quote due to confidentiality   
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As one senior health regulator indicated ‘Trade is an issue with new agreements as we want 
to ensure that standards are not lowered ’.  Another environmental regulator suggested that 
they need to ‘consider formal obligations.  Is a measure justified under statute?’347 
 
Avoiding barriers to trade 
Regulators also identified their efforts at avoiding barriers to trade as an influence on the 
regulatory development process.  This issue is arguably more prominent under the current 
Canadian administration given the focus on regulatory cooperation with trading partners in 
efforts to ensure market access and the push to reduce regulatory burden on corporations 
while encouraging competitiveness.  ‘The number one consideration is how effective will the 
regulations be.  How can we make them as effective as possible without burden for industry?’ 
argued a senior regulator. 
 
For many regulators the only time they consider the trade implication of their proposed 
regulations is during the preparation of the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAs).  
Under the RIAs regulators must consider the impact of their proposed regulation with respect 
to ‘costs or savings to government, businesses, or Canadians and the potential impact on the 
Canadian economy and its international competitiveness’348  These would include any 
potential trade and investment impacts and how they might be mitigated so as to ensure the 
least possible economic burden on Canadians and businesses. 
 
As one health regulator put it ‘RIAs are the key driver for trade considerations’349 
 
Avoiding international trade and investment disputes 
The extent to which regulators seek to avoid international trade or investment disputes when 
developing regulations was of great interest to this research.  This was not a widespread 
theme amongst the senior regulators that were interviewed.  As noted previously however, 
36% of survey respondents selected it as a factor that they consider, and there was some 
awareness regarding the possibility that new regulations or changes to regulations could 
result in a trade dispute.  An analysis was undertaken to understand how this differed by 
Department and level of seniority. 
                                               
347 Canadian Federal Regulator Interview transcripts – un-attributable quote due to confidentiality   
348 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. 2009.  RIAS Writers Guide. Government of Canada Publication. Catalogue No. BT53-
16/2009E-PDF. ISBN 978-1-100-15046-8 
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Looking at the survey data collected on this issue, when a cross tabulation was performed, the 
importance placed on this did differ by department with the most concern to avoid disputes 
being shown among regulators at the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (57%), Transport 
Canada (75%) and Natural Resources Canada (75%).  The number of respondents from these 
departments was small however and when we look at the larger responses from Environment 
Canada and Health Canada the number of regulators who see this as a concern is much lower 
at 45.5% and 30% respectively.  None of the regulators from the Canadian Nuclear Safety 
Commission saw this as a concern. 350 
 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of seniority levels of regulators 
on the likelihood that they would consider ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ in 
the regulatory development process.  The model contained five levels of seniority as 
independent variables (Director General, Director, Head of Section, Manager, Other).  351  The 
strongest predictor of a regulator’s likelihood to consider trade and investment dispute 
avoidance as a factor was the level of Director General, recording an odds ratio352 of 3.056.  
This indicated that regulators at the Director General level were 3 times more likely to 
identify this as a factor of concern, controlling for all other factors in the model.  Directors 
were 1.5 times more likely and Head of Sections were 1.6 times more likely to see this as an 
influencing factor.  Managers were .98 times less likely to see this as an important factor 
showing a negative B value353 of -.018. 354  (Table 4) This suggests that the more senior a 
regulator the greater their awareness and the likelihood they would see this as an issue of 
concern. 
 
                                               
350 SPSS crosstab analysis was undertaken which showed that the Chi Square test for independence indicated a significant 
association between government departments and the likelihood they consider the avoidance of trade and investment disputes as an 
important factor in regulatory development, x2(9, n=125)=19, p=0.024, phi=0.392. 
351The full model under the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 351showed goodness of fit with significance value of 1>.05.  The model as 
a whole explained between 3% (Cox and Snell R square) and 4% (Nagelkerke R squared)351 of the variability based on seniority 
level and correctly classified 64.8% of cases.  None of the independent variables showed a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model suggesting that beyond the analysis of this data it may not be generalizable. 
352 Julie Pallant in SPSS Survival Manual quotes Tabachnick and Fidell’s 2007 book Using multivariate statistics (5th edn). Boston: 
Pearson Education, ‘the odds ratio represents the change in odes of being in one of the categories of outcome when the value of a 
predictor increases by one unit. P.177 
353 Julie Pallant’s SPSS Survival Manual (4th edn.). McGraw Hill. 2010 explains that B values are ‘equivalent to the B values 
obtained in a multiple regression analysis’.  The positive or negative direction of the B value indicates the direction of the 
relationship where ‘negative B values indicate that an increase in the independent variable score will result in a decreased 
probability of the case recording a score of 1 in the dependant variable.  
354 These results are presented in a format recommended by Julie Pallant’s SPSS Survival Manual (4th edn.). McGraw Hill. 2010 
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Table 4 – Logistic regression predicting impact of seniority on the likelihood of  a regulator considering 
trade and investment dispute avoidance as a factor 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP (B) 
Lower Upper 
Director General 1.117 .743 2.260 1 .133 3.056 .712 13.107 
Director .417 .662 .397 1 .529 1.517 .415 5.550 
Head of Section .481 .707 .463 1 .496 1.618 .405 6.466 
Manager -.018 .783 .001 1 .982 .982 .212 4.553 
Constant -1.012 .583 3.002 1 .083 .364   
 
Among the few that mentioned this as an issue in the face-to-face interviews, they saw it as a 
peripheral influence and something about which they would seek legal advice, but not a factor 
that would shape the HSE regulation.  Generally the type of ‘trade dispute’ was quite vague 
and did not denote any particular knowledge of trade versus investment disputes, state-to-
state versus investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms,  nor differentiate between the 
possible regional, bilateral or multilateral fora.  A few regulators suggested the need to 
manage the expectation or perception of foreign investors in order to avoid such a challenge.  
These regulators were among the few that had had specific experiences with NAFTA Chapter 
11.  Even in these cases it was made clear that the social mandate was the primary driver in 
regulatory development and that the desire to avoid a trade dispute simply led to a 
heightened awareness of the issue and did not alter the outcome.   ‘I don’t want to step into a 
major trade issue.  At the same time, it is not our primary mandate which is the protection of 
health and the environment’, suggested one senior environmental regulator with experience 
of NAFTA chapter 11 disputes. 
 
 A sub theme was the role played by political interests in the process of regulatory 
development or in the implementation of regulations such as environmental assessments.  As 
one senior environmental regulator put it ‘trade difficulty arises when there is political 
interest in a project’.355 
 
Not considering trade and investment 
In efforts to probe awareness of Canada’s international trade commitments and specifically 
the extent to which they impact regulatory decision making, it became clear that trade and 
investment are not drivers at all for many health, safety and environmental regulators (20% 
of those surveyed stated that they are not of concern).  There was a lack of understanding of 
Canada’s trade and investment obligations and no real awareness or widespread concern 
about the possible impact of investment disputes.  Regulators were putting health and safety 
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first, saw science as a key driver and as such were concerned with ensuring a risk based, 
objective, solid science basis to justify adding a regulation in the area of health, safety and the 
environment.   They were consistently clear on this issue. 
 
Trade commitments are ‘not front of mind’ - senior environment regulator 
Trade is ‘not a priority’ – senior environment regulator 
‘Trade doesn’t change what we measure.  The results are the results’ – senior health regulator 
‘NAFTA Chapter 11 is not on our radar’356 – senior health regulator 
 
b. The most relevant trade and investment commitments to the regulatory 
development process 
 
As outlined above, international trade and investment is from time to time a consideration in 
the regulatory development process in a number of ways, including some desire to avoid 
international trade disputes.  It was important however to determine to what extent 
regulators differentiated between international trade and investment agreements such as 
NAFTA and other international trade commitments at the bilateral and multilateral level.  
Additionally it was important that they differentiate between the types of trade commitments 
that were most relevant, such as investment (which could expose their government to ISDS 
challenges to HSE regulation) versus commitments on SPS or TBT. 
 
Types of trade and investment commitments by fora  
 
Regulators were asked in the electronic survey which agreements they considered most 
relevant to the regulatory development process.  The largest percentage indicated the 
relevance of NAFTA at 74% followed by the WTO at 49% and other bilateral agreements at 
32%.  Only 7% of respondents indicated investment agreements or Foreign Investment 
Protection Agreements (FIPAs) as being of relevance as outlined in Table 5 below.  When 
level of seniority was factored into the analysis, there was consistent and unanimous support 
among regulators regarding the relevance of NAFTA to regulatory decision making.  At every 
level of management, over 70% of regulators overwhelmingly indicated this was the case.  
Director Generals were more inclined than other regulators to identify the WTO as relevant.  
Most interestingly, all levels of regulator indicated that FIPAs were not relevant, with 84% of 
Director Generals, 95.5% Directors, 92% Sector Heads, 94% Managers and 100% of technical 
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regulators indicating they did not find them relevant.357  This is not surprising as the profile of 
the FIPA in Canada has been quite low (until the recent completion of negotiations towards 
the Canada-China FIPA which substantially raised the profile), and no ISDS challenges have 
been launched against the government’s regulatory measures under FIPAs to date. 
 
Table 5 – Regulators’ views on type of trade and investment agreement most relevant 
9.  Where trade is a factor, which types of trade commitments are relevant for you to 
consider when making a regulatory decision?  You can identify as many as are relevant. 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
World Trade 
Organization 
(WTO) 
commitments 
  
 
57 49% 
2 
North American 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
commitments 
  
 
87 74% 
3 
Bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) 
commitments 
  
 
37 32% 
4 
Foreign Investment 
Protection 
Agreement (FIPA) 
commitments 
  
 
8 7% 
5 Other   
 
24 21% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
Additionally, direct logistic regression was performed to assess whether regulators were 
more likely to consider ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ in the regulatory 
development process with respect to different trade treaties.  The model contained four trade 
treaties as independent variables (WTO, NAFTA, FTA, FIPA).358  Two of the independent 
variables showed a unique statistically significant contribution to the model (WTO, FTAs).  
The strongest predictor of a regulator’s likelihood to consider trade and investment dispute 
avoidance as a factor was with respect to the WTO, recording an odds ratio359 of 5,526.  This 
indicated that regulators were 5 times more likely to consider ‘the avoidance of trade and 
investment disputes’ with respect to the WTO, controlling for all other factors in the model.  
They were 4 times as likely under FTAs (OR=4.226) and 2.5 times as likely under NAFTA 
                                               
357 An SPSS cross-tabulation was undertaken to look at the relationship between level of seniority and relevance of Canada’s 
various trade commitment.  A Chi Square test for independence indicated no significant association between level of seniority and 
relevance of any of the international trade and investment commitments by agreement type.  On the WTO the test showed x2(4, 
n=118)=5.99, p=.20, phi=.22, on NAFTA x2(4, n=119)=2.49, p=.64, phi=1.5, on FTA x2(4, n=119)=4.22, p=.37, phi=.19, on 
FIPA x2(4, n=119)=3.97, p=.41, phi=.41 
358 The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, X2 (4, N=116) = 33.42, p<.001358, indicating that the model 
was able to distinguish between respondents who did and did not consider the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ as 
relevant to the regulatory development process. The model as a whole explained between 25% (Cox and Snell R square) and 34.3% 
(Nagelkerke R squared)358 of the variability based on type of agreement and correctly classified 74.1% of cases.   
359 Julie Pallant in SPSS Survival Manual quotes Tabachnick and Fidell’s 2007 book Using multivariate statistics (5th edn). Boston: 
Pearson Education, ‘the odds ratio represents the change in odes of being in one of the categories of outcome when the value of a 
predictor increases by one unit. P.177 
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(OR=2.528).  Finally they were 0.819 times less likely to consider this issue under FIPAs 
where the B value was -.204 and the odds ratio was .816.360  This result suggests that when 
developing regulations, regulators are most concerned about disputes that might arise under 
the WTO followed by FTAs and NAFTA. They are not concerned about disputes arising under 
FIPAs.   
 
Table 6 – Logistic regression predicting impact of different trade treaties on the likelihood a regulator 
would consider the avoidance of trade and investment disputes in the regulatory development process 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP (B) 
Lower Upper 
WTO 1.709 .474 12.988 1 .000 5.526 2.181 13.999 
NAFTA .927 .603 2.366 1 .124 2.528 .776 8.241 
FTA 1.441 .487 8.746 1 .003 4.226 1.626 10.983 
FIPA -.204 1.010 .041 1 .840 .816 .113 5.910 
Constant -2.741 .635 18.598 1 .000 .065   
 
Again this finding is interesting for several reasons.  First, the likelihood of a trade and 
investment dispute arising under Canada’s WTO commitments is quite low and yet it plays a 
bigger role in the minds of regulators.  Furthermore such a dispute would involve a state to 
state action rather than an investor state challenge.  Similarly, the likelihood of regulators 
taking the ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes into account with respect to FTAs 
as separate from NAFTA is also surprising given the absence of any history of disputes under 
Canada’s FTAs (apart from NAFTA).  This lends some credibility to the assumption that 
regulators do not fully understand the concept of a ‘dispute’ in this regard and are most likely 
considering their involvement within these fora on committees dealing with TBT and SPS 
issues.  This is probed below. 
 
Types of trade and investment commitments by agreement 
 
This analysis was also interested in understanding whether regulator’s consideration of 
disputes under these agreements were with respect to investment commitments or other 
areas.  This is obviously crucial to the research question.  To this end, regulators were 
questioned about the types of commitments they felt had an impact on the regulatory 
development process under both NAFTA and the WTO with a view to understanding the 
relative importance of investment agreements. 
                                               
360 These results are presented in a format recommended by Julie Pallant’s SPSS Survival Manual (4th edn.). McGraw Hill. 2010 
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Table 7 – Regulators’ views on the relevance of different NAFTA chapters 
11.  For greater clarity please indicate which  NAFTA chapters have the most impact on your 
regulatory decision making process? 
# Question 
SPS Chapter 7 
(Sanitary & 
Phytosanitary 
Measures) 
TBT Chapter 3 
(Technical 
Barriers to 
Trade) 
Investment 
Chapter 11 
Services 
Chapter 12 
Total 
Responses 
1 
Has a big 
impact 
18 25 9 2 54 
2 
Has a small 
impact 
16 33 
23 
13 85 
3 Has no impact 41 32 45 56 174 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
As tables 7 and 8 demonstrate, it was the agreements on Sanitary and Pytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures that regulators felt had the greatest 
impact under both NAFTA and the WTO.  The majority of regulators felt that NAFTA Chapter 
11 on investment and the investment provisions of the WTO (TRIMS) had no, or very limited 
impact on the regulatory development process.     
 
Table 8 – Regulators’ views on the relevance of different WTO agreements 
10.  For greater clarity, please indicate which  WTO agreements have the most impact on 
your regulatory decision making process? 
# Question 
SPS (Sanitary & 
Phytosanitary 
Measures) 
TBT (Technical 
Barriers to 
Trade) 
TRIPS (Trade 
Related 
Intellectual 
Property 
Rights) 
TRIMS (Trade 
Related 
Investment 
Measures) 
Total 
Responses 
1 
Has a big 
impact 
22 25 5 2 54 
2 
Has a small 
impact 
13 28 15 
12 
68 
3 Has no impact 45 34 57 60 196 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
A cross tabulation was undertaken to determine whether level of seniority had an influence 
on regulator views about the impact of NAFTA Chapter 11.  All levels of regulator felt 
strongest that NAFTA Chapter 11 did not have a big impact with Head of Section regulators 
showing the largest inclination at 100%. 361   This is a particularly important finding.  While it 
is not surprising that these regulators will feel the influence of the government’s 
commitments on SPS and TBT as these agreements go to the heart of their work and 
requirements for notification.  At the same time the fact that they feel very little impact in 
                                               
361 A cross tabulation in SPSS was undertaken to look at the relationship between level of seniority and views on the impact of 
NAFTA Chapter 11.  The Chi-Square test for independence indicated no significant association for ‘no impact’ x2(4, n=97)=2.42, 
p=.66, phi=.16, or ‘small impact’ it showed x2(4, n=98)=4.46, p=.35, phi=.21 
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their regulatory decision making from NAFTA Chapter 11 on investment is directly relevant 
to our understanding of any possible chilling effect. 
 
The in-depth interviews reinforced this message.  There was little differentiation among 
regulators between types of trade and investment commitments.  More emphasis was placed 
on WTO and across all agreements on SPS and TBT measures.  These were seen as most 
relevant given their notification requirements.  Additionally, many regulators are involved in 
the SPS and TBT committees set up under NAFTA and the WTO.  There was very little 
awareness of the existence of investment agreements, either NAFTA Chapter 11, bilateral 
investment treaties (or FIPAs as they are known in Canada) or within the WTO (TRIMS).  
Similarly there was little awareness of the existence of investor state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) provisions or the types of disputes which might arise under such provisions.  Where 
there was experience within a department of a NAFTA Chapter 11 challenge there was 
slightly more awareness.   
 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess whether the views of regulators about the 
impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 on decision making was correlated with the likelihood that these 
same regulators would consider ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ in the 
regulatory development process.  The model contained three impacts of NAFTA Chapter 11 
on decision making as independent variables (NAFTA Chapter 11 had a ‘big impact’, ‘small 
impact’ or ‘no impact’).  Only one of the independent variables made a unique statistically 
significant contribution to the model (NAFTA Chapter 11 has no impact on decision making). 
362  Not surprisingly regulators were less likely (OR = 0.148) to consider ‘the avoidance of 
trade and investment disputes’ in the regulatory development process where they believed 
NAFTA Chapter 11 had no impact, controlling for all other factors in the model.363  Regulators 
were 1.2 times more likely to consider this issue when they felt NAFTA Chapter 11 had a 
small impact.  This is outlined in Table 9 below. 
 
 
                                               
362 The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, X2 (3, N=96) = 20.098, p<.001362, indicating that the model 
was able to distinguish between respondents who did and did not consider the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ as 
relevant to the regulatory development process. The model as a whole explained between 18.9% (Cox and Snell R square) and 
25.7% (Nagelkerke R squared)362 of the variability based on the impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 and correctly classified 72.9% of 
cases.   
363 These results are presented in a format recommended by Julie Pallant’s SPSS Survival Manual (4th edn.). McGraw Hill. 2010 
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Table 9 – Logistic regression predicting the impact of regulators’ views about the impact of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 on decision making with the likelihood that these same regulators would consider ‘the 
avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ in the regulatory development process 
 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP (B) 
Lower Upper 
Big Impact -1.658 .923 3.230 1 .072 .190 .031 1.162 
Small Impact .223 .632 .124 1 .724 1.250 .362 4.318 
No Impact -1.910 .601 10.098 1 .001 .148 .046 .481 
Constant .405 .456 .789 1 .374 1.500   
 
 
c. Experience with trade disputes and concern over investment commitments 
 
Another key component of assessing awareness of Canada’s investment commitments and 
their impact was to gauge the extent to which regulators had knowledge of the investor state 
dispute provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 and the possible policy and cost implications of a 
challenge.   
 
Regulators were asked whether they were aware of any NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes or 
threats of a dispute launched against their area of regulatory policy.  Very few regulators 
were aware of any such threats with only 12% claiming awareness.  This was very much in 
line with the in-depth discussions held with senior regulators where there was very little 
awareness or concern about NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes.     
 
Considering responses by government department, there was zero awareness of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 disputes amongst regulators from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
(CNSC), the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans (DFO), Transport Canada (TC) and the National Energy Board (NEB) that responded 
to the survey.  Additionally, of more significance 96% of Health Canada (HC) and 97% of 
Environment Canada (EC) regulators were not aware of NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges 
despite the fact that a number of past and current challenges would have impacted these 
departments.  Finally, less surprising was the fact that 40% of the Pest Management Review 
Agency (PMRA) and 77% of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) 
regulators had awareness of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes reflecting a number of high profile 
past and present cases364 in their organizations.365  Understanding whether this awareness 
                                               
364 Both Chemtura v. Government of Canada and Dow AgroScience v. Government of Canada involved bans on pesticides which 
come under the remit of the PMRA.  The ongoing case Clayton/Bilcon v. Government of Canada involves the rejection of a basalt 
quarry and marine terminal following a federal environmental review within the remit of CEAA. 
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led regulators to take these disputes into consideration when developing regulations, was the 
next stage in the process of trying to determine whether the regulatory chill hypothesis was 
potentially viable. 
 
Table 10 – Regulator awareness of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes 
13.  Have there been any NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor State Dispute cases launched against 
your area of regulatory policy that you are aware of? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
I am aware of a 
NAFTA Chapter 
11 Investor State 
Dispute against 
my area of 
regulation 
(please describe 
below) 
  
 
14 12% 
2 
I am not aware of 
any NAFTA 
Chapter 11 
Investor State 
Dispute against 
my area of 
regulation 
  
 
100 88% 
 Total  114 100% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
Among those regulators that were aware as Diagram 11 demonstrates, 42% claimed that 
despite this awareness it did not influence the regulatory development process at all, while 
17% claimed it influenced the process ‘very much’ and 25% ‘some’. 
 
Table 11 – Regulators’ view on the influence of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes 
15.  If you have answered yes to any of the last three questions, to what degree does this 
influence your decision making within the regulatory development/ management process?  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Very much   
 
10 17% 
2 Some   
 
15 25% 
3 Not very much   
 
10 17% 
4 Not at all   
 
25 42% 
 Total  60 100% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
In an effort to look at this issue in more depth and to understand the extent to which 
awareness of disputes had an impact on regulatory decision making, a number of additional 
cross tabulations were undertaken with the survey data.   
 
                                                                                                                                         
365 SPSS cross tabulation was undertaken to look at the relationship between government departments and awareness of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 disputes.  A Chi-square test for independence indicated a significant association between government department and 
awareness of Chapter 11, x2(9, n=114)=52.41, p=.000, phi=.68 
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First we looked at whether a regulator’s level of awareness of a NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute or 
threat affected the extent to which it influenced their regulatory development process.  Do 
they consider this influence more than regulators with no awareness?  The results of the 
cross tabulation suggest that those regulators who were aware of disputes in their areas felt it 
impacted their decision making only somewhat 28.6% or not very much 28%.  Only 21.4% 
said it impacted their decision on regulatory development process very much.366  Similarly, 
the analysis looked at the extent to which a regulator’s awareness of NAFTA Chapter 11 
disputes or threats, was correlated with their identification of ‘the avoidance of trade and 
investment disputes’ as influencing their regulatory decision making.  The results of this 
analysis suggest that close to two thirds of regulators who were aware of disputes in their 
area did not also consider ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ as influencing 
their regulatory decision making.367  This finding is interesting as it suggests that even when a 
regulator has awareness of disputes, it is not a key factor in their regulatory development 
decision making. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Regulators are focussed on a number of factors in the regulatory development process which 
include complying with international standards and commitments, harmonizing regulations 
with the US and internationally, responding to health, safety and environmental needs, 
responding to advances in science and technology, responding to the expectations of 
stakeholders such as the provinces, NGOs and the general public, facilitating international 
trade and responding more recently to domestic streamlining and modernization initiatives. 
 
Trade and investment while not a priority was a consideration in the context of harmonizing 
regulation with trade partners, ensuring international transparency and disclosure through 
SPS and TBT commitments, ensuring compatibility with new and existing trade commitments, 
avoiding barriers to trade to maintain Canada’s overall competitiveness and finally, avoiding 
trade disputes. 
 
                                               
366 Cross tabulation in SPSS did not show a significant relationship between awareness of Chapter 11 disputes on decision making 
in the regulatory development process.  A Chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association, x2(3, n=60)=3.69, 
p=.30, phi=.25  
367 Cross tabulation in SPSS did not show a significant relationship between awareness of Chapter 11 disputes and whether they also 
considered the avoidance of trade and investment disputes in the regulatory development process.  A Chi-square test for 
independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated no significant association, , x2(1, n=113)=.07, p=.79, phi=.57 
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After completing in-depth interviews with over fifty regulators and the electronic survey of 
140 regulators, the general impression was that there was very little to no knowledge of 
NAFTA Chapter 11 across all the regulatory departments.   
 
Despite very low levels of awareness, the more senior a regulator the greater their awareness 
of trade and investment disputes and the greater the likelihood they would see this as an 
issue of concern.  Direct regression analysis showed that regulators at the Director General 
level were 3 times more likely to identify this as a factor of concern, controlling for all other 
factors in the model.  Directors were 1.5 times more likely and Head of Sections were 1.6 
times more likely to see this as an influencing factor. 
 
NAFTA was seen as the most relevant agreement by regulators followed by the WTO and 
other bilaterals.  Most interestingly, all levels of regulator indicated that FIPAs were not 
relevant, with 84% of Director Generals, 95.5% Directors, 92% Sector Heads, 94% Managers 
and 100% of technical regulators indicating they did not find them relevant.   
 
The strongest predictor of a regulator’s likelihood to consider trade and investment dispute 
avoidance as a factor was with respect to the WTO, recording an odds ratio of 5,526.  This 
indicated that regulators were 5 times more likely to consider ‘the avoidance of trade and 
investment disputes’ with respect to the WTO, controlling for all other factors in the model.  
This was followed by FTAs and NAFTA. 
 
When we spoke about international trade and investment, there was no differentiation 
between the different types of trade fora or agreements or their implications.  Most 
references to trade commitments referred to SPS or TBT commitments under the WTO or 
NAFTA.  NAFTA Chapter 11 did not rank as an influencing factor. 
 
It was the agreements on Sanitary and Pytosanitary Measaures (SPS) and Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) measures that regulators felt had the greatest impact under both NAFTA and 
the WTO.  The majority of regulators felt that NAFTA Chapter 11 on investment and the 
investment provisions of the WTO (TRIMS) had no, or very limited impact on the regulatory 
development process.  All levels of regulator felt strongest that NAFTA Chapter 11 did not 
have a big impact with Head of Section regulators showing the largest inclination at 100%. 
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Where there had been a NAFTA dispute that had impacted one of their regulatory measures, 
the level of knowledge was still quite vague and the understanding of the implications or 
costs associated with such a challenge was not high.  Their experience would have made them 
more aware and more likely to flag future regulatory changes for legal advice but this did not 
impact their decision making.  These disputes were seen as one off incidents which did not 
have a bearing on future regulation. 
Very few regulators were aware of any such threats with only 12% claiming awareness.  This 
varied by department with 96% of Health Canada (HC) and 97% of Environment Canada (EC) 
regulators not aware of NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges despite the fact that a number of past 
and current challenges would have impacted these departments.  Finally, less surprising was 
the fact that 40% of the Pest Management Review Agency (PMRA) and 77% of the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) regulators had awareness of NAFTA Chapter 11 
disputes reflecting a number of high profile past and present cases368 in their organizations. 
 
Among those regulators that were aware of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes, 42% claimed that 
despite this awareness it did not influence the regulatory development process.  The results 
of the cross tabulation suggest that those regulators who were aware of disputes in their 
areas felt it impacted their decision making only somewhat 28.6% or not very much 28%.  
Only 21.4% said it impacted their decision on regulatory development process very much. 
 
Taken together, the conclusions in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 suggest a number of things with 
respect to the hypothesis on regulatory chill.  First, HSE regulatory trends showed a steady 
and increasing level of stringency in comprehensiveness over the last decade with only a 
minor demonstrable impact across areas of regulation most frequently subjected to NAFTA 
Chapter 11 challenges as reflected through both observed trends in regulatory growth or 
levels of stringency as well as by the presence of a statistically significant impact in 2002 and 
2007. 
 
Second, there was very little awareness among HSE regulators about the existence of IIAs and 
particularly NAFTA Chapter 11.  Regulators did not identify trade and investment 
commitments as an influencing factor in the regulatory development process and where they 
did merit consideration it was predominantly with respect to the need to ensure trade 
facilitation with trading partners, meet transparency requirements under international 
                                               
368
 Both Chemtura v. Government of Canada and Dow AgroScience v. Government of Canada involved bans on pesticides which 
come under the remit of the PMRA.  The ongoing case Clayton/Bilcon v. Government of Canada involves the rejection of a basalt 
quarry and marine terminal following a federal environmental review within the remit of CEAA. 
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agreements or not at all.    This did not differ markedly by Federal Department or by level of 
seniority of the regulator. 
 
Based on the hypothesis of regulatory chill, there did not appear to be evidence of the 
regulatory trends nor regulator awareness one would expect if chill on the back of IIA 
disputes were a potential consideration in the Canadian context.  Chapter 6 will look at the 
issue of regulatory chill in the context of global tobacco control regulations.  This will also 
allow for a comparison of a developed versus developing country context as well as the 
possibility of cross border regulatory chill. 
                   156 of 245 
 
 
Chapter 6:  Case Study 2:  Tobacco control regulation –  
A global look at investment and regulation 
 
 
‘A particularly disturbing trend is the use by the tobacco industry of international trade and 
investment agreements as a vehicle to seek enhanced market access and protection from 
regulation.’ 
 
Dr. Margaret Chan, Director General WHO 369 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The tobacco industry has historically been very litigious in its approach to addressing tobacco 
control measures imposed by governments globally concerned with the health impact of 
tobacco use.    In recent years the industry has turned to the increased use of the ISDS 
mechanism under IIAs to challenge legislation on everything from health warnings to plain 
packaging in emerging market and developed countries alike.  Global tobacco control 
regulations provide a unique opportunity to investigate the potential chilling impact of IIAs, 
particularly with respect to cross-border chill where the experiences of one country impacts 
decision making in another.   
 
Methodological overview of Case Study 2370 
 
Interviews were conducted with senior global tobacco control regulators from ten countries, 
representing four regions during the fifth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP5) of 
the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).  
The FCTC conference took place in Seoul, Republic of Korea, from 12 to 17 November 2012.  
The purpose of the interviews was to gain an understanding of the influences on the 
regulatory development process and particularly the role played by international trade and 
investment commitments as well as the impact of recent IIA challenges to tobacco control 
measures introduced in Uruguay and particularly Australia. 
 
                                               
369 Speech by Margaret Chan, Director General WHO in February 2013, Harvard University Conference on Governance of Tobacco 
in the 21st Century:  Strengthening National and International Policy for Global Health and Development, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.  
370
 Chapter 3 provides a detailed outline of the methodology 
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In addition to this an online survey of global tobacco control regulators was conducted in two 
waves between January and March 2013.   This survey was aimed at reaching a broader range 
of regulators and on probing similar themes to those addressed in the in-depth interviews.   
There were 28 countries that responded in total with representation from North America, 
Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe.  
 
The views of regulators that have emerged from these interviews together with those 
outlined in the survey findings, and the outcome of a quantitative analysis of countries’ 
reports filed in 2012 and 2013 on progress with tobacco control regulations as reported to 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), provide a triangulation of data 
to test the expectations of the hypothesis on regulatory chill. 
 
This chapter will first provide an understanding of the evolution of global tobacco control 
regulations including the establishment of the WHO FCTC and general trends in tobacco 
control initiatives worldwide.  Second it will outline the tobacco industry response including 
litigation and challenges that have been launched under IIAs globally.  This will then provide 
the global context on tobacco control for testing both the first ‘expectation’ on trends in 
regulation as well the second ‘expectation’ on the role of international trade and investment 
in the regulatory development process. 
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL TOBACCO CONTROL REGULATIONS 
 
The global tobacco epidemic and its related public health implications had reached a pinnacle 
by the 1990s.  Tobacco use was seen as ‘a leading cause of premature death’371, had resulted 
in the loss of 3.5 million lives in 1998 with the expectation that deaths could approach 10 
million a year by 2030 if left unchecked.  The largest impact was being felt in the developing 
world which accounted for 70% of the deaths.  This problem was exacerbated by the strength 
and wealth of an aggressive tobacco industry intent on promoting tobacco use, the addictive 
nature of nicotine and the lack of a global approach to tobacco regulation.372 
                                               
371 World Health Organization. 2009. History of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. ISBN 978241563925. P. 1 
372 Ibid. 
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a. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) 
 
The ‘urgent public health issues’ provided countries with a strong rationale for coordinating 
tobacco control efforts.373 The benefits of an international instrument aimed at controlling 
tobacco use was formally recognised in 1995 by the World Health Assembly (WHA), followed 
the year later by the initiation of steps to develop a WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control.374  Negotiations for such a treaty began in 1999 culminating in the adoption of the 
final text in 2003 by the WHA and entered into force with the support of 40 member 
countries in 2005.  That number has since grown to reach 174.375 
 
The process of negotiation within the auspices of the WHO helped raise the political profile of 
the international health problems caused by tobacco use and served to raise awareness of 
both the key issues and possible interventions, leading to a ‘global agenda for action’.376  The 
preamble of the treaty highlights the important commitment of the signatories to ‘give 
priority to their right to protect public health’.377  The WHO FCTC consists of broad 
obligations and requirements (both binding and non-binding) on member countries 
supported by implementation guidelines and tools focussed on encouraging them to adopt 
domestic measures aimed at reducing both the demand for and supply of tobacco products.  
The decision by Parties to create a ‘binding international instrument’ has been beneficial with 
respect to the obligations it places on signatories to adopt and strengthen tobacco control 
regulations, as well as ensuring the instrument is ‘subject to the law of treaties, including the 
presumption against a conflict between two conventions.’  This gives it equal status to other 
binding international instruments.378 
 
The obligations and requirements related to the reduction of demand cover price and tax 
measures focussed on reducing consumption (Article 6), measures on protection from 
tobacco smoke exposure (Article 8), the regulation of product content (Article 9), product 
disclosures (Article 10), packaging and labelling (Article 11), measures aimed at 
                                               
373 Lannan, Kate, ‘The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control:  the international context for plain packaging’, in Public 
Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes, edited by Tania Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell and Jonathan Liberman with Glyn Ayres, 
11-29.Edward Elgar, 2012 
374 WHO FCTC Secretariat. The history of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 
http://www.who.int/fctc/about/history/en/ 
375 Lannan, Kate, ‘The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control:  the international context for plain packaging’, in Public 
Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes, edited by Tania Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell and Jonathan Liberman with Glyn Ayres, 
11-29.Edward Elgar, 2012 
376World Health Organization. 2009. History of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. ISBN 978241563925. P. 20  
377 Lannan, Kate, ‘The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control:  the international context for plain packaging’, in Public 
Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes, edited by Tania Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell and Jonathan Liberman with Glyn Ayres, 
11-29.Edward Elgar, 2012 
378 Ibid 
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strengthening public awareness (Article 12), a ban on advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship (Article 13) and measures to promote cessation of use and dependence (Article 
14).  The obligation and requirement related to the reduction of supply include measures 
aimed at eliminating the illicit trade in tobacco products (Article 15), prohibiting the sale of 
tobacco products to minors (Article 16), and promoting viable alternative activities for 
tobacco workers, growers and sellers (Article 17).  The overall goal is the strengthening of 
both ‘national and international coordination in the fight against the tobacco epidemic’379 and 
to contribute to the protection of human health from the consequences of smoking and 
exposure to tobacco smoke.380   
 
Those tobacco control measures which have garnered the most attention from the general 
public and resulted in the most aggressive responses from the tobacco industry have been 
those dealing with the packaging and labelling of tobacco products (Article 11) and those 
encouraging a comprehensive ban on advertising promotion and sponsorship of tobacco 
products (Article 13). 
Article 11    
 
Article 11 of the FCTC is focussed on the establishment of measures dealing with the 
packaging and labelling of tobacco products.  The FCTC Guidelines for the implementation of 
Article 11  argue that ‘well-designed health warnings and messages on tobacco product 
packages have been shown to be a cost-effective means to increase public awareness of the 
health effects of tobacco use and to be effective in reducing tobacco consumption.’381  The 
convention specifies that  health warnings and messages should be ‘large, clear, visible and 
legible’ while ensuring maximum visibility’ and ‘should be 50% or more, but no less than 
30%, of the principal display areas.’  Parties are encouraged to make use of coloured pictures 
or pictograms in their health warnings as well as ensure that health warnings are rotating 
given that ‘evidence suggests that the impact of health warnings and messages that are 
repeated tend to decrease over time.’382 
 
Article 11 also encourages parties to ensure the tobacco product packaging and labelling is 
not misleading or deceptive with respect to the product and health effects of its use.  Finally, 
Article 11 asks parties to consider adopting plain packaging measures.  Plain packaging is 
                                               
379 Ibid 
380 Gruszczynski, Lukasz, ‘The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control as an International Standard under the TBT 
Agreement? Transnational Dispute Management (2012) P.4 
381 Guidelines for implementation of Article 11 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Packaging and labelling 
of tobacco products) 
382 Ibid. 
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defined as ‘measures to restrict or prohibit the use of logos, colours, brand images or 
promotional information on packaging other than brand names and product names displayed 
in a standard colour and font style.’383 
 
Article 13 
 
Article 13 of the FCTC is focussed on the establishment of measures dealing with tobacco 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship.  The FCTC Guidelines for the implementation of 
Article 13  argue that parties should consider instituting a comprehensive ban on tobacco 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship384, banning the visibility of tobacco products at 
points of sale, the internet sales of tobacco, ‘brand stretching’ and ‘brand sharing’385, and 
adopting plain packaging requirements.  The guidelines argue that there is well documented 
evidence that such a ban results in a decrease in tobacco use. 
 
To date, both prior to and under the auspices of the WHO FCTC, countries have implemented 
a wide variety of tobacco control measures aimed at addressing the issues of packaging and 
labelling as well as advertising promotion and sponsorship.  Specific measures aimed at 
banning tobacco products from the point of sale, mandating large health warnings (covering 
over 50% of the front and back of packaging) including those which make use of coloured 
pictograms as well as a complete ban on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
have become increasingly common among developed and developing countries.  While many 
countries have also given consideration to adopting measures on plain packaging, to date only 
Australia has passed a law to this effect.  The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act was passed in 2011 
and became law in 2012.  The Australian law prohibits ‘the use of logos, brand imagery, 
symbols, other images, colours and promotional text on tobacco products and tobacco 
product packaging’.386  Additionally ‘packaging must be a standard drab dark brown colour in 
                                               
383 Ibid. 
384 The Guidelines for implementation of Article 13 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Tobacco 
Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship) argues that a comprehensive ban would include ‘all advertising and promotion, as well as 
sponsorship, without exception; direct and indirect advertising, promotion and sponsorship; acts that aim at promotion and acts that 
have or are likely to have a promotional effect; promotion of tobacco products and the use of tobacco; commercial communications 
and commercial recommendations and actions; contribution of any kind to any event, activity or individual, advertising and 
promotion of tobacco brand names and all corporate promotion; and traditional media and all media platforms, including internet, 
mobile telephones and other new technologies as well as films.’ 
385 The Guidelines for implementation of Article 13 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Tobacco 
Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship).  Brand stretching ‘occurs when a tobacco brand name, emblem, trademark, logo or trade 
insignia is connected with a non-tobacco product or service to cause an association while brand sharing ‘occurs when a brand name, 
emblem, trademark, logo or trade insignia on a non-tobacco product or service is connected with a tobacco product or tobacco 
company’ to cause an association. 
386 ‘Australia’s World First Plain Packaging’, McCabe Centre for Law & Cancer website. Accessed 12 December 2013. 
http://www.mccabecentre.org/focus-areas/tobacco/australias-world-first-plain-packaging 
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matt finish’387.  As the first country to adopt such measures, Australia is both a regulatory 
leader and a target for aggressive litigation by the global tobacco industry.  
 
b. The tobacco industry and its response 
 
The tobacco industry has long had a history of litigation, challenging tobacco control laws in 
domestic courts and through international fora.  In more recent years there have been a 
number of landmark challenges launched by the tobacco industry through international trade 
and investment treaties, largely aimed at fighting ‘the effective implementation of the tobacco 
control measures in the WHO FCTC.’388  The case of Australia’s plain packaging legislation 
provides an interesting point of reference as it has faced legal challenges in domestic 
Australian courts, under investor-state provisions of the bilateral investment treaty between 
Australia and Hong Kong and at the World Trade Organization (WTO).  In general the 
industry arguments are that tobacco control policies, such as Australia’s plain packaging 
legislation infringe the intellectual property rights of tobacco companies and would not be 
justifiable on public health grounds because such measures are not proven to be effective at 
reducing tobacco consumption and finally that these measures amount to an ‘acquisition of 
property without just terms’389.  Furthermore the industry argues that such policies will hurt 
small business retailers and increase illicit trade in tobacco products.390 
 
Litigation through domestic courts 
 
The tobacco industry has historically been very active in domestic courts challenging tobacco 
control legislation.  They have threatened and launched constitutional challenges to plain 
packaging proposals and legislation mandating a comprehensive ban on advertising in 
Canada in the 1990s and more recently unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of 
Australia’s plain packaging legislation and the Government of Norway’s visual display ban of 
tobacco products at point of sale.   
 
                                               
387 Ibid. 
388 Lannan, Kate, ‘The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control:  the international context for plain packaging’, in Public 
Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes, edited by Tania Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell and Jonathan Liberman with Glyn Ayres, 
11-29.Edward Elgar, 2012 
389 Evans, Simon and Jason Bosland, ‘Plain packaging of cigarettes and constitutional property rights’, in Public Health and Plain 
Packaging of Cigarettes, edited by Tania Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell and Jonathan Liberman with Glyn Ayres, 48-80.Edward Elgar, 
2012 
390 Liberman, Jonathan and Michelle Scollo, Becky Freeman and Simon Chapman, ‘Plain tobacco packaging in Australia: the 
historical and social context’, in Public Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes, edited by Tania Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell and 
Jonathan Liberman with Glyn Ayres, 30-47.Edward Elgar, 2012 
                   162 of 245 
JT International SA vs. Commonwealth of Australia 
 
In this case Australia British American Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco, Japan Tobacco and 
Philip Morris International challenged the Australian Government’s 2011 plain 
packaging legislation arguing it restricted intellectual property rights and amounted 
to an ‘acquisition of property without just terms’391.  The Australian High Court held 
that the Act was valid as it did not constitute an acquisition of property or an 
infringement of intellectual property rights in August 2012.  As Liberman argues, ‘The 
outcome of the litigation vindicated the Australian Government’s decision to stare 
down the tobacco industry’s legal threats, bluff and bluster.’392 
 
Philip Morris Norway AS vs. Statenv/Helse-Og Omsorgsdepartementet 
 
Philip Morris challenged the Government of Norway’s visual display ban of 
tobacco products before the Oslo District Court in 2010.  The Oslo District Court 
requested guidance from the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade 
Association States (EFTA Court) asking whether a visual display ban on tobacco 
products constituted an obstacle to trade and whether it is justifiable on public 
health grounds.393  The court ruled that the measure was suitable for the 
protection of human health.  While the EFTA court agreed that such a measure did 
hinder the free movement of goods it left it up to the national court to determine if 
the measure was justified for the protection of public health. 
Litigation under IIAs  
 
Challenges to tobacco control measures under IIAs is a very recent phenomena but one which 
has caused growing concern among health regulators worldwide and raised fears about the 
possible cross border chilling effects.  The most high profile cases are those by Philip Morris 
International challenging both the Government of Australia’s plain packaging legislation 
through the Australia-Hong Kong BIT and the Government of Uruguay’s law on health 
warnings via the BIT between Uruguay and Switzerland.  The ISDS cases against Australia and 
Uruguay are still underway at the time of writing. 
 
                                               
391 Evans Simon and Jason Bosland, ‘Plain packaging of cigarettes and constitutional property rights’, in Public Health and Plain 
Packaging of Cigarettes, edited by Tania Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell and Jonathan Liberman with Glyn Ayres, 40-80.Edward Elgar, 
2012 
392 Liberman, Jonathan, ‘Plainly Constitutional:  The Upholding of Plain Tobacco Packaging by the High Court of Australia’, 
American Journal of Law & Medicine, 39(2013): 361-381. P.380 
393 Alemanno, Alberto, ‘The Philip Morris Norway Judgement:  The First International Challenge to Point of Sale Tobacco Display 
Bans’, Transnational Dispute Management (2012) P.4 
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Philip Morris Asia Limited vs. The Commonwealth of Australia 
 
Philip Morris Asia launched an investor state dispute challenge against Australia in 
June 2011 under the bilateral investment treaty between Australia and Hong Kong 
394over its plain packaging legislation.  PMI are arguing that these tobacco control 
measures constitute an expropriation of its intellectual property and that it has not 
been afforded fair and equitable treatment.  The Australian Government is arguing for 
rejection of the claim based on jurisdiction395 and counters the claim of expropriation.  
A ruling on the issue of jurisdiction is expected in early 2014. 
 
Philip Morris Products SA (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos SA (Uruguay) v. Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay 
 
In 2010 Philip Morris challenged Uruguay’s measures on health warnings covering 
80% of cigarette packaging surface under the investor state provisions of the bilateral 
investment treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay.  PMI has argued that the 
tobacco control measures are discriminatory, fail to provide fair and equitable 
treatment, constitute indirect expropriation and violate intellectual property 
commitments under TRIPS.  In July 2013 the World Bank arbitration tribunal 
UNCITRAL agreed to hear the claim.  A decision is expected in the next 2 to 3 years. 
 
At the WTO 
 
The multilateral trade forum has also become a venue for challenges to tobacco control 
regulations from other countries concerned about the broader policy implications.  This also 
raises the spectre that the tobacco industry has succeeded in its indirect influence on 
developing countries in its attempt to curtail aggressive tobacco control regulations which 
threaten its livelihood.396 
 
                                               
394 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments 
395 The arguments on jurisdiction relate to the objections raised by Australia regarding the fact that Philip Morris Asia only made its 
investment in Australia after the government had already announced its intention to pursue plain packaging.  This point is raised in 
Voon, Tania and Andrew D. Mitchell, ‘Implications of international investment law for plain tobacco packaging:  lessons from 
Hong Kong-Australia BIT’, , in Public Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes, edited by Tania Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell and 
Jonathan Liberman with Glyn Ayres, 137-172.Edward Elgar, 2012 
396 According to the McCabe Centre for Law and Cancer‘ it has been reported that the tobacco industry has been providing support 
to countries that are challenging Australia's laws. According to Bloomberg, British American Tobacco is contributing to Ukraine's 
and Honduras' legal costs, and Philip Morris to those of the Dominican Republic. The two companies told the Financial Times back 
in April 2012 that they were providing such support.’  http://www.mccabecentre.org/blog-main-page/waiting-out-the-legal-
challenges  
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Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging 
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging 
 
Since September 2012, the Ukraine, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras and 
Indonesia have all launched complaints against Australia’s plain packaging legislation 
at the World Trade Organization.   In a few cases dispute panels have been established 
to hear these complaints.  The biggest concern amongst these developing countries is 
that the Australian measures are impacting intellectual property rights and 
Australia’s commitments under TRIPs, and the validity of registered trademarks and 
that these measures are more restrictive than necessary to achieve the stated public 
health goals, violating the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  
According to the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, the 
Dominican Republic, is most concerned about ‘the difficulties that producers in small 
and medium-sized economies would face in remaining competitive in the tobacco 
market due to the bill.’397  A number of countries have come out in formal support of 
Australia at the WTO including Uruguay, New Zealand and Norway.  A ruling is not 
expected before the middle of 2014. 
 
Concern about chill and calls for reform of IIA ISDS 
 
While litigation has long been an instrument of choice for the tobacco industry, these cases 
raise the specter of an entirely different vehicle for challenging the tobacco control measures 
of governments and the autonomy of governments to regulate in the public interest.  
Concerns about regulatory chill have been raised in this context.  A New York Times article in 
December 2013 highlights concerns by tobacco opponents that the tobacco industry strategy 
is ‘intimidating low-and middle-income countries from tackling one of the gravest health 
threats facing them: smoking.’398  While the article claims the four African countries of 
Namibia, Gabon, Togo and Uganda have all ‘received warnings from the tobacco industry that 
their laws run afoul of international treaties’, it also goes on to highlight Uruguay’s 
acknowledgement that its own BIT defense against Philip Morris International was only made 
possible through financial support by former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s 
foundation.399 
 
                                               
397 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, ‘Australian Cigarette Packaging Law Hits a Nerve with Developing 
Countries’, ICTSD Intellectual Property Programme. Volume 15, Number 22, 15 June 2011 
398 Sabrina Tavernise, ‘Tobacco Firms’ Tactics Limit Poorer Nations’ Smoking Laws’, The New York Times, December 13, 2013. 
399 Ibid. 
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Public policy advocates and legal scholars have also raised recommendations on how this 
issue might be addressed given the important public health concerns raised by tobacco 
products and the aggressive use of IIAs by the tobacco industry.  Among the 
recommendations have been calls for the exclusion of an ISDS mechanism in future 
treaties,400 for treaties to ‘include an exemption for investments involving ‘dangerous 
good’401, constituting a new addition to general exemptions but specific to tobacco control 
measures’402, and a reformulation of the IIA provisions most commonly invoked in ISDS 
arbitrations on expropriation and fair and equitable treatment to ‘ensure that a State’s policy 
space will be protected.’403 If all else fails, it has been argued countries always have the option 
of non-compliance with arbitral rulings given the challenges that tobacco companies would 
likely have enforcing them with respect to ‘considerations of public policy and sovereign 
immunity.’404 
 
The influence of legal action by the tobacco industry 
 
During the course of this research, tobacco regulators were asked whether they faced legal 
challenges by the tobacco industry and whether the industry had an influence on their 
regulatory development process.  Broadly speaking regulators fell into three groups, those for 
whom the industry had a small influence, those for whom the tobacco industry was active but 
yielded little influence and those for whom the actions of the industry and their influence 
were strong.   
 
Those who argued that the tobacco industry had a small influence on their regulatory 
decision making were from both developed and developing countries.  They had not faced 
litigation either through their domestic court systems (sometimes due to the weakness of the 
legal systems themselves) or through any kind of international agreement or forum.   This 
                                               
400 This proposal reflects the position adopted by the Government of Australia in the 2011 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement :  Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity (. 
http://www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-a3df-3f58228daf6d/Gillard-Government-Trade-Policy-
Statement.aspx)and has been proposed by numerous public policy advocates and scholars including a petition signed by a large 
number of respected jurists from Australia, New Zealand, the USA, Canada, Peru and Chile in May 2012 (‘An Open Letter From 
Lawyers to the Negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Urging the Rejection of Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ May 8,  
2012 http://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/) 
401 Nottage, Luke, ‘Consumer Product Safety Regulation and Investor-State Arbitration Policy and Practice after Philip Morris Asia 
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group were adamant that the industry had little influence in their countries and that they 
were not a driver of policy development.  405 
 
The second group had experienced an active industry response to their tobacco control 
initiatives either through domestic courts or through regional trade bodies yet felt this did 
not influence their regulatory decision making.  In these cases the regulators had managed to 
overcome the legal challenges by winning their cases and passing the legislation in question, 
and had therefore persevered with their regulatory initiatives despite the tactics of the 
tobacco industry.  This second group had vocal proponents from both developed and 
developing countries.406 
 
Finally, the third group felt a strong influence by the tobacco industry in their regulatory 
development process.  A number of developing countries argued that they had faced legal 
challenges in their domestic court which had succeeded in blocking government support for 
their policies.  Additionally, one country regulator talked about the influence of the tobacco 
industry resulting from its close ties to the political presidency.  Developed countries 
discussed how the tobacco industry had openly lobbied against the consideration of plain 
packaging measures and threatened litigation.  These countries identified the cross border 
influence of judicial action by the tobacco industry and were vocal about the fact that they 
wanted to ‘wait and see’ what happened in Australia prior to initiating their own measures on 
plain packaging.  There was awareness and concern about the resourcefulness of the tobacco 
industry in their efforts at treaty shopping. 407 While this sets the context, the remainder of 
this chapter will seek to test the expectation of the hypothesis on regulatory chill. 
 
3. TESTING EXPECTATION 1: TRENDS IN TOBACCO CONTROL REGULATION 
OVER LAST DECADE 
 
Expectation 1 – We would expect HSE regulatory trends to reflect regulatory chill through the 
level of uptake in key tobacco control measures in the wake of IIA challenges 
 
In an effort to understand the trends in tobacco control regulation we have looked at the 
analysis of countries’ measures undertaken by the Canadian Cancer Society as well as our 
own independent analysis of country reports submitted to the WHO FCTC in 2011 or 2012. 
 
                                               
405In-depth interviews with Tobacco Control regulators – non attributable comment due to confidentiality    
406Ibid   
407 Ibid. 
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a. Trends in tobacco control regulations  
 
The Canadian Cancer Society produced an International Status Report on Cigarette Package 
Health Warnings in 2012 which highlighted the upward trend in the number of countries 
adopting tobacco control measures in this area.  It is interesting to note that 63 
countries/jurisdictions have now adopted picture health warnings on tobacco packaging.  
Diagram 1 shows the evolution of this policy.408 
 
Furthermore the increase in the number of countries which have adopted health warnings 
covering 30% and 50% of the package front and back has increased steadily since 2008.  As 
the International Status Report highlights ’47 countries/ jurisdictions have warnings covering 
at least 50% of the package front and back, up from 32 in 2010 and 24 in 2008.’409  Despite 
the legal challenges faced by Uruguay for its 80% warnings outlined above, seven other 
countries from the same region rank in the top 37 countries in terms of the size of warnings 
on the front of package at 50% on average for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Panama 
and Peru and 60% in the case of Ecuador.410 While this regional trend is a fair distance from 
the 80% health warnings Uruguay has put in place it illustrates that the countries in the 
region remain among those countries moving in the direction of more aggressive warnings. 
 
Diagram 1 – Countries/ jurisdictions requiring picture warnings on cigarette packages 
 
Source:  Canadian Cancer Society. Cigarette Package Health Warnings – International Status Report- 2012 
 
                                               
408 Canadian Cancer Society. Cigarette Package Health Warnings – International Status Report – Third Edition. October 2012 
409Ibid. 
410 Ibid. 
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Level of uptake of tobacco control measures 
 
Those 174 countries that are signatories to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) have committed to regularly report how they are meeting their obligations 
under the convention across all areas of tobacco control regulation.  This analysis was 
particularly interested in understanding the extent to which countries have met their 
obligations in the areas of packaging and labelling of tobacco products (Article 11) and 
tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (Article 13).  As already mentioned these are 
areas which have been most commonly subject to tobacco industry litigation both through 
domestic courts as well as through international trade and investment treaties such as the 
WTO and IIAs in recent years.      
 
To facilitate the analysis of uptake of tobacco control regulation by country and region a 
database was created for this research out of the raw data included in country reports 
submitted by parties to the convention in 2011 and 2012, indicating whether they had 
complied with Articles 11 and Article 13 of the FCTC convention.  There were 131 reports 
submitted during this period and used for the purpose of this analysis.411   
 
Diagram 2 – Limits on tobacco packaging advertising and promotion 
 
Source:  Analysis of WHO FCTC reports of the Parties submitted in 2011/2012 
 
Under the country reporting system, Section 3.2.5.1 of Article 11 of the FCTC asks whether 
Parties have adopted and implemented measures requiring that tobacco products ‘do not 
                                               
411 Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used for this analysis.  Only reports submitted in 2011 or 2012 were included.  A number of 
countries had last submitted a report between 2008 and 2010.  These were deemed too outdated for inclusion.  Furthermore it is 
worth noting that there is an under-representation of reports include which were submitted in Arabic (x) however all reports 
submitted in English, Spanish and French were included. 
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carry advertising or promotion’412.  While the strict interpretation of this requirement would 
be the adoption of plain packaging measures, we know that Australia is the only country to 
have done so.413  Nevertheless based on their responses, countries appear to have adopted 
measures which are moving in that direction.  The analysis of responses shows that at least 
50% countries in all regions have placed such restrictions on tobacco packaging, advertising 
and promotion.  In the case of Europe, 73.2% of countries have adopted restrictive measures 
and 60% in Australasia.  Diagram 2 above outlines the findings 
 
Section 3.2.5.3 of Article 11 in the country reports asks whether Parties have adopted and 
implemented measures requiring tobacco products ‘carry health warnings describing the 
harmful effects of tobacco use’414.  The analysis of responses shows a very high degree of 
compliance of countries across all regions.  The highest uptake was in North America and 
Europe with 100% and 98% respectively, followed closely by Australasia at 82% and the 
Middle East at 82%.  The lowest uptake is in the Latin American & Caribbean region with 
68.4% of countries complying.  Figure 3 below outlines the findings 
Diagram 3 – Health warnings required 
 
Source:  Analysis of WHO FCTC reports of the Parties submitted in 2011/2012 
 
As part of the reports, Section 3.2.5.8 and 3.2.5.9 of Article 11 asks those countries which have 
implemented health warnings whether they are ensuring that the health warnings occupy no 
less than %30 and 50% or more of the principal display area respectively.  The analysis of 
responses shows a very high degree of compliance of countries with respect to 30% warning 
                                               
412 FCTC Parties’ reports - http://www.who.int/fctc/reporting/en/ 
413 The Step by step instructions for the FCTC reporting says that Parties should indicate they have complied if they have put in 
place measures ‘to restrict or prohibit the use of logos, colours, brand images or promotional information on packaging other than 
brand names and product names displayed in a standard colour and font style (plain packaging).  Many countries have interpreted 
this more liberally to include measures which ‘restrict’ rather than ‘prohibit’.  This was confirmed by an email exchange held with a 
senior European regulator whose country had responded accordingly. 
414 FCTC Parties’ reports - http://www.who.int/fctc/reporting/en/ 
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across all regions except Africa at 59.4%.  The 50% warnings however have achieved a level 
of uptake of 47 countries, as outlined earlier by the Canadian Cancer Society.  While there has 
been a steady increase in the number of countries adopting these measures, the percentage 
per region still remains relatively low with the exception of North America.  Europe was the 
lowest at 12.2% followed by the Middle East at 33.3%, Australasia (36.7%), Africa (46.9%) 
and Latin America & Caribbean recording the highest uptake at (52.6%).  This reinforces the 
earlier point made regarding the IIA case against Uruguay which we might have expected to 
have had a downward influence on the level of uptake of such a policy in the region.  Diagram 
4 below outlines the findings 
Diagram 4 – Over 50% health warnings on packaging  
 
Source:  Analysis of WHO FCTC reports of the Parties submitted in 2011/2012 
 
Diagram 5 – Comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
 
Source:  Analysis of WHO FCTC reports of the Parties submitted in 2011/2012 
 
Finally, Section 3.2.7.1 of Article 13 in the country reports asks whether Parties have adopted 
and implemented measures ‘instituting a comprehensive ban on all tobacco advertising, 
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promotion and sponsorship’.415  With the exception of North America (0%)416 and Latin 
America & Caribbean at 31.6%, over 50% of countries in all regions have implemented such 
measures.  The highest uptake was in Europe with 78% of countries adopting such measures.  
Diagram 5 above outlines the findings. 
 
Overall this analysis shows that countries have been adopting tobacco control measures in 
the area of packaging, labelling, advertising and promotion at ever increasing rates since 
2001.  More particularly they have done so equally in regions where these measures have 
come under challenges by the tobacco industry through IIAs and other trade and investment 
instruments. 
 
4. TESTING EXPECTATION 2:  THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT IN THE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
 
a. Influences on the regulatory development process 
 
In trying to understand the role played by international trade and investment commitments 
in influencing the regulatory development process, the in-depth interviews with regulators 
and the electronic survey probed the main influences. 
 
Survey 
Regulators where asked in the electronic survey to identify what factors influenced the 
development of tobacco control regulations.  They identified domestic public health concerns 
as the most important followed by the FCTC protocol and guidelines.  A country’s trade and 
investment commitments tended to rank between 3rd and 5th among most countries with the 
least important influence being the views of tobacco industry stakeholders.  Table 1 below 
illustrates. 
 
                                               
415 FCTC Parties’ reports - http://www.who.int/fctc/reporting/en/ 
416 Canada faced a successful domestic constitutional challenge by the tobacco industry to its tobacco control legislation in the 
1990s dealing with an advertising ban. 
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Table 1 – Regulators’ views on the influences on the development of tobacco control regulations 
rs influence your development of tobacco control regulations?  Please rank the influences 
below, where 1 indicates the most influential and 6 the least. 
# Answer 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Responses 
1 Domestic public health concerns 17 6 4 0 0 1 28 
2 The FCTC protocol and guidelines 7 12 5 3 1 0 28 
3 The activities of neighboring countries 0 1 6 10 7 4 28 
4 
Your country's international trade and investment 
commitments 
1 1 6 7 10 3 28 
5 The views of key tobacco industry stakeholders 2 0 0 5 5 16 28 
6 
The views of other stakeholders such as Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or the public 
1 8 7 3 5 4 28 
 Total 28 28 28 28 28 28 - 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
Face-to-face interviews 
During the in-depth interviews, regulators were similarly asked to outline and discuss the 
primary factors which influenced their regulatory development process, consistent with the 
survey results though in a slightly different order of importance.  The main influencing factors 
for them were the FCTC obligations and guidelines, the health gap, regional obligations, the 
actions of other countries, domestic constraints, scientific research, industry influence but not 
international trade and investment.417 
 
FCTC obligations and guidelines 
The primary driver of regulatory development in the area of tobacco control was the FCTC 
obligations and the subsequent guidelines established for their implementation.  Both 
developed and developing country regulators highlighted the importance of these obligations 
and the usefulness of the tools given to countries as they pursue new and more aggressive 
tobacco control regulations. 
 
The health gap 
A major influencing factor for developed countries was the public health gap.  Identifying 
domestic health needs or concerns and developing regulatory policy to address it was seen as 
a primary goal for tobacco control regulators in the developed world. 
 
                                               
417 Quantitative coding of interview data was undertaken in order to identify the key categories and themes outlined here.  Appendix 
8 provides the coding and categories resulting from this analysis 
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Regional obligations 
Both developed and developing country regulators highlighted the role played by regional 
initiatives (such as the Gulf Countries joint efforts on health, education and sports) as well as 
the constraints of regional obligations and legislative frameworks (such as EU legislation and 
the EU Tobacco Products Directive). 
 
Actions of other countries 
The actions of other country in the area of tobacco control was a driver for many developed 
and developing country regulators both in terms of the learning that can be provided with 
respect to implementation but also the effectiveness of new measures and the risks inherent 
in their adoption. 
 
Domestic constraints 
Domestic constraints were a big theme among developed and developing countries regulators 
interviewed.  Legal and constitutional constraints played a big role in developed countries, 
restricting their ability to pursue certain tobacco control regulations.  Consideration of the 
impact of new regulations was important particularly with respect to the economic impact 
and any unintended consequences such measures might entail.  Domestic public opinion was 
an influencing factor in this regard both with respect to the media, the NGO community and 
general consensus of opinion on tobacco regulation.  Related to this was the level of political 
will or influence on high profile regulatory measures. 
 
Scientific research 
Both developed and developing countries highlighted the importance they placed on scientific 
research as an influencing factor in their regulatory development.  In some cases government 
researchers were employed directly, others relied on the scientific academic community both 
domestic and international. 
 
Industry influence 
Industry influence was identified as an influencing factor in the regulatory development 
process by a number of developing countries interviewed. 
Trade 
Finally, international trade and investment was not raised by regulators as an influencing 
factor when asked this broader question.  There was some concern about the impact of the 
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illicit trade in tobacco products but not trade with respect to international commitments and 
litigation through IIAs. 
 
b. Health Warnings and Plain Packaging - the factors influencing decision making 
 
Given the IIA challenges in Australia and Uruguay and in an attempt to gauge their impact, 
regulators were asked about their health warning and plain packaging policies and the factors 
which will influence their decisions in this regard. 
 
Health Warnings 
 
With respect to health warnings and the size of pictoral health warnings, regulators identified 
domestic public health concerns and the FCTC commitments and guidelines as the largest 
influences.  The threat of an international trade or investment challenge was not a big factor, 
ranking last with only 18% of regulators surveyed selecting it as relevant. 
Table 2 – Regulators’ views on the factors influencing consideration of pictoral warnings  
5.  What factors are important to you when considering either the introduction of pictoral 
warnings or increases to the size of pictoral warnings on tobacco products? Please select as 
many of these as are relevant. 
# Answer   % 
1 Domestic public health concerns   
 
86% 
2 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
commitments and guidelines 
  
 
77% 
3 The tobacco control policies of neighboring countries   
 
41% 
4 
The tobacco control policies of world leaders in this area 
(eg: Australia, Canada, EU countries) 
  
 
41% 
5 The threat of litigation from the tobacco industry   
 
27% 
6 
The threat of an international trade or investment 
challenge 
  
 
18% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
A cross tabulation analysis was conducted in SPSS to look at the degree to which regulators 
considered the threat of an international trade or investment dispute by geographical region.  
While it was a consideration by 50% of the regulators from the Middle East, the vast majority 
of the other regions said it was not (100% in North America, 87.5% in Europe, 85.7% in 
Africa and 66.7% in Australasia).418 
 
                                               
418
 While this analysis was not statistically significant or therefore generalizable given the small number of respondents it provides 
insight into the views of this particular survey sample.  A Chi Square test for independence indicated no significant association 
between geographical region and likelihood to see the threat of trade or investment disputes as an influence on the regulatory 
development process, x2(4, n=21)=2.2, p=.70, phi=.32  
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Table 3 – Cross tabulation of the influence of a threat of trade or investment dispute by geographical 
region  
 Threat trade or investment dispute impact  
Yes No Total 
North America 00.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Europe 12.5% 87.5% 100.0% 
Africa 14.3% 85.7% 100.0% 
Australasia 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
Middle East 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013 – analysed using SPSS  
 
Plain Packaging 
 
During the in-depth interviews, regulators fell into two groups, those who are not considering 
the introduction of plain packaging regulations and those that are considering it.  Those who 
are not considering it were generally driven by a number of key and consistent factors.  In the 
case of developing countries they generally argued that it was not a consideration because 
they had a long way to go in the development of their core and basic tobacco control 
regulations.  They were usually focussed on the establishment and implementation of health 
warnings – either increasing the size and percentage of the cigarette package it would 
represent or whether or not to introduce pictograms.  Additionally, developing countries 
were often concerned about the lack of political will or the fact that existing laws were not 
being enforced.  Developed countries that were not considering the introduction of plain 
packaging measures were either watching and waiting the Australian example or were not 
clear on the effectiveness of the policy as a means of curbing the use of tobacco products 
given lack of empirical evidence to date. 
 
Those countries that were considering the introduction of plain packaging measures were 
also universally interested in understanding the impact the policy would have domestically.  
Developing countries saw the challenges in dealing with domestic departmental differences 
particularly with respect to intellectual property concerns.  Developed countries were 
concerned about the risks of introducing such a measure and the need to observe the results 
of Australia’s current legal challenges, the potential difficulty of getting political approval and 
the need to defer to regional jurisdiction in the case of the EU.  
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Table 4 – Regulators’ stated policy on plain packaging 
6.  What is your country's position on the policy of plain packaging? 
# Answer    % 
3 Plain packaging is not a priority for my country   
 
23% 
4 
We have begun the formal process of considering 
plain packaging 
  
 
18% 
5 We will consider this policy sometime in the future   
 
59% 
 Total  100% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
The electronic survey showed that the majority of countries at 59% will consider plain 
packaging sometime in the future while 18% have begun the formal process of consideration 
and 23% do not see it as a priority for their country.  Table 4 above shows this breakdown. 
Furthermore when survey respondents were probed about the main influences on the plain 
packaging decision, regulators in the electronic survey identified domestic political support as 
the most important influence on the decision to pursue this policy.  This was followed by the 
compatibility of plain packaging regulations with domestic or regional laws and policies.  
While 45% of regulators identified Australia’s WTO challenge as an influence, only 23% saw 
Australia’s BIT challenge as a factor.  Table 5 below shows this breakdown. This finding is 
particularly interesting given our desire to understand the influence of IIA ISDS on regulation 
policy in this area.  While this finding clearly demonstrates awareness of the Australia case 
and its influence on a country’s policy decision, this awareness is not with respect to the 
challenge under the Hong Kong Australia BIT. 
 
Table 5 – Factors of influence on plain packaging decision 
7.  Which factors will be influential in your decision to pursue plain packaging (either now or 
in the future)?  Please select as many of these as are relevant. 
# Answer    % 
1 Domestic political support for this policy   
 
73% 
2 
The compatibility of plain packaging regulations 
with our domestic or regional laws and policies 
(e.g: EU law and directives) 
  
 
50% 
3 The FCTC Guidelines for Articles 11 & 13   
 
45% 
4 
The outcome of the WTO challenge to Australia's 
plain packaging law 
  
 
45% 
5 
The outcome of the Philip Morris investor-state 
challenge to Australia's plain packaging law 
  
 
23% 
6 Other   
 
5% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013  
 
A cross tabulation analysis was conducted in SPSS to look at the importance of Australia’s 
WTO and BIT challenges by region.  With respect to the influence of Australia’s WTO 
challenge on the regulatory development process it was most important within the 
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Australasia region (with 75% of those from the region identifying it as an influence) and least 
important to North America and Latin America (with 100% of those from the region not 
identifying it as a factor) and Africa (75%). 419 Table 6 below outlines the results. 
 
Table 6– Cross tabulation of the influence of Australia’s WTO challenge on the regulatory development 
process by geographical region  
 Australia WTO Challenge   
Yes No Total 
North America 00.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Europe 44.4% 55.6% 100.0% 
Africa 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Australasia 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Middle East 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Latin America 00.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013 – analysed using SPSS 
 
Table 7 – Cross tabulation of the influence of Australia’s BIT challenge on the regulatory development 
process by geographical region  
 Australia BIT Challenge   
Yes No Total 
North America 00.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Europe 33.3% 66.6% 100.0% 
Africa 12.5% 87.5% 100.0% 
Australasia 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Middle East 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Latin America 00.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013 – analysed using SPSS  
 
Again of crucial interest was the fact that Australia’s BIT challenge was not seen as an 
influencing factor by most respondents from every region with the exception of the Middle 
East at 50%. 420  This is outlined in table 7 above. 
 
The in-depth interviews suggested the influences on the decision making process regarding 
plain packaging were threefold. 
 
                                               
419
 While this analysis was not statistically significant or therefore generalizable given the small number of respondents it provides 
insight into the views of this particular survey sample.  A Chi Square test for independence indicated no significant association 
between geographical region and likelihood to see Australia WTO challenge as an influence on the regulatory development process, 
x2(5, n=26)=4.99, p=.42, phi=.44 
420 100% from North America , 66.&% from Europe, 87.5% from Africa, 75% from Australasia said it was not a factor.  While this 
analysis was not statistically significant or therefore generalizable given the small number of respondents it provides insight into the 
views of this particular survey sample.  A Chi Square test for independence indicated no significant association between 
geographical region and likelihood to see the Australia WTO challenge as an influence on the regulatory development process, x2(5, 
n=26)=2.75, p=.74., phi=.33. 
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Countries were not ready and needed to focus on the basics first 
Countries were not ready to pursue plain packaging measures because they needed to focus 
on ensuring their basic framework of tobacco control regulation was in place and being 
enforced.  This was predominantly a developing country issue. 
 
Trade implications  
Developed countries were concerned about the trade implications of introducing plain 
packaging measures driven by the on-going trade challenges faced by Australia.  There were 
concerns with the possible impact on intellectual property rights and the general risk of 
litigation either domestically or through the WTO.  In the case of developing countries, the 
influence of the tobacco industry was a big factor as was the experience of other countries.  AS 
with the survey results, the Philip Morris BIT ISDS challenge was not raised and the focus was 
on the WTO. 
 
Legal and constitutional obligations 
 
Legal and constitutional obligations were another major influencing factor felt by developed 
countries.  They were concerned with ensuring the compatibility of any new regulation with 
regional policy directives and their own domestic constitutions, given the degree of litigation 
from the tobacco industry.  Finding the appropriate political will for such a policy was also an 
influencing factor.  This was often tied to the high profile nature of Australia’s political 
challenges with the plain packaging policy. 
 
c. The role of international trade and investment in the regulatory development process 
 
Beyond the specific example of plain packaging, regulators were asked more generally the 
extent to which a country’s trade and investment commitments were relevant to the 
regulatory development process on tobacco control.  In the electronic survey, roughly a third 
of regulators equally considered its relevance ‘very much’, ‘some’ and ‘not very much’. 
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Table 8 – Regulators’ views on the relevance of trade and investment commitments 
8.  To what extent do you consider your country's trade and investment commitments as 
relevant to the regulatory development process on tobacco control? 
# Answer    % 
1 Very much   
 
32% 
2 Some   
 
27% 
3 not very much   
 
32% 
4 not at all   
 
9% 
 Total  100% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013  
 
The in-depth interviews probed this question more deeply with a view to understanding the 
degree to which regulators considered these issues, their level of awareness of IIAs and the 
extent to which a legal challenge through an IIA would have an impact on their decision 
making. 
 
There were a number of key themes in the answers given by regulators.  Some regulators 
argued that trade and investment commitments were not an issue or that they were more 
focussed on other factors.  Others considered trade and investment commitments with 
respect to the trade challenge experience of other countries.  There was some 
acknowledgment that other domestic departments did consider trade and would therefore 
seek to influence health regulation in this regard and finally recognition that the 
consideration of trade and investment was a more recent consideration in the regulatory 
development process.  421 
 
Trade is not an issue or influence 
 
Many regulators, almost entirely from developing countries claimed that international trade 
and investment was not an issue which influenced the regulatory development process.  They 
were either not thinking about trade, not aware of trade challenges at home or when aware of 
trade challenges elsewhere did not see them as having an influencing role.  One developed 
country regulator claimed that ‘international investment agreements mean nothing to me’ 
and they are ‘not on my radar screen.’422 
 
                                               
421
 Quantitative coding of interview data was undertaken in order to identify the key categories and themes outlined here.  
Appendix 8 provides the coding and categories resulting from this analysis 
422 In-depth interviews with Tobacco Control regulators – non attributable comment due to confidentiality   
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They are focussed on things other than trade 
 
Another major theme raised by regulators was that they were focussed on more important 
factors then trade when developing tobacco control regulation.  Health policy, and the 
guidelines and obligations of the FCTC and the EU were most commonly raised by developed 
and developing countries alike.  This reflects the earlier answers they gave regarding the 
main influencing factors and the relative importance of trade and investment. 
 
Other country’s trade challenges are of concern 
 
Trade seemed more of a concern among developed country regulators in the context of trade 
challenges faced by other countries.  Most commonly raised was the case of Australia and the 
WTO challenges it was facing with respect to its plain packaging regulations. 
 
Other domestic departments consider trade 
 
While many regulators argued that trade and investment was not a consideration for them in 
the regulatory development process, a number highlighted the fact that other government 
departments in their countries were concerned about the trade implications of health policy 
and as such would try to influence the regulatory decision making process as a result.  
Equally, a number of developed country regulators did admit however that when other 
domestic departments (such as trade or commerce)were involved in the negotiation of new 
trade agreements, they as health regulators were interested in ensuring any new trade 
agreement allowed them to retain their regulatory space. 
 
Trade is a more recent consideration 
 
Finally a number of developed country regulators raised the fact that trade had become for 
them a new consideration alongside other public concerns when developing tobacco control 
regulations.  When probed further, this more recent trade focus was almost exclusively on 
issues within the WTO and in particular the TBT, SPS & TRIPS agreements.  This point is 
probed further in the next section. 
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d. The most relevant trade and investment commitments to the regulatory 
development process 
 
Regulators were asked in the electronic survey to specify which trade and investment 
commitments were relevant when making a regulatory decision on tobacco control.  The 
WTO was identified by 91% of regulators as an important factor.  As outlined in table 9, 55% 
of respondents felt that regional agreements were a factor while only 27% of regulators 
identified bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  This view was reflected in the in-depth 
interviews with little awareness of BITs and their potential for regulatory challenges and a 
greater focus on the potential impact of the multilateral trading system and agreements on 
TBT and SPS. 
 
Table 9 – Regulators’ views on types of trade and investment commitments of relevance 
9.  Where trade is a factor, which types of trade commitments are relevant for you to 
consider when making a regulatory decision on tobacco control?  You can identify as many 
as are relevant. 
# Answer    % 
1 
World Trade Organization (WTO) 
commitments (such as TBT, SPS, TRIPS) 
  
 
91% 
2 
Regional trade commitments (e.g.: EU, 
ASEAN, NAFTA) 
  
 
55% 
3 
Bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
commitments 
  
 
32% 
4 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 
commitments 
  
 
27% 
5 Other   
 
0% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013  
 
It was particularly interesting that regulators focussed on the WTO commitments as most 
relevant vis-à-vis others when making a regulatory decision on tobacco control, particularly 
given the fact that the tobacco industry BIT challenges to these regulatory measures have 
been the most prominent in Australia and Uruguay.  While there is arguably industry support 
behind the country challenges at the WTO it has been less overt and the potential financial 
implications for member states less dramatic. 
 
e. Awareness of regulators 
 
Regulators were asked in the electronic survey to identify whether they were aware of any 
trade or investment challenges to tobacco control regulations in their countries.  The majority 
at 73% claimed no awareness.   
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Table 10 – Regulators’ awareness of trade and investment challenges 
10.  Have there been any trade or investment challenges to tobacco control regulations in 
your country? 
# Answer   % 
1 
I am aware of a trade or investment challenge 
against tobacco control in my country 
  
 
27% 
2 
I am not aware of any trade or investment 
challenge against tobacco control in my country 
  
 
73% 
 Total  100% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013  
 
A series of cross tabulations were conducted in SPSS to look at the extent to which regulators 
that were aware of trade or investment challenges were more likely to also take the 
Australian WTO and BIT challenges into consideration in their decision making on plain 
packaging or to consider the threat of trade and investment disputes as a factor in their 
decision making on pictoral health warnings. 
 
First on the issue of plain packaging, the cross tabulation showed that 87.5% of those 
regulators who were aware of trade or investment challenges did not consider either the 
WTO challenge or the Philip Morris BIT challenge to Australia’s plain packaging law in their 
own decision making on plain packaging.423 
 
Table 11 – Cross tabulation on the impact of Australia’s WTO & BIT challenges on regulators with 
awareness of challenges  
 Awareness of a trade or investment challenge  
Yes No Total 
Australia’s WTO Challenge 12.5% 87.5% 100.0% 
Australia’s BIT Challenge 12.5% 87.5% 100.0% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013 – analysed using SPSS 
 
Second on the issue of pictoral health warnings the cross tabulation showed that 100% of 
those regulators who were aware of trade or investment challenges against tobacco control 
regulations did not consider the threat of such a dispute in developing regulation in the area 
of health warnings.424 
 
                                               
423 While this analysis was not statistically significant or generalizable given the small number of respondents it provides insight 
into the views of this particular survey sample.  A Chi Square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated no 
significant association between geographical region and likelihood to see the threat of trade or investment disputes as an influence 
on the regulatory development process, x2(1, n=26)=1.9, p=.17, phi= -.36 
424 While this analysis was not statistically significant or generalizable given the small number of respondents it provides insight 
into the views of this particular survey sample.  A Chi Square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated no 
significant association between geographical region and likelihood to see the threat of trade or investment disputes as an influence 
on the regulatory development process, x2(1, n=21)=.625, p=.429, phi= -.30 
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Finally a cross tabulation analysis was undertaken to look at which trade and investment 
agreements were most relevant to those regulators that had awareness of disputes in their 
country.  100% of those with awareness identified the WTO, 62.5% regional trade 
agreements as most relevant.  Interestingly 75% of those who registered awareness of 
disputes in their country felt that FTAs and BITs were not relevant in their decision 
making.425 
 
Table 12– Cross tabulation of which trade and investment agreements are most relevant for regulators 
with awareness of challenges  
 Awareness of a trade or investment challenge  
Yes No Total 
WTO most relevant 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Regional most relevant 62.5% 37.5% 100.0% 
FTA most relevant 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
BIT most relevant 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Global Tobacco Regulators – Report May 22 2013 – analysed using SPSS 
 
The regulators interviewed made very general references to international trade.  When 
discussing international trade challenges which gave them concern, they were almost 
exclusively referring to the WTO or domestic court challenges faced by Australia.  There was 
very little direct references to the IIA challenges faced by Australia and no reference to the IIA 
challenge faced by Uruguay. 
 
Regulators were concerned more generally however about litigation from the tobacco 
industry and the fact that this litigation was morphing in more recent times towards other 
types of legal challenges such as trade.  The issue of forum shopping was raised by one 
regulator experienced with these matters, but it is clearly a trend that more and more 
regulators are becoming aware of.   
 
Of interest was the fact that the concern over litigation and trade challenges was most felt 
among developed country regulators while those from developing countries had little 
experience of direct litigation given the weak nature of domestic institutions.  
                                               
425 While this analysis was not statistically significant or generalizable given the small number of respondents it provides insight 
into the views of this particular survey sample.  A Chi Square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated no 
significant association between geographical region and likelihood to see the threat of trade or investment disputes as an influence 
on the regulatory development process, x2(1, n=26)=.317, p=.574, phi= .22 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Overall an analysis of available data showed very little empirical support for the regulatory 
chill hypothesis.  With respect to the first expectation that we would expect trends in tobacco 
control regulation to reflect regulatory chill through the level of uptake in key tobacco control 
measures in the wake of IIA challenges, the analysis showed that: 
 
Countries have been adopting tobacco control measures in the area of packaging, labelling, 
advertising and promotion at ever increasing rates since 2001.  More particularly they have 
done so equally in regions where these measures have come under challenges by the tobacco 
industry through IIAs and other trade and investment instruments. 
 
Latin American countries were among the highest implementers of 50%+ health warnings 
despite challenges faced by Uruguay under IIAs on this issue. 
 
With respect to the second expectation that we would expect senior tobacco control 
regulators to be aware of IIAs and their implications and to take them into consideration in 
the regulatory development process, the analysis showed that: 
 
The influence of trade and investment commitments was not a leading influencing fact or in 
the regulatory development process.  The majority of regulators ranked it near the end of 
factors or in the face-to-face interviews did not identity it at all.  More influential factors were 
the health gap, FCTC obligations, actions of other countries, domestic and regional obligations 
or domestic constitutional issues.  Despite emerging experience with IIA litigation the threat 
of an international trade and investment challenges as a deciding fact on this policy ranked 
last. 
 
On plain packaging, developing countries were generally more concerned with establishing 
more basic tobacco control regulations or ensuring the implementation of existing ones.  Both 
developed and developing countries were interested in understanding the effectiveness of the 
policy and the legal constraints both domestic and regional as well as the challenge of gaining 
political support 
 
While there was evidence that countries were adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach to tobacco 
control on policies such as plain packaging given the legal challenges against Australia, this 
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seemed to be more directly related to the challenges under the auspices of the WTO or 
domestic courts.   The electronic survey demonstrates that this was particularly focused on 
Australia’s WTO challenge and not the BIT challenge by PMI.  A cross tabulation analysis 
shows that Australia’s BIT challenges was not seen as important in the majority of regions. 
 
More broadly on the issue, tobacco control regulators do not consider trade and investment 
commitments when developing tobacco control regulations except when it is championed by 
other domestic government departments. 
 
Where trade commitments do play a role in the regulatory development process regulators 
identified the WTO (90%) as the most relevant influencing type of commitments.  BITs 
ranked last among regulators with many showing a complete lack of awareness or 
understanding of their existence or potential impact.  Where there was awareness, these 
regulators still identified the WTO as the most relevant and BITS as the least. 
 
Views were expressed by both developed and developing countries regarding concerns about 
the influence of the tobacco industry on the regulatory development process.  This influence 
was not driven directly by IIA challenges but rather domestic court challenges, threat of 
litigation (in many possible fora including IIAs) as well as close political ties. 
 
The results of this analysis show little observable evidence regarding the expectations to 
support the hypothesis of regulatory chill with direct link to IIAs and ISDS challenges.  As the 
same time there is certainly an awareness of the threat of challenges by the tobacco industry 
and recognition that trade is playing a larger part as a new vehicle for this threat.  Domestic 
litigation and challenges through the WTO multilateral forum seem to be the most top of mind 
and may be having a chilling impact in their own right evidenced by the comments of both 
developed and developing countries describing a ‘wait and see’ attitude to adopting domestic 
policies in the area of plain packaging prior to the resolution of disputes against the 
Government of Australia. 
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Chapter 7:  Understanding the level of chill – Cross case 
study analysis and key findings 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
While legal scholars, civil society groups and the public press continue to raise concerns 
about the potential chilling impact of IIAs and ISDS provisions, particularly in the wake of 
high profile regional and bilateral trade and investment negotiations such as the TPP and 
TTIP and lingering doubts regarding NAFTA Chapter 11, the majority of scholars have looked 
at the merits of IIA investment disputes and found little evidence of potential for regulatory 
chill beyond a handful of anecdotal examples in both developed and developing countries.   
 
This research was aimed at providing a more comprehensive and systematic approach to the 
consideration of regulatory chill, beyond the case-by-case approach which has characterized 
analysis of this issue to date.  Both the findings of this research and the methodology used are 
aimed at addressing the gap in research to date by considering not only trends in regulation 
but the views and understanding of regulators themselves.  Coe and Rubins make the point 
that the regulatory chill thesis ‘assumes that regulators are aware of international law, but are 
they?  On the one hand, it is likely that legislators often attempt to acquaint themselves with 
the international ramifications of contemplated measures likely to affect foreign enterprises.  
Indeed, with the unprecedented public awareness of investor–state arbitration and the recent 
burgeoning of the associated docket, regulators may be more conscious of the prospect of 
liability than ever before.’ 426 This research suggests that this is not the case, at least in the 
context of the Canadian regulatory environment and as outlined by a snapshot of developed 
and developing country tobacco control regulators globally. 
 
This thesis has sought to engage with the theory on globalization and particularly the strand 
concerned about the impact of globalization on government policy autonomy.  More 
specifically, the goal of this research was to understand the impact of International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs) on national regulatory autonomy.  By probing trends in 
regulation as well as the level of awareness of IIAs by government regulators, the aim of this 
                                               
426
Coe, Jack and Noah Rubins. 2005. Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context and Contributions. In International 
Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law, 
edited by Todd Weiler, 597-667. London: Cameron May.  
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research was to identify the likelihood of constrained regulatory decision making or 
‘regulatory chill’ amongst those governments who have faced challenges, or the threat of 
challenges, to their regulatory measures under IIAs.  It was also interested in understanding 
whether any chilling effect was more likely in a developing country versus a developed 
country environment.  Through the use of case studies on the Canadian regulatory 
environment under NAFTA Chapter 11 and on global tobacco control regulation under IIA 
investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) challenges, this research sought to answer the 
following question: 
 
What has been the impact of international investment agreements on national regulatory 
autonomy in the areas of health, safety and environment?  Is there evidence of a “chilling” 
impact on the regulatory development process? 
 
The assumption of this thesis was that if the regulatory chill hypothesis was to hold or to 
be considered a viable possible outcome of IIA legal challenges, we would expect to find a 
number of observable outcomes in regulator behaviour and regulatory trends across the two 
case studies.   First, one would expect trends in HSE regulation to reflect this chilling impact 
(through a stagnant or weakening regulatory environment or through the degree of uptake in 
regulatory policy), particularly in policy areas where regulatory measures were challenged 
under IIAs.  Second we would expect to find a level of awareness and understanding among 
HSE regulators about the existence and content of IIAs.  Any potential causal link between 
IIAs and regulatory chill also needed to demonstrate that beyond awareness, that IIAs had an 
influential role on regulators in the HSE regulatory development process. 
 
2. KEY CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE REGULATORY CHILL HYPOTHESIS 
 
a. Main conclusion 
 
Overall this research found that the empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis on 
regulatory chill.  While there are some findings which raise the possibility of influence by IIA 
ISDS cases on the regulatory development process or trends in regulation, there is no 
consistent observable evidence to suggest the possibility of regulatory chill. 
 
b. Key findings in the Canada Case Study  
 
The case study on the Canadian regulatory environment found that the empirical evidence did 
not support the hypothesis on regulatory chill.  Overall while the analysis found a declining 
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trend in the growth rate of new HSE regulations or regulatory changes it did not find evidence 
of a trend of stagnant or weakening regulations in the wake of NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges 
which would suggest possible regulatory chill.  Additionally the empirical evidence found a 
low level of awareness among HSE regulators regarding NAFTA Chapter 11 and the potential 
threat of an ISDS challenge to regulation.  The research revealed regulators rarely take 
Canada’s trade and investment commitments into consideration when developing 
regulations, but when they do, they are more likely to be concerned about trade commitments 
under the WTO SPS and TBT agreements than NAFTA Chapter 11. 
 
Canada Case Study - Expectation 1 – We would expect HSE regulatory trends to reflect 
regulatory chill(through a stagnant or weakening regulatory environment),  in the wake of IIA 
challenges 
 
In testing the first ‘expectation’ regarding the regulatory chilling impact of IIAs on HSE 
regulations in Canada we looked at a number of primary and secondary sources in an effort to 
achieve a triangulation of data.   
 
An analysis of the Canada Gazette 1 and Canada Gazette 2 shows a declining trend in the 
growth rate of new regulations or regulatory changes, but an increasing trend in the 
stringency and comprehensiveness of regulations in health safety and environment.  The 
analysis showed that the trends in adopted regulatory changes under Gazette 2 have been 
towards neutral regulatory change (58%) or regulatory increases (36%) with 566 
regulations representing increases in regulations and 912 showing a more neutral change. 
  
Senior Federal HSE regulators in Canada confirmed the point that regulations in HSE have 
generally been increasing in stringency and comprehensiveness driven by new areas now 
being regulated, deeper science requirements, a strong international influence, increasing 
public scrutiny and demands, and the push for harmonization of regulations with the US.  
Alongside this trend, a desire for regulatory efficiency and modernization has also resulted in 
a different way of regulating (a leading explanation for declining trends in the growth rate of 
regulations).  
 
There was at the same time some evidence of a statistical correlation between Chapter 11 
disputes on environment and health measures and the adoption of environment and health 
regulations during a few of the years between 1998-2013.   There was a statistically 
significant impact shown by NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges to environmental or health 
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measures in two of the of the fifteen years suggesting that the presence of an investment 
dispute on the environment and health was likely to decrease the probabliity of the adoption 
of environmental regulations in 2002 and 2007.  This raised the potential that these NAFTA 
disputes were having a dampening effect on regulators during the period in question.  At the 
same time however, a NAFTA Chapter 11 challenge on environmental or health measures was 
also likely to increase the probablility of the adoption of health regulations in 2013.  This 
positive correlation suggests it was not a concern in the development of health regulations. 
 
While not providing a clear perspective on trends in regulation the OECD confirms the 
Canadian focus on regulatory reform and a different way of regulating and highlights 
Canada’s improvement in environmental policies as a reflection of increased stringency and 
comprehensiveness.  Canada also receives praise for its steady performance on health and the 
environment from the Conference Board of Canada. 
 
Canada Case Study - Expectation 2 – We would expect senior HSE regulators to be aware of IIAs 
and their implications, and to take them into consideration in the regulatory development 
process 
 
In testing the second ‘expectation’ regarding the hypothesis on regulatory chill we probed 
regulator awareness and the extent to which they took international trade and investment 
into consideration in the regulatory development process. 
 
The empirical analysis revealed that regulators are focussed on a number of factors in the 
regulatory development process which include complying with international standards and 
commitments, harmonizing regulations with the US and internationally, responding to health, 
safety and environmental needs, responding to advances in science and technology, 
responding to the expectations of stakeholders such as the provinces, NGOs and the general 
public, facilitating international trade and responding more recently to domestic streamlining 
and modernization initiatives. 
 
Trade and investment, while not a priority was a consideration in the context of harmonizing 
regulation with trade partners, ensuring international transparency and disclosure through 
SPS and TBT commitments, ensuring compatibility with new and existing trade commitments, 
avoiding barriers to trade to maintain Canada’s overall competitiveness and finally, and to 
some extent in avoiding trade disputes. 
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Despite very low levels of awareness, the more senior a regulator the greater their awareness 
of trade and investment disputes generally and the greater the likelihood they would see this 
as an issue of concern.  Direct regression analysis showed that regulators at the Director 
General level were 3 times more likely to identify this as a factor of concern, controlling for all 
other factors in the model.  Directors were 1.5 times more likely and Head of Sections were 
1.6 times more likely to see this as an influencing factor. 
 
The NAFTA agreement as a whole was seen as the most relevant agreement by regulators 
followed by the WTO and other bilateral FTAs.  Most interestingly, all levels of regulator 
indicated that FIPAs were not relevant, with 84% of Director Generals, 95.5% Directors, 92% 
Sector Heads, 94% Managers and 100% of technical regulators indicating they did not find 
them relevant.  
 
The strongest predictor of a regulator’s likelihood to consider trade and investment dispute 
avoidance as a factor was with respect to the WTO, recording an odds ratio427 of 5,526.  This 
indicated that regulators were 5 times more likely to consider ‘the avoidance of trade and 
investment disputes’ with respect to the WTO, controlling for all other factors in the model.  
This was followed by FTAs and NAFTA. 
 
When we spoke about international trade and investment in the in-depth interviews, there 
was no differentiation between the different types of trade fora or agreements or their 
implications.  Most references to trade commitments referred to SPS or TBT commitments 
under the WTO or NAFTA.  NAFTA Chapter 11 did not rank as an influencing factor. 
 
It was the agreements on Sanitary and Pytosanitary Measaures (SPS) and Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) measures that regulators felt had the greatest impact under both NAFTA and 
the WTO.  The majority of regulators felt that NAFTA Chapter 11 on investment and the 
investment provisions of the WTO (TRIMS) had no, or very limited impact on the regulatory 
development process.  All levels of regulator felt strongest that NAFTA Chapter 11 did not 
have a big impact with Head of Section regulators showing the largest inclination at 100%. 
 
Where there had been a NAFTA dispute that had impacted one of their regulatory measures, 
the level of knowledge was still quite vague and the understanding of the implications or 
                                               
427 Julie Pallant in SPSS Survival Manual quotes Tabachnick and Fidell’s 2007 book Using multivariate statistics (5th edn). Boston: 
Pearson Education, ‘the odds ratio represents the change in odes of being in one of the categories of outcome when the value of a 
predictor increases by one unit. P.177 
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costs associated with such a challenge was not high.  Their experience would have made them 
more aware and more likely to flag future regulatory changes for legal advice but this did not 
impact their decision making.  These disputes were seen as one off incidents which did not 
have a bearing on future regulation. 
Very few regulators were aware of any such threats with only 12% claiming awareness.  This 
varied by department with 96% of Health Canada (HC) and 97% of Environment Canada (EC) 
regulators not aware of NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges despite the fact that a number of past 
and current challenges would have impacted these departments.  Finally, less surprising was 
the fact that 40% of the Pest Management Review Agency (PMRA) and 77% of the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) regulators had awareness of NAFTA Chapter 11 
disputes reflecting a number of high profile past and present cases428 in their organizations. 
 
Among those regulators that were aware of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes, 42% claimed that 
despite this awareness it did not influence the regulatory development process.  The results 
of the cross tabulation suggest that those regulators who were aware of disputes in their 
areas felt it impacted their decision making only somewhat 28.6% or not very much 28%.  
Only 21.4% said it impacted their decision on regulatory development process very much. 
 
Taken together, the conclusions in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 suggest a number of things with 
respect to the hypothesis on regulatory chill.  First, HSE regulatory trends showed a steady 
and increasing level of stringency in comprehensiveness over the last decade with only a 
minor demonstrable impact across areas of regulation most frequently subjected to NAFTA 
Chapter 11 challenges as reflected through both observed trends in regulatory growth or 
levels of stringency as well as by the presence of a statistically significant impact in 2002 and 
2007.  Second, there was very little awareness among HSE regulators about the existence of 
IIAs and particularly NAFTA Chapter 11.  Regulators did not identify trade and investment 
commitments as an influencing factor in the regulatory development process and where they 
did merit consideration it was predominantly with respect to the need to ensure trade 
facilitation with trading partners, meet transparency requirements under international 
agreements or not at all.    This did not differ markedly by Federal Department or by level of 
seniority of the regulator. 
 
                                               
428 Both Chemtura v. Government of Canada and Dow AgroScience v. Government of Canada involved bans on pesticides which 
come under the remit of the PMRA.  The ongoing case Clayton/Bilcon v. Government of Canada involves the rejection of a basalt 
quarry and marine terminal following a federal environmental review within the remit of CEAA. 
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Based on the hypothesis of regulatory chill, there did not appear to be evidence of the 
regulatory trends nor regulator awareness one would expect if chill on the back of IIA 
disputes were a potential consideration in the Canadian context.  
 
c. Key findings in the tobacco control case study  
 
The case study on tobacco control found that the empirical evidence did not support the 
hypothesis on regulatory chill.  Overall the analysis found a increasing trend in the level of 
uptake of tobacco control regulations among countries worldwide, including in regions which 
were facing ISDS challenges under IIAs.  Additionally the empirical evidence found a low level 
of awareness among tobacco control regulators regarding IIAs and the potential threat of an 
ISDS challenge to tobacco regulation.  The research revealed that regulators rarely take trade 
and investment commitments into consideration when developing regulations and when they 
do, they are more likely to be concerned about trade commitments under the WTO SPS and 
TBT agreements than commitments under IIAs.  Illustrative of this point was the fact that 
regulators from developed and developing countries see the influence of the WTO challenge 
against Australia’s plain packaging legislation as an influencing factor in their own ‘wait and 
see’ approach on this issue.  
 
Tobacco Control Case Study - Expectation 1 – We would expect tobacco control trends to reflect 
regulatory chill(through the degree of uptake in regulatory policy), in the wake of IIA 
challenges 
 
Overall an analysis of available data showed very little empirical support for the regulatory 
chill hypothesis.  With respect to the first expectation that we would expect trends in tobacco 
control regulation to reflect regulatory chill through the level of uptake in key tobacco control 
measures in the wake of IIA challenges, the analysis showed that: 
 
Countries have been adopting tobacco control measures in the area of packaging, labelling, 
advertising and promotion at ever increasing rates since 2001.  More particularly they have 
done so equally in regions where these measures have come under challenges by the tobacco 
industry through IIAs and other trade and investment instruments. 
 
Latin American countries continue to be among the highest implementers of 50%+ health 
warnings despite challenges faced by Uruguay under IIAs on this issue. 
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Tobacco Control Case Study - Expectation 2 – We would expect senior tobacco control 
regulators to be aware of IIAs and their implications, and to take them into consideration in the 
regulatory development process 
 
 
With respect to the second expectation that we would expect senior tobacco control 
regulators to be aware of IIAs and their implications and to take them into consideration in 
the regulatory development process, the analysis showed that: 
 
A country’s trade and investment commitments were not a leading influencing fact in the 
regulatory development process.  The majority of regulators ranked it near the end of all 
factors identified and in the face-to-face interviews did not identity it at all.  More influential 
factors were the public health gap, FCTC obligations, actions of other countries, domestic and 
regional obligations or domestic constitutional issues.  Despite emerging experience with IIA 
litigation, the threat of an international trade and investment challenge as an influencing 
factor ranked last. 
 
On plain packaging, developing countries were generally not considering it as a future policy 
as they were more concerned with establishing more basic tobacco control regulations or 
ensuring the implementation of existing ones.  Both developed and developing countries were 
interested in understanding the effectiveness of the policy and the legal constraints both 
domestic and regional as well as the challenge of gaining political support 
 
While there was evidence that countries were adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach to tobacco 
control on policies such as plain packaging given the legal challenges against Australia, this 
seemed to be more directly related to the challenges under the auspices of the WTO or 
domestic courts.   The electronic survey demonstrates that this was particularly focused on 
Australia’s WTO challenge and not the BIT challenge by PMI.  A cross tabulation analysis 
shows that Australia’s BIT challenges was not seen as important in the majority of regions. 
 
More broadly on the issue, tobacco control regulators do not consider trade and investment 
commitments when developing tobacco control regulations except when it is championed by 
other domestic government departments. 
 
Where trade commitments do play a role in the regulatory development process regulators 
identified the WTO (90%) as the most relevant influencing type of commitments.  BITs 
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ranked last among regulators with many showing a complete lack of awareness or 
understanding of their existence or potential impact.  Where there was awareness, these 
regulators still identified the WTO as the most relevant and BITS as the least. 
 
Views were expressed by both developed and developing countries regarding concerns about 
the influence of the tobacco industry on the regulatory development process.  This influence 
was not driven directly by IIA challenges but rather domestic court challenges, threat of 
litigation (in many possible fora including IIAs) as well as close political ties in developing 
countries between tobacco industry and political representatives. 
 
The results of this analysis show little observable evidence regarding the expectations to 
support the hypothesis of regulatory chill with direct link to IIAs and ISDS challenges.  As the 
same time there is certainly an awareness of the threat of challenges by the tobacco industry 
and recognition that trade is playing a larger part as a new vehicle for this threat.  Domestic 
litigation and challenges through the WTO multilateral forum seem to be the most top of mind 
and may be having a chilling impact in their own right evidenced by the comments of both 
developed and developing countries describing a ‘wait and see’ attitude to adopting domestic 
policies in the area of plain packaging prior to the resolution of the dispute against the 
Government of Australia. 
 
3. CROSS CASE THEMATIC CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBALIZATION 
THEORY 
 
There were a number of key themes which can be drawn within and across the Canada Case 
Study and the Tobacco Control Case Study which provide a perspective on the overall theory 
of globalization. 
 
Globalization has not prevented policy divergence with respect to the impact of IIAs 
 
Just as globalization scholars have considered whether competitive pressure and the threat of 
exit by mobile firms and capital have had constraining influences on national policies, there is 
a view that the threat of litigation through rights provided private actors by IIAs will 
constrain the regulatory ability of the state, leading to regulatory chill.  This research has 
found no empirical support for the hypothesis on regulatory chill across both the Canada Case 
Study and the Tobacco Control Case Study suggesting that international investment 
agreements, as one component of globalization, are not restricting national regulatory 
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autonomy in the area of health, safety and the environment.  This result suggests policy 
divergence whereby globalization in the form of IIAs has not prevented different approaches 
to national policies, hindered national policy autonomy or resulted in a decline in social 
welfare policies.   
 
Policy diffusion and emulation  appear to be leading to upward policy convergence 
 
Regulators across both case studies and therefore between developed and developing 
countries were quite consistent in the types of factors they identified as most influencing 
their regulatory development process.  These tended to be focussed on the key HSE need, 
advances in science and technology, the recommendations of the international community or 
experiences of neighbouring countries, public opinion as well as domestic or sometimes 
regional constraints.  Competitiveness and the desire to ensure low burden on industry was a 
unique driver in the Canadian context while there was little respect or willingness to engage 
with industry concerns among tobacco regulators. 
 
The outcome of this analysis also showed support however for an upward convergence in 
regulation or a ‘race-to-the top as described by Drezner429, but driven by ideational forces or 
policy diffusion, rather than any race to the bottom driven by competition for capital or 
investment.  This policy diffusion or emulation as outlined by Simmon, Dobbin and Garret, is 
‘characterized by the voluntary adoption of policies put forward by experts and international 
organizations, rather than their adoption through coercion.’430  This trend was evidenced first 
by the focus on harmonization as outlined in the Canada-US context across many key 
regulatory areas.  Regulators placed harmonization with the US high on the list of influencing 
factors and the Gazette analysis revealed a series of regulatory increases in areas such as 
transport safety and the reduction of vehicle emissions to reduce greenhouse gases which 
were overwhelmingly motivated by a desire to align with higher US standards.   Regulators 
also highlighted the influential nature of the work of international standard setting bodies 
such as the WHO organization on international food standards CODEX and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Control IPCC.  These bodies set high level standards on 
food safety and emission standards, which countries such as Canada sought to emulate. 
 
This trend in upward convergence was further reflected by the interest shown by tobacco 
control regulators in the policies pursued by neighboring countries and the overall 
                                               
429 Drezner, Daniel W. 2001. ‘Globalization and Policy Convergence.’ International Studies Review 3: p.75-76 
430 Simmons, Beth A., Franck Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett.  2008. The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy. Cambridge 
University Press. 
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importance they placed for regulatory development on global tobacco standards set and 
promoted through the FCTC. This upward convergence is reinforced in this research by both 
the regulatory trend towards increasing stringency and comprehensiveness of HSE 
regulations in Canada and the growing uptake of tobacco control regulations by countries 
across all regions.   
 
There is evidence of re-regulation not deregulation 
 
There seems to be a shift towards better regulation rather than less regulation.  This reflects 
the concept of re-regulation as described by Vogel in which governments ‘reorganized their 
control of private sector behaviour, but not substantially reduced the level of regulation’ and 
the absence of a zero sum trade-off between governments and markets.431  This new 
approach to regulating was very much in evidence in the case of Canada where regulators 
consistently claimed that efforts at modernization, efficiency improvement and streamlining 
of regulations were not done at the expense of regulatory stringency or comprehensiveness 
and continued to be driven by the core goals of meeting health, safety and environmental 
sustainability needs.  The manifestation of this approach was a shift from process to output 
based regulations, a greater cost/benefit focus, the use of alternative control mechanisms as 
well as the movement to smarter focussed regulations.  Initiatives such as the 2007 Cabinet 
Directive on Streamlining Regulations and the 2012 Red Tape Reduction Plan in Canada are a 
case in point.  Again, the trend in HSE regulations as shown through our research which 
showed a declining trend in the growth rate of regulations but consistent levels of stringency 
and comprehensiveness reflected this. 
 
Evidence suggest regulatory chill should be considered in a broader trade and investment 
context  
 
As discussed earlier, the empirical evidence has shown that regulators across the two case 
studies demonstrated very little knowledge of IIAs or the ISDS mechanism.  These agreements 
were not raised by regulators themselves and when asked directly they showed little 
awareness except in a few cases.  Even when a regulator had first-hand experience of a 
NAFTA Chapter 11 or IIA challenge they were not entirely clear on the specifics or even the 
implication of such a challenge (financial or policy impact).  The notion of trade and 
investment commitments was vague and did not have a consistent meaning amongst 
                                               
431 Vogel, Steven. 1996.  Freer Markets, More Rules.  Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries. Cornell University 
Press.  
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regulators.    Furthermore the empirical findings suggest that even with awareness it was not 
an influencing factor. 
 
While the impact of trade and investment was seen as a minor factor in the regulatory 
development process across both case studies, where it was a consideration it was almost 
exclusively with respect to the WTO or across all trade fora with respect to TBT and SPS 
commitments.  This is not surprising given the involvement that health, safety and 
environmental regulators are likely to have with TBT and SPS issues within the WTO (for 
tobacco control and Canadian HSE regulators) and within NAFTA in the case of Canada.  The 
high profile nature of WTO disputes and potential impact on the policies of member states is 
also most certainly a defining factor.  Past cases at the WTO have been high profile and 
resulted in tribunal rulings on the trade compatibility of HSE measures, providing pressure 
for countries to undertake amendments to ensure compliance. The US-EU Beef Hormones 
Dispute regarding ‘Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)’432, The 
Mexico-US Tuna Dolphin Dispute regarding ‘Measures Concerning the Importation,  
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products’433 and the US-Indonesia Cigarette Clove 
Dispute regarding ‘Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes’434 all serve 
to highlight the stakes for developed and developing countries in this forum on HSE 
regulatory issues.   
 
It is certainly conceivable that the possibility of challenges within this forum as well as an 
actual dispute such as the one launched by numerous countries against Australia’s plain 
packaging legislation is having a chilling impact.  The survey results certainly suggest that 
countries take this into account more than any other trade and investment factor.  What is the 
implication of this for our question of regulatory chill?  One key difference is that these WTO 
disputes are driven and championed by other countries rather than private actors (although 
the spectre of industry influence is large in many cases).  This would in general suggest that 
the debate on regulatory chill needs to be recast with respect to the arguments put forward 
by public policy advocates, NGOs and the general public.  Those scholars that have looked at 
the issue of the impact of IIAs have tended to take a narrow focus on one fora or another but 
rarely across all to consider the broader impact.  The results of this research project suggest 
that scholars might be well placed to broaden the scope of their focus to encompass the 
influence of this larger set of trade and investment issues.  It was clear from discussions with 
regulators that they did not often differentiate between fora, or tended to consider the impact 
                                               
432 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm  
433 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm  
434 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds406_e.htm  
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of disputes across all fora (WTO, domestic litigation, FTA) as one set of factors on trade and 
investment which could have an impact on the regulatory development process. 
 
4. THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE 
 
While this research has focussed primarily on the case of Canada, an effort has been made 
through the Tobacco Control Case Study to gain some insights into the impact of IIAs on 
developing countries.  Many findings were consistent across all countries, however there 
were a number of factors which were specific to developing countries including the role 
played by weak domestic institutions, the larger potential financial impact of ISDS disputes 
and the frequent lack of expertise and experience aimed at navigating the trade and 
investment landscape. 
 
Institutional weakness  
 
Perhaps a key differentiating factor between developed and developing countries rests with 
the relative strength of domestic institutions and their ability to support regulatory choices in 
the area of HSE.  As Dani Rodrik has argued, ‘globalization benefits countries with strong 
existing institutions while hindering the ability of nations to build institutions to address both 
regulatory and redistributive issues.435  This reality was evident in the case of developing 
countries on tobacco control regulation.  It became apparent from the in-depth interviews 
that many developing countries were struggling to put in place the most basic levels of 
tobacco control policies before they could give any consideration to more advanced policies 
such as plain packaging.  Furthermore, for those countries that had managed to establish a 
suite of strong tobacco control regulations, they were often consumed with ensuring that 
their existing regulations were actually being implemented.  They were more vulnerable to 
intimidation but by the tobacco industry giving examples of how industry coercion (though 
not through the auspices of an IIA) often led to the cancelation of policy proposals or how 
collusion between the industry and officials at the political level was a factor hindering the 
establishment of strong policies.     
 
                                               
435 Rodrik, Dani. 2007. One Economics Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth. Princeton University 
Press p. 195 
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Increased financial burden  
 
Another differentiator for developing countries was the potentially greater relative financial 
burden they face with respect to IIA ISDS challenges and the deterring impact this is likely to 
have on their desire to pursue policies which could result in a dispute.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, concerns in general about the cost of arbitration are driven by both the size of the 
awards as well as the costs of defending the state. 436 Most recently in 2012 ‘the highest 
known award of damages in the history of investment treaty arbitration featured in 
Occidental v. Ecuador ll where the investor was awarded US$1.77 billion plus pre and post 
award interest’437   This is not a new trend and has been an issue of some concern for a 
number of years.  On average the cost of an arbitration case is upwards of US$8 million per 
party with legal fees making up 82% of this cost.438  Furthermore, Uruguay’s 
acknowledgement that its own BIT defense against Philip Morris International was only made 
possible through financial support by former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s 
foundation lends credence to this concern.439 
 
There is a growing concern that developing countries, particularly in Latin America, may be 
feeling that the burdens of investment agreements (in terms of financial costs and loss of 
autonomy) outweigh the benefits and this may lead to scepticism and provide an incentive for 
them to withdraw both from the ICSID convention, as well as to renege on their 
agreements.440 A 2009 UNCTAD report highlights the fact that ‘2008 saw the denunciation of 
11 BITs.’ Ecuador alone denounced nine BITs, mainly with neighbouring Latin American 
countries.  The report speculates that perceived effects of BITS on developing countries’ 
economic development as well as issues of compatibility with domestic laws may play a 
role.441  To date Bolivia (in 2007), Ecuador (in 2010) and Venezuela (in 2012) have all 
withdrawn from the ICSID Convention and Argentina has announced its intention to do so as 
well.442  This disillusionment with the arbitral process and concern over the costs of litigation 
appear to be having a disproportionate impact on developing countries. 
 
                                               
436 UNCTAD. May 2013. Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) p. 19 
437 ibid. Other cases of note were EDF v. Argentina with an award of $13.73 million, Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka with an award of 
$60.36 million and SGS v. Paraguay with an award of $39.02 million. 
438 Gaukrodger, David and Kathryn Gordon. 2012. ‘Investor-state dispute settlement:  A scoping paper for the investment policy 
community.’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No 2012/3 OECD Investment Division.  
www.oecd.org/daf/investment/workingpapers p.19 
439 Sabrina Tavernise, ‘Tobacco Firms’ Tactics Limit Poorer Nations’ Smoking Laws’, The New York Times, December 13, 2013. 
440 Ibid 
441 UNCTAD – Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2008-June 2009) p 9 
442International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) Investment Treaty News. April 2012.  
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/  
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Lack of trade expertise and experience 
 
Finally, many developing countries face challenges from the lack of available domestic trade 
and investment expertise.  Gottwald identifies what he sees as the top three barriers for 
developing nations participation in the international investment arbitration process: ‘a lack of 
affordable access to legal expertise, a lack of transparency in the arbitration process, and 
uncertainty over the meaning of key treaty rights.’443  This hinders their ability to negotiate 
treaties which reflect their interests (through appropriate carve outs for regulatory policy 
space) as well as their ability to defend themselves should an ISDS dispute arise.  Moreover 
this absence of trade and investment experience and expertise is also felt amongst HSE 
regulators and accounts for the low level of awareness of these threats and their implications.  
Coupled with the financial constraints raised above, the overall possibility that a threat of an 
ISDS challenge could lead to a chilling of regulation in a developing country seems more 
plausible.   
 
5. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OPTIONS 
 
While this empirical analysis does not support the regulatory chill hypothesis there remains 
much debate regarding the ability of governments to balance the protection of private 
investors with their ability to regulate in the public interest.  This debate is likely to continue 
and there are a number of policy choices available to governments which might allow them to 
improve the precarious balance. 
 
Ensuring the right to regulate in future IIAs 
 
While this research has found no strong empirical support for the regulatory chill hypothesis, 
concerns among public policy advocates, scholars and the general public about the impact of 
trade and investment agreements and particularly the ISDS provisions of IIAs on 
government’s ability to regulate in the public interest remain a reality.  The unintended use of 
the ISDS mechanism by private interests, including the tobacco industry, to challenge HSE 
measures highlight the need for governments to consider how to ensure that their regulatory 
space is preserved.   
 
                                               
443 Gottwald, Eric. 2007. ‘Levelling the Playing Field:  Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration?’. American University International Law Reveiw. 22:237, p 252 
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Many IIAs or model agreements (such as the US and Canadian model BITs) already have 
provisions which make explicit the government’s right to regulate and ensure commitments 
by signatory governments on labour and environmental standards, provide explicit 
clarification of their intention with respect to contentious provisions such as those dealing 
with indirect expropriation and fair and equitable treatment, as well as carve-outs for HSE 
measures.  Encouraging governments to consider such approaches is sensible, particularly 
given the learning that has taken place under NAFTA Chapter 11 and which has been a driver 
for such approaches to IIAs.  Finally, a reformulation of IIAs provisions such as that dealing 
with fair and equitable treatment (FET) makes sense given that according to UNCTAD, it is 
‘the most likely provision to be invoked by an investor in an arbitral claim.’444  The NAFTA 
Commission efforts to clarify the FET provision is a useful example in this regard, although it 
is debatable the extent to which tribunals have since taken it into consideration in their 
deliberations.  These measures do however come with a trade-off in terms of the balance 
between a government’s right to regulate and the protection of investors.   
 
Given that one of the stated purposes of these agreements is the protection of investors, it is 
worth considering the extent to which governments wish to reduce this protection.  While 
research from Lauge Poulsen suggests that both companies and international agencies do not 
consider them relevant as risk mitigation instruments445, the explosion of ISDS cases which 
had reached 244 by 2012, suggest that they are being used and as Salacuse and Sullivan 
argue, have ‘achieved their first  goal of fostering investment protection.’446 
 
Furthermore, this protection which has traditionally been driven by a desire to overcome the 
lack of property rights in developing countries with weak institutions, has over the last fifteen 
years  involved overcoming the problem of measures disguised as legitimate government 
regulation aimed at either protecting domestic industries or dealing with public pressure.  
Reference is often made to the NAFTA Chapter 11 cases Ethyl v. Government of Canada, S. D. 
Myers v. Government of Canada and Methanex v. Government of Mexico in this regard, as 
outlined in Chapter 2.  These are the types of situations from which IIAs are trying to protect 
private investors and arguably remain an important component both for governments 
seeking to encourage inward investment and those aiming to ensure protection for their 
                                               
444 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties1995-2006:  Trends in Investment Rulemaking, (New York and Geneva:  United 
Nations, 2007), 32. 
445 445Skovgaard Poulsen, Lauge. The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the 
Evidence. Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2009/2010 by K. Sauvant (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010) quoting from World Bank World Development Report 2005: A better investment climate for everyone (2005)  
446 Salacuse, jeswald W. and Nicholas P. Sullivan.  2005.  ‘Do BITs Really Work:: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Their Grand Bargain.’ Harvard International Law Journal, 46: 67-129.  Reprinted as Chapter 5 in:  Sachs, Lisa and Karl P. 
Sauvant. 2009. The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment:  Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and 
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investors abroad.  Getting the right balance between these competing pressures is the 
challenge and should guide any efforts to further clarify policy space. 
  
Debating the continued inclusion of ISDS provisions in IIAs 
 
The continued calls for the exclusion of ISDS provisions in IIAs have been growing as 
evidenced by the petition signed by respected jurists from numerous Australasian and North 
and Latin American countries and sent to governments involved in the TPP negotiations.447  
This issue is most strongly advocated however with respect to concern over the misuse of 
ISDS provisions by the tobacco industry.  The Australian Government’s earlier decision not to 
include ISDS provisions in future IIAs has highlighted this issue and provided ammunition to 
civil society groups and public policy advocates that believe this is the best approach to 
preserving HSE policy space.  While the Australian Government now seems to be providing 
room for a case by case consideration of this issue as evidenced by both its recently 
completed FTA with Korea and its participation in the TPP, a number of other proposals have 
been raised to deal with the tobacco industry threat. 
 
Such proposals include calls for the exclusion of an ISDS mechanism in future treaties,448 for 
treaties to ‘include an exemption for investments involving a ‘dangerous good’449, a new 
addition to general exemptions but specific to tobacco control measures’450, and a 
reformulation of the IIA provisions most commonly invoked in ISDS arbitrations on 
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment to ‘ensure that a State’s policy space will be 
protected’,451as discussed above. If all else fails, countries always have the option of non-
compliance with arbitral rulings given the challenges that tobacco companies would likely 
have enforcing them with respect to ‘considerations of public policy and sovereign 
immunity.’452  
                                               
447 Letter by 200 environmental, consumer and labour groups expressing opposition to the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP. December 
2013. http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ttip_investment_letter_final.pdf   
448 This proposal reflects the position adopted by the Government of Australia in the 2011 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement :  Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity (. 
http://www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-a3df-3f58228daf6d/Gillard-Government-Trade-Policy-
Statement.aspx)and has been proposed by numerous public policy advocates and scholars including a petition signed by a large 
number of respected jurists from Australia, New Zealand, the USA, Canada, Peru and Chile in May 2012 (‘An Open Letter From 
Lawyers to the Negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Urging the Rejection of Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ May 8,  
2012 http://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/) 
449 Nottage, Luke, ‘Consumer Product Safety Regulation and Investor-State Arbitration Policy and Practice after Philip Morris Asia 
v. Australia’, Transnational Dispute Management, (2012) Volume 9, Issue 5. www.transnational-dispute-management.com  
450 Lester, Simon, ‘Free Trade and Tobacco’, Transnational Dispute Management, (2012) Volume 9, Issue 5. www.transnational-
dispute-management.com 
451 Rojid, Faraz and Junianto James Losari and Alberto Madero, ‘No Coverage for Tobacco Industries With Regard to Tobacco-
Control Measures-The Future of International Investment Agreements?’ Transnational Dispute Management, (2012) Volume 9, 
Issue 5. www.transnational-dispute-management.com  
452 Voon, Tania and Andrew D. Mitchell, ‘Implications of international investment law for plain tobacco packaging:  lessons from 
Hong Kong-Australia BIT’, , in Public Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes, edited by Tania Voon, Andrew D. Mitchell and 
Jonathan Liberman with Glyn Ayres, 137-172.Edward Elgar, 2012 
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On the issue of an exclusion of ISDS mechanisms from IIA treaties, this approach while 
popular among NGOs and public policy advocates would seriously undermine the investor 
protection component of the agreements.  Given earlier arguments concerning the 
importance of such protections and evidence from the Australia case that this policy has been 
a difficult one to maintain, this does not appear to be the best solution to addressing concerns.  
The issue of expanding the general exceptions chapter is currently being considered by the 
USTR in the context of the TPP negotiations and the language used in this context allow 
‘health authorities in TPP governments to adopt regulations that impose origin-neutral 
science-based restrictions on specific tobacco products/ classes in order to safeguard public 
health.’ 453   
 
Addressing developing country challenges 
 
Addressing institutional weakness in developing countries is an enormous undertaking and 
one to which organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations has been deeply 
committed for decades.  454 
 
More manageable assistance in the areas of trade and investment policy is being tackled by 
UNCTAD the WTO and ICSID by way of technical assistance on the development of IIAs and 
the navigation of the arbitral process.455  The focus of this technical assistance would be well 
placed to ensure the appropriate capacity building in the specific area of international 
investment agreements and to focus not only on those trade officials who will be negotiating 
future agreements but also on awareness building among country regulators particularly in 
sensitive areas such as HSE.  HSE regulators in developing countries would benefit greatly 
from developing an awareness and understanding regarding the existence and impact of IIAs 
as well as ways to ensure that the regulatory development process does not contravene the 
trade and investment provisions to which their countries have committed.  Greater 
awareness of the types of regulations which are likely to give rise to IIA ISDS challenges will 
help regulators make informed decisions regarding the regulatory options available to them 
to achieve their important health and environmental goals.  While this effort could be driven 
                                               
453 USTR, ‘FACT SHEET: TPP Tobacco Proposal,’ available at http://www.ustr.gov/aout-us/press’office/fact-sheets/2012/may/tpp-
tobacco-proposal. As outlined in Lester, Simon, ‘Free Trade and Tobacco’, Transnational Dispute Management, (2012) Volume 9, 
Issue 5. www.transnational-dispute-management.com 
454World Bank Institutional Development Fund 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:21016577~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:4
0941,00.html , UN Governance and Institution Building, http://www.un.org/en/development/progareas/governance.shtml  
455 UNCTAD’s technical assistance and capacity building services http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/TNCD/Technical-Assistance-
and-Capacity-Building-.aspx, WTO technical assistance and training 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm  
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by the WTO and UNCTAD it would also benefit from collaborations with other international 
institutions dealing with specific HSE regulatory issues such as the WHO FCTC, CODEX and 
IPCC to name a few.   
 
Greater efforts to address the paralysing costs of ISDS for smaller countries through reform of 
the arbitral process and innovative financing or cost sharing techniques would also go some 
way to tackling the imbalance faced by the developing world. 
 
6. FOCUS AND LIMITATIONS OF ANALYSIS 
 
While the goal of this research has been to explore the impact of IIAs on government 
regulatory autonomy with a view to assessing the likelihood of regulatory chill through the 
observation of regulatory trends and awareness of HSE regulators, it has also sought to 
provide a comprehensive methodological approach which might be used to address this issue 
in the future.  This research has sought to assess chill as a general phenomenon rather than 
on a case-by-case basis which has been the approach of past research.  Past research on this 
issue has stressed the anecdotal examples or the outcome and impact of specific IIA ISDS 
challenges, but never looked comprehensively at the views and practices of regulators 
coupled with regulatory trends.  The Canada Case Study has provided a perfect test case for 
such a broad and comprehensive assessment of chill given the country’s unique experience 
with ISDS challenges to HSE measures over the last 15 years.  The Tobacco Control Case Study 
served to support this analysis by providing a broader developed and developing country 
perspective on a global issue of importance.  
 
There have however been a number of limitations to the analysis.  
 
Federal focus of the Canada Case Study 
 
The Canada case study was focussed exclusively on the federal level of regulation.  This focus 
was driven by issues of time, cost and accessibility.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the Canadian 
federal system involves the devolution of regulatory responsibility in many areas of HSE 
policy.  By speaking with federal regulators this research provides a valuable and rich 
perspective on the issue of regulatory trends and the impact of trade and investment on the 
regulatory development process.  It does not however reflect the perspective of those 
provincial regulators who have some responsibilities in overlapping areas and have been 
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responsible in some cases for the measures which have led to arbitration through NAFTA 
Chapter 11. 
 
Sample size of the Tobacco Control Case Study 
 
While every attempt was made to identify and contact a large sample of government 
regulators, this was achieved primarily within the context of the primary case study on 
Canada.  The Tobacco Control Case study served as a supportive piece of analysis but did not 
achieve a large enough sample size to be fully generalizable.  Nevertheless it provided a 
counterbalance to the Canadian experience and helped to confirm some specific trends 
particularly with respect to the awareness and focus of regulators. 
 
Reflecting the legal and political perspectives 
 
Similarly, this analysis has focussed on the views of senior HSE regulators and as such did not 
engage with international trade lawyers or politicians (although a number of past Canadian 
Health Ministers were interviewed during the course of this research).  The view was taken 
that regulatory development and much decision making (with respect to regulatory options 
identified and those proposed for adoption) takes place at this level of government.  The 
concerns raised from a legal perspective were reflected in the discussions held with 
regulators based on the advice they would had received during their own departmental policy 
deliberations and in the development of regulatory recommendations.  Furthermore, there 
were obvious constraints both in gaining access to government’s legal counsel, and in their 
general willingness or ability to discuss such sensitive issues even under guarantees of 
confidentiality. 
 
7. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
 
While the focus of this research has been very specific, it has endeavored to provide a 
methodological approach for the consideration of regulatory chill.  It would be interesting to 
use this methodological approach to delve further into the regulatory development and 
decision making process of HSE regulators both at the various levels of government in the 
Canadian context as well as across other NAFTA countries with a view to confirming the 
views and approaches of other governments who have faced a similar set of ISDS challenges.   
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On tobacco control, gaining access to a much larger sample of regulators for both in-depth 
interviews and more extensive survey would provide richer and more generalizable 
information on any potential cross border regulatory chill impact of IIA ISDS disputes.   
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
As Layna Mosley claims  ‘Only by specifying how varying dimensions of globalisation matter 
for government policy choices can we begin to gauge the overall – and often contending – 
effects of economic openness on policy making.’456  This work has shown that there does not 
appear to be a specific impact of IIA ISDS on HSE regulatory decision making and therefore 
that the impact of private actors in the policy making process is perhaps less pronounced 
than many fear.  It is clear that the tobacco industry efforts to influence governments through 
their aggressive lobbying and litigation, is having an impact though not as much through the 
vehicle of the IIA.  At the same time there is a broader relationship between international 
trade and investment and the constraints or pressure a government might feel in its ability to 
regulate in the public interest.  Regulators are interested in the views of their peers as 
expressed within multilateral and regional fora like the WTO and NAFTA in committees on 
SPS and TBT and this explains the relevance they placed on this fora and in particular on the 
WTO challenge to Australia’s plain packaging legislation.  Future research will need to take 
this broader perspective into account in its efforts to assess regulatory chill as a more general 
phenomenon. 
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APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH CANADIAN FEDERAL REGULATORS 
 
List of semi- structured interviews conducted between  
April-September 2012 
 
Government of Canada – Health, Safety and Environment Regulators 
 
HEALTH CANADA 
 
Trish MacQuarrie - Director General Policy, Communications & Regulatory Affairs, Pest 
Management Regulatory Agency, Health Canada 
Denis Choiniere - Director, Office of Regulations & Compliance, Tobacco Control Program, 
Health Canada 
Samuel Godefroy – Director General, Food Directorate, Health Products and Food Branch, 
Health Canada 
Tina Green – Director General, Consumer Product Safety Directorate, Health Canada 
Kaarina Stiff - Director Program Bureau, Consumer Product Safety Directorate, Health Canada 
Helen Ryan – Director, Consumer Product Safety Directorate, Health Canada 
John Moffet - Director General, Environmental Stewardship Branch, Environment Canada 
Vincenza Galatone - Executive Director, Chemical Sectors Directorate, Environmental 
Stewardship Branch, Environment Canada 
Beth Pieterson – Director General, Environmental and Radiation health Sciences Directorate, 
Health Canada 
Doug Haines - Director, Chemical Surveillance Bureau, Environmental and Radiation Health 
Services Directorate, Health Canada 
Christian Lavoie – Director, Consumer and Clinical Radiation Protection Bureau, Health Canada 
Kendal Weber - Director General, Policy, Planning & Regulatory Affairs, Health Products and 
Food Branch, Health Canada 
Louise Dery – Director, Policy, Planning & Regulatory Affairs, Health Products and Food 
Branch, Health Canada 
David Lee – Director, Office of Legislative and Regulatory Modernization, health Products and 
Food Branch, Health Canada 
Jocelyn Kula – Manager, Office of Controlled Substances, Health Canada 
ENVIRONMENT CANADA 
 
Steve McCauley - Director General, Energy and Transportation Directorate, Environment 
Canada 
Ed Crupi - Senior Regulatory Policy Advisor, Energy and Transportation, Environment Canada 
Tim Gardiner - Director Waste Reduction and Management Division, Environment Canada 
Jacinthe Sequir – Manager, Waste Policy, Waste Reduction and Management Division, 
Environment Canada 
Tanya Smyth-Monteiro – Waste Reduction and Management Division 
Stewart Lindale – Director, Legislative and Regulatory Affairs Directorate, Environment Canada 
Danielle Rodrigue – Manager, Regulatory Affairs and Quality Management Legislative and 
Regulatory Affairs Directorate, Environment Canada 
Don Stewart – Manager, Regulatory Policy Section, Legislative and Regulatory Affairs 
Directorate, Environment Canada 
Stephen deBoer – Director General, Climate Change, International Affairs Branch, 
Environment Canada 
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Dan McDougall – Assistant Deputy Minister, International Affairs Branch, Environment Canada 
Lyne Monastesse – Director, Bilateral Affairs, International Affairs Branch, Environment 
Canada 
Jean Boutet – Senior Policy Analyst, International Affairs Branch, Environment Canada 
CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AGENCY 
 
Elaine Feldman - President, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency 
Helen Cutts - Vice President, Policy Development Sector, Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency 
TREASURY BOARD 
 
Alan Neeff - Director, Regulatory Policy, Treasury Board Secretariat 
Jim Martin - former head of Regulatory Affairs, Treasury Board Secretariat 
Glyn Chance -, Executive Director, Regulatory Cooperation Secretariat, Treasury Board 
Jing Xu, Director - Regulatory Cooperation Secretariat, Treasury Board 
FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA 
 
Sharon Ashley – Director General, Ecosystem Management, Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada 
Jeff MacDonald – Director General, Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
Nigel Harrison –Senior Regulatory Analyst, Legislation and Regulatory Affairs , Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada   
Julie Thompson – Director, Environmental Response, Canadian Coast Guard, Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
Paul Gaskin – Director, Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
TRANSPORT CANADA 
 
Donald Roussel – Director General, Marine Safety and Security, Safety and Security Group, 
Transport Canada 
Kash Ram – Director General, Road Safety and Motor Vehicle Regulation, Safety and Security 
Group, Transport Canada 
Merz Rusom – Director, Motor Vehicle Standards, Research and Development, Safety and 
Security Group, Transport Canada 
Geoffrety Oliver – A/Director General, Aviation Safety, Safety and Security Group, Transport 
Canada 
Joanne St.-Onge – Director, Regulatory Affairs, Safety and Security Group, Transport Canada  
CANADIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMISSION 
 
Jason Cameron – Director General, Strategic Planning Directorate, Canadian Nuclear Safety 
Commission 
Greg Rzentkowski – Director General, Directorate of Power Reactor Regulation, Canadian 
Nuclear Safety Commission 
Peter H Elder – Director General, Directorate of Nuclear Cycle and Facilities Regulation, 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
HUMAN RESOURCES AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT CANADA (HRSDC) 
 
Brenda Baxter – Senior Director, Occupational Health & Safety, Program Development and 
Guidance Directorate, HRSDC 
Bawan Saravana – Director, Occupational Health & Safety, Program Development and 
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Guidance Directorate, HRSDC 
Janine Aussan – Manager Operations, Occupational Health & Safety, Program Development 
and Guidance Directorate, HRSDC 
CANADIAN FOOD INSPECTION AGENCY (CFSA) 
Colleen Barnes – Executive Director, Program, Regulatory & Trade Policy, CFSA 
 
Government of Canada – Former Cabinet Ministers 
The Honourable Marc Lalonde - former Canadian Minister of Health, Finance and current 
international arbitrator 
The Honourable David Dingwall - former Canadian Minister of Health 1996 
 
Canadian NGO community 
Howard Mann - Associate and Senior Law Advisor, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD)  
Cynthia Callard -Executive Director, Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada 
Neil Collishaw - Research Director, Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada 
 
Academics 
Eric Neumeyer - Professor of Environment and Development and Head of the Department of 
Geography and Environment, London School of Economics 
Todd Weiler - Investment Treaty Arbitration 
Ben McGrady - Project Director, Initiative on Trade, Investment and Health, O’Neil Institute for 
National and Global Health Law, Georgetown University 
Kyla Tienhaara - Research Fellow at the Regulatory Institutions Network 
Lauge Poulse - Research Fellow, London School of Economics 
Jonathan Bonitcha - Research Fellow, London School of Economics 
David Schneiderman - University of Toronto Faculty of Law, Canada 
Gus Van Harten- Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada 
 
International organizations 
Meg Kinnear – Secretary General, ICSID, World Bank 
 
Tobacco Industry 
Marie-Josee Lapointe - former communications director with the Canadian Tobacco 
Manufacturers Council CTMC 
Pierre Fortier - former executive with Imperial Tobacco 
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APPENDIX 4– IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH CANADIAN FEDERAL REGULATORS 
Semi-Structured in-depth interviews with  
Federal Canadian Department/ Agency Regulators 
 
Interview Questions 
 
My project 
 
I am looking at the impact Canada’s trade commitments on government’s regulatory 
autonomy.  Whether trade commitments such NAFTA constrain ability to regulate 
health, safety and environment – and to what extent these commitments and their 
implications play into the decision making process. 
 
Speak to you to understand how the regulatory environment has changed and whether 
as regulator you have felt impact of trade commitments 
 
 What are the key regulatory responsibilities within your Branch/ Directorate? 
 
 How have regulations changed in your area over the last fifteen years?  What are 
some of the key milestone changes? 
 
 Have regulations become more stringent or less stringent (in terms of the 
requirements placed on industry to comply- such as requiring a greater depth of 
science to demonstrate acceptability of risk or a greater quantity or frequency of 
reporting)  
 
 What evidence would you highlight to support your position?  Are there 
independent reports which would echo that view (such as from OECD or other 
international body)? 
 
 What are the key factors influencing your regulatory development process? (e.g.: 
the public need, view of key stakeholders, international trends, domestic trends, 
international commitments, other) 
 
 How would you rank these influences? 
 
 Do you consider Canada’s international trade commitments and the potential 
constraints they impose, when developing regulation or regulatory policy?  How? 
 
 How does this influence your decision making? (perhaps in the wording of 
regulations, their content or the timing of changes)  To what extent does it 
influence your decision making? (e.g.: a lot, somewhat, a little, not at all)   
 
 Which trade commitments are most relevant to you in your regulatory capacity? 
(e.g.: WTO, FTAs, NAFTA, FIPAs)   Why? 
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 Are you aware of Canada’s international investment agreements such as FIPAs 
and NAFTA Chapter 11?  Do they influence your decision making? 
 
 Has your regulatory area ever faced a challenge under NAFTA Chapter 11 or the 
threat of a challenge?  Describe. 
 
 Are you aware of NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges to other areas of Canadian 
regulation?  How? 
 
 Does the threat of such a challenge or your awareness of such challenges affect 
your decision making with respect to regulatory policy?  How? 
 
 How often are regulatory proposals dropped following public consultation or 
Gazette 1?  Have there been any specific instances that you are aware of when this 
has happened?   
 
 What have been the main causes of this? (e.g.: change in policy direction, strong 
lobbying by stakeholders, incompatibility with international commitments) 
 
 Has Canada led or followed international trends in this area of regulation?  
 
 Given any complementary mandates in this area of regulation at the Federal and 
Provincial levels, how do you manage the trade implications of provincial actions? 
 
 Who else should speak with in the Department, provinces, internationally 
 
 I will be conducting a very short survey of all regulators within your 
Department/Agency in the coming months.  Would you be able to assist by: 
 
o Participating as a respondent in the survey 
o Confirming which division on this list have regulatory responsibility. 
o Acting as or identifying a point of contact within your Directorate/Branch 
and helping me distribute these surveys by internal mail and receiving 
them back for me to collect?  I would do all the actual email and phone 
chasing. 
 
 Would such a survey be feasible during the months of July and August or would it 
be best to wait until September? 
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APPENDIX 5: QUALITATIVE CODING – INTERVIEWS WITH CANADIAN REGULATORS  
Categories for 'Factors influencing the regulatory development process' 
When asked what factors influence their regulatory development process, these are the factors identified by regulators during the in-depth 
interviews 
 
Initial Coding Action Coding 
Invivo quotes/paraphrasing Desriptive Code Descriptive categories process codes process categories 
          
We consider these (SPS and TBT 
commitments) in our decision 
making process' global inititiatives 
international standards 
& commitments (18) complying with global initiatives 
complying with 
international standards & 
commitments 
The agenda is set 
internatioanlly and through 
model regulations 
international 
approach 21% 
aligning with international 
community   
  
international 
scrutiny   adapting to international trends   
  international bodies   
withstanding international 
scrutiny   
  
international 
commitments   
adhering to international 
commitments   
  international trends   adhering to TBT and SPS   
  
international 
standards   
resonding to international 
trends   
  
 
  
adhering to international 
standards   
      tracking international standards   
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why are we not adopting a US 
or European solution'.  We have 
some latitude to exercise our 
sovereignty but the question is 
always weather this is really 
needed.  What are the key 
differences with other major 
trading partners that would 
necessitate such a unique 
approach 
harmonizing with 
trade partners 
harmonization 
initiatives (7) harmonizing internationally 
Harmonizing regulations 
with US/Internationally 
 The bedrock is US regulation 
harmonization with 
US 8% adapting for Canadian context 
(adapting for Canadian 
context) 
 
standard 
harmonization   
cooperating internationally to 
reduce trade barriers   
  
international 
harmonization   harmonizing with trade partners   
  
trends among 
trading partners   harmonizing with the US   
  
international 
cooperation-RCC   cooperating with the US   
  stakeholders 
stakeholder 
expectations (12) responding to stakeholders 
Responding to stakeholder 
expectations 
  provinces 14% 
incorporating views of 
provinces   
  provincial trends (2)   
aligning federal provincial 
interests   
  NGOs   responding to NGOs   
  
public and NGO 
stakeholder views (2)   ensuring domestic consistency   
  
consumer demands 
(4)   
responding to consumer 
expectations   
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public push for 
strong regulations   considering stakeholder views   
  public expectations   
responding to public 
expectations   
          
Science is the main driver of 
regulatory change and 
development scientific data advances in science (9) responding to scientific data 
Responding to advances in 
science & technology 
  Advances in science 11% responding to science   
  Science   adjusting to scientific advance   
  research driven   
responding to science and 
research   
  
science and 
engineering   
incorporating advances in 
science and engineering   
  
technology and 
innovation   
ensuring technology and 
innovation   
  
emerging 
technologies (2) (emerging technology)     
          
It is dangerous we should ban it' 
in health departmet vs 'have 
not seen evidence of risk to 
people' in economic 
department. health impact 
health & safety 
mandate and need 
(16) responding to health concern 
Responding to health & 
safety needs 
First and foremost is the 
determination of health issue health issues 19% addressing health issues   
what they need to do to protect 
human health and safety public health gap   filling public health gap   
  domestic need   identifying domestic need   
  workplace need   responding to workplace need   
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  health driver   addressing safety concerns   
  safety issue   ensuring safety   
  
hazardous nature of 
substance   ensuring effective controls   
  potency level   reducing dependance and abuse   
  
potential substance 
abuse       
  
potential for 
addiction       
  
protect human 
health and safety   
protecting human health and 
safety   
  health & safety   
responding to health safety and 
environemntal concerns   
  
mandate of health 
safety & 
environment   
protecting health and 
environment   
  radiation protection       
  
risk levels of product 
protect health & 
environment   assessing risk levels   
  
public safety risk 
assessment (2) (assessments of risk) 
responding to public safety risk 
assessments (Assessing risk levels) 
  emerging risks   identitying emerging risk   
  
risk informed 
approach   using risk informed approach   
      
 
  
trade is not really a driver for 
us' 
trade through new 
trade negotiations 
international trade 
facilitation (11) negotiating new trade treaty Avoiding trade restrictions 
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They are under pressure on 
FTAs to move towards common 
standards 
common standards 
in FTAs (2) (new negotiations)   
(negotiating new trade 
treaties) 
Trade is not on the radar in 
terms of breaching agreements trade law input (2) (legal considerations) incorporating trade law input 
(considering legal 
challenges) 
need to balance the issue of 
health and safety with the issue 
of competitiveness legal considerations   
considering potential legal 
challenges   
Not thinking about trade 
commitments in this process market access (2) 
(market access/ 
reducing barriers) ensuring market access   
They are being asked to 
consider what may or may not 
encourage greater trade while 
at the same time wanting to 
protect workers 
avoid barriers to 
trade 13% 
avoiding restrictions to market 
access   
facilitating trade globally and 
not disadvantaging Candian 
companies 
reducing trade 
barriers   
avoiding barriers which hinder 
competitiveness   
  
reduce innovative 
technology barriers   reducing trade barriers   
  trade facilitation   
reducing barriers to technology 
and innovation   
  
trade and 
competitiveness   facilitating trade   
  
impact on export 
opportunities   
considering trade and 
commerce impacts   
  
health, safety and 
competitiveness 
balance   
balancing competitiveness with 
health & safety   
  economic impact   
focussing on impact regulations 
on market opportunities   
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  competitiveness   ensuring competitiveness   
  encouraging trade   
balancing market access and 
competitiveness   
  
trade with respect 
nuclear licencing   encouraging trade   
  
RIAs (lead to trade 
focus)   considering trade through RIAs   
      
 
  
  
domestic 
streamlining 
initiatives 
domestic streamlining 
& modernization (11) 
responding to domestic 
streamlining initiative 
Responding to domestic 
streamlining and 
modernization initiatives  
  modernization 13%     
  
domestic efficiency 
objective   
responding to domestic 
efficiency initiatives   
There is a desire not to impose 
onerous costs 
cost/benefit 
justification (2) (cost benefit) 
increasing flexibility for 
regulatory change   
  objective based   justifying cost/benefit justifying cost/ benefits 
  
outcome focussed 
(2) (outcome based) 
focussing on objective vs 
prescriptive (focussing on outcomes) 
  
fixing long term 
irritants   focussing on outcomes 
 
  outdated regulations 
 
addressing irritatnts through 
regulation 
       addressing outdated regulations   
          
 
 
Categories for 'How regulators consider trade commitments in the regulatory development process' 
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Trade was one of many factors.  Specifically how do regulators consider trade commitments in the regulatory development process 
 
Initial Coding Action Coding 
Invivo quotes/paraphrasing Process Code Process categories Descriptive Code Descriptive categories 
          
biggest trade concern is notification.  Needs to 
be scientifically robust basis for regulation Notifying to the WTO 
ensuring international 
transparency/ disclosure (6) trade notification 
international 
transparency/disclosure 
real desire to be as open as can ensuring trade notification 11% 
performing beyond TBT notificaiton 
requirements   
  sharing information beyond notification   WTO TBT committee   
  notifying to SPS & TBT at WTO   notifications to WTO SPS   
  
 
  
 
  
          
Consider formal obligations - Is a measure 
justified under statute? Ensuring standards in new trade regulations 
ensuring compatibility with 
new and existing trade 
commitments (8) new trade negotiations 
compatibility with new & existing 
trade commitments 
Trade is an issue with new agreements as want 
to ensure that standardards are not lowered negotiating FTAs 14% WTO commitments   
  
justifying regulations under trade 
commitments   
regulations consistent under trade 
commitments   
  adhering to SPS & TBT       
          
trade factor in terms market access RIAs forcing trade considerations Avoiding barriers to trade (11) RIAs force trade consideration international trade facilitation 
tension between maitaining integrity of the food 
system and trade interests' convincing treasury board no trade issue 20% MLR's as barriers to trade   
industry challenges are a concern following EA process   convergence MLR standards   
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Consideration of trade impact of the EA is 
entirely perhipheral.  90% of their energy is on 
the legal parts of the act which doesn't mention 
trade issues preventing barriers to trade (MRLs)   market access   
The number one consideration is how effective 
will the regulations be.  How can they make 
them as effective as possible without burden for 
industry.   Trade means all types - WTO, TRIPs minimising industry burden   minimise burdent on industry   
consider health and environmental concers and 
the value of trade and commerce ensuring competitiveness balance   competitiveness focus   
Trade concerns seen as 'What will be the impact 
on producers and consumers'.  Is our market big 
enough to justify our own regulations - made in 
Canada balancing liability & trade promotion   Industry concerns   
Market access is a key driver for regulatory 
development.  If the US sets new standards, 
Canada needs to adhere. understanding industry concerns   tobacco industry threat    
RIAs key driver for trade considerations tobacco litigating industry   
 
  
Treasury Board gave them hard time over 
potential trade issue         
          
trade difficulty arises when there is political 
interest in project 
careful when political interest driving 
decision managing political interests (2) political influence political influence 
delays are down to political will rather than 
trade concerns 
politics driving decisions can lead to trade 
challenge 4% non science based political decisions   
We always think about trade' - focus is 
competitiveness         
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previous cases don't have a lot of influence 
avoiding disputes while focussed on core 
mandate avoiding disputes (8) Legal advice avoid dispute 
  Avoiding trade challenges   rigourous objective EA process    
The EA process is onerous on the proponent.  
Foreign investors are particularly concerned with 
ensuring that they are not going through more 
effort than a Canadian investor 
managing foreign investor 
expectation/perception 14% investor nationality irrelevant   
I don't want to step into a major trade issue.  At 
the same time, it is not our primary mandate 
which is the protection of health and the 
environment' reacting to foreign investor   avoid dispute   
they are aware of the cash drain of such a case considering possible legal challenge   potential legal challenge   
  Receiving legal advice on trade impact       
  asking for legal advice       
          
FTAs matter most avoiding US regulatory imediments 
harmonizating with trade 
partners (18) harmonization harmonization 
question whether Canada will feel pressure to 
respond to international regulatory changes already harmonizing with US 32% harmonization through RCC   
NAFTA working group harmonize to highest 
common denominator US driving GHG regulation   international standard alignment   
The willingness to regulate, both the forum and 
actual regulations is driven by what the US is 
doing harmonizing to high standards   international cooperation   
Now they need more than a good reason to do 
something different in regulation  facilitating trade through harmonization   stadard harmonization   
The Canadian government is currently very 
focussed on manufacturers and US 
harmonization harmonizing for market access   harmonization balance   
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high degree of attention on making things 
compliant with the US harmonizing through RCC   strong push US harmonization in transport   
  aligning international standards   consistent with trade partners   
  Cooperating internationally   trade facilitation in export mandate   
          
trade commitments are 'not front of mind' focussing on health Not considering trade (3) little trade impact trade not a driver 
Trade 'not a priority' Reducing red tape 5% trade not driver   
Trade doesn't change what we measure.  'The 
results are the results' focussing on science       
trade is not a big factor relaxing of trade angst       
health and safety first trade not impacting regulation       
Science is main driver lack understanding of trade obligations       
never seen NAFTA have an influence'         
NAFTA Chapter 11 is not on our radar'         
accpetance that it is ok if environmental issues 
affect trade         
concerened with ensuring risk based, objective, 
solid science basis to justify adding a regulation 
in the area of health and the environment         
safety is the key driver         
there are no issues in trade         
NAFTA disputes not top of mind on the 
operational side         
The mandate of the agency is health and safety 
and there is no economic mandate         
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APPENDIX 6 – LIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH TOBACCO CONTROL REGULATORS 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
Fifth Conference of the Parties – Seoul Korea November 12-16 
 
Meetings and Interviews 
 
Country Name Meeting Date 
New Zealand Paul Badco 
National Programme Manager, Tobacco 
Control, Sector Capability and 
Implementation 
Thursday November 15 
Singapore Mr. Litt Chan, Manager Adult Health 
Division, Health Promotion Board 
Tuesday November 13 
Sweden Andreas Johansson 
Head of Section, Public Health Division, 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
Thursday November 15 
Finland Kari Passo 
Director Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health 
Wednesday November 14 
Norway Karl-Olaf Wathne 
Special Adviser, Norwegian Ministry of 
Health and Care Services 
Thursday November 15 
UK Andre Black 
Tobacco Programme Manager, 
Department of Health 
Monday November 12 – Set 
up time to discuss further in 
London in December 
Panama Dr. Reina Roa Rodriguez 
Direcotra de Provision, Servicio de Salud, 
Punto Focal para el control del Tobaco, 
Minsterio de Salud 
Tuesday November 13 
Malta John Attard Kingswell 
Director, Superintendence of public 
Health, Environmental Health Directorate 
Wednesday November 14 
Ghana Edith Wellington 
Research and Development Division 
Ghana Health Services 
Tuesday November 13 
Yemen Mohamed Al Khawlani 
Director of Tobacco Control Program, 
Ministry of Public Health and Population 
Wednesday November 14 
Ecuador Dr. Hugo Noboa Has agreed to meet.  Does 
not speak English so will 
need to bring colleagues for 
interpretation 
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NGO Elizabeth Furgurson, Chief Operating 
Officer 
Framework Convention Alliance 
Thursday November 15 – 
agreed to communicate 
further via email 
Tobacco Industry Barbara Martellini, Assistant VP 
Corporate Affairs, Ultoco Services S. A. 
Thursday November 15 – 
agreed to communicate 
further via email 
Academic Dr. Ben McGrady 
Project Director, Initiative on Trade, 
Investment and Health 
O'Neill Institute for National and Global 
Health Law 
Monday November 12 
Academic Raphael Lencucha 
Assistant Professor, University of 
Lethbridge 
Faculty of Health Sciences 
Monday November 12 
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APPENDIX 7– IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH TOBACCO CONTROL REGULATORS 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control FTCC Conference 
Seoul, Korea – November 12-16 
Interviews with tobacco control regulators 
 
 
 
Delegation Country________________________________________________ 
 
What role do you play in the development of tobacco control regulation? 
 
 
What are the key factors driving your regulatory development policy? (eg: health goals of the 
government, domestic pressures, international commitments such as FCTC, industry lobbying 
or litigation, etc.) 
 
What are you doing to meet your commitments to Article 11 and 13 of the FCTC?  What 
types of policies are you putting in place or planning to put in place?   
 
Have you required health warnings comprising 50% or more of the product area?  If not, 
what is preventing you from doing this? (Do the legal challenges faced by Uruguay on this 
issue play a role?) 
 
FCTC guidelines for Article 11 and 13 recommend parties consider adopting plain packaging 
requirements as means of restricting packaging, labelling and advertising.  Is this something 
you are considering? 
 
What factors are influencing your decision to pursue this policy?  (To what extent does the 
litigation faced by Australia play a role in your decision making?  Are you awaiting the 
results of that battle?) 
 
In general, how influential is the response from the tobacco industry to your policy making? 
Has your government faced a threat of legal action by the tobacco industry for your tobacco 
policy initiatives?  What kind of threat? 
 
Do you consider your country’s international trade commitments when developing 
regulatory policy?  Which ones?  Do you ever consider IIAs?  Do you know what these are? 
 
Survey participation?  Who? 
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APPENDIX 8 – QUALITATIVE CODING TABLES FROM INTERVIEWS WITH TOBACCO REGULATORS 
List of descriptive codes for Tobacco Control 
 
1. Key drivers in regulatory development 
 
A) FCTC obligations and guidelines (U,D) 
FCTC guidelines (U, D) 
FCTC Convention and guideline (U, D) 
FCTC tools (D) 
FCTC obligations (D) 
 
B) Regional obligations (U,D) 
Regional initiatives (U) 
EU legislation (framework convention) (U, D) 
EU constraints and obligations (D2) 
EU tobacco directive (D) 
 
C) Actions other countries (U,D) 
What other countries are doing (U, D2) 
 
D) Domestic constraints (D) 
Domestic constitutional constraints (D) 
 
E) Industry influence (U) 
Industry influence (U) 
 
F) Impact of regulations (U,D) 
Economic impact (D) 
Unintended consequences (D) 
 
G) Scientific research (U,D) 
Research (U) 
Academic research (U) 
Scientific evidence (D) 
 
H) Health gap (D) 
Health (D) 
Public health gaps (D2) 
Domestic concerns (D) 
Domestic need (D) 
 
I) Public opinion (U,D) 
Media and public (U) 
Public consensus (U) 
Public opinion (D2) 
NGO community (D) 
 
J) Political will (U,D) 
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Political will (U, D) 
Political influence (D) 
 
K) Trade (D) 
Trade distant (D) 
Impact of illicit trade (D) 
 
2. Considering Plain packaging  
 
Not considering, because 
Long way away (U) 
First focussed on health warnings (U) 
Lack political commitment (U) 
Existing laws not enforced (U) 
Watching and waiting Australia results (D) 
Not clear on effectiveness policy (D) 
Have not considered it (D) 
 
Considering, however 
Departmental differences an issue (U) 
IP concerns (U) 
Lack understanding on impact of policy (U) 
Sees it as EU jurisdiction issue D) 
Awaiting Australia (D) 
Ability to get it through political system an issue (D) 
Highlighting risk of policy (D) 
Examining the idea (D) 
Interested in understanding the impact (D) 
 
3. Factors influencing plain packaging decision 
 
A) Not ready (U) 
 
B) Focus on basics first (U) 
 
C) Industry influence (U) 
 
D) Experience of other countries (U) 
 
E) Trade implications (D) 
Awaiting Australian results (D2) 
IP rights impact (D2) 
Possible trade repercussions (D) 
WTO battle (D) 
Risks of litigation (D) 
 
F) New EU Directive (D) 
 
G) Domestic constitutional constraints/ legislation (D2) 
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H) Political will (D) 
 
4. Legal action facing and influence of industry 
 
A) Small influence (U,D) 
Not threatening in general (U) 
Have not faced litigation (U) 
No legal action due to weak court system (U) 
Don’t consider industry lobbying in developing policy (D) 
Industry has small influence (D) 
Not big influence on direction of policy (D) 
Industry not influential (D) 
 
B) Active industry, little influence (D) 
Litigation from industry on three occasions – procedural not content – passed 
legislation (D) 
Industry challenge through EFTA on point of sale – won case (D) 
 
C) Strong influence and action (U,D) 
Two legal challenges in domestic court - Industry intervention succeeded in blocking 
government support for policies (U) 
Very influential and tied to political presidency (U) 
Industry lobbied openly against plain packaging (D) 
Threat of litigation on plain packaging (D) 
Judicial action has cross border impact – wait and see Australia (D) 
Tobacco companies looking for angle – treaty shopping (D) 
 
 
5. Do consider international trade commitments 
 
A) Not an issue/influence (U) 
Trade is not an issue (U) 
Not thinking of trade (U) 
Not aware of trade challenges at home – does not affect (U) 
Aware of challenges elsewhere but not influenced by this (U) 
IIAs means nothing – not on radar screen (D) 
 
B) Other country’s trade challenges of concern (D) 
 
C) Other domestic departments consider trade (U) 
  
D) Alternative focus to trade (U,D) 
FCTC guidelines are the focus (U) 
Key focus is health policy not trade (D) 
EU commitments more important than trade (D) 
EU is key focus (D) 
 
E) New trade negotiations (D) 
Trade key when new treaty negotiated to retain regulatory space (D) 
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F) Recent consideration (D) 
Trade is recent phenomena and considered in development of regulations (D) 
Trade considered along with other public concerns (D) 
WTO and TRIPS most important (D) 
 
6. My observations 
 
General references made to trade 
Litigation is usually WTO or domestic court litigation 
Few direct references to IIA challenges in Australia.  Australia usually means domestic 
constitutional challenge or within the WTO. 
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APPENDIX 9 – SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CANADIAN FEDERAL REGULATORS 
Canadian Federal Regulator Survey 
 
Q0   CANADIAN FEDERAL REGULATOR SURVEY  THIS SURVEY WILL TAKE LESS THAN 5 MINUTES 
TO COMPLETE!  This survey forms part of a doctoral research project at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE) on the Canadian Regulatory Process.  Over the last six 
months, meetings have been held with senior officials in your organization regarding this 
doctoral research project.  Officials are aware that this next stage of the research project will 
involve a short confidential survey of government officials with responsibility within the 
regulatory process.  You have been identified as a valuable source of information and are 
encouraged to respond.  Thank you!  INSTRUCTIONS  This survey is confidential.  It will take 
less than 5 minutes to complete.  Please answer all questions (there are only 15 in total). The 
Government wide results will be available to all participants at the completion of the research 
project.  Please do not hesitate to contact Christine Cote at c.cote@lse.ac.uk  if you have any 
questions regarding this survey  Thank you for your time! 
 
Q1 1.  Which title most approximates your position within your Department or Agency? 
 Director General (1) 
 Director (2) 
 Head of Section (3) 
 Manager (4) 
 Other (5) ____________________ 
 
Q2 2.  Where in the regulatory process do you spend your time?  You can identify more than 
one. 
 Regulatory policy development and planning (1) 
 Developing regulatory changes or new regulations (2) 
 Regulatory authorization (e.g.: licensing) (3) 
 Monitoring regulatory compliance (4) 
 Evaluating regulatory effectiveness (5) 
 Other (6) ____________________ 
 
Q3 3.  To the best of your knowledge, would you say that regulation within your area of 
expertise has become more or less comprehensive in its coverage over the last decade (where 
comprehensive refers to the number of emerging areas being regulated)? 
 More comprehensive (1) 
 Less comprehensive (2) 
 Other (3) ____________________ 
 
Q4 4.  To the best of your knowledge, would you say that regulation in your area of expertise 
has become more or less stringent over the last decade (where stringent refers to the 
requirements for a greater depth of science to demonstrate acceptability of risk)? 
 More stringent (1) 
 Less stringent (2) 
 Other (3) ____________________ 
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Q5 5.  In a couple of lines, what examples would you offer to justify your answers to Q3 and 
Q4 
 
Q6 6.  When developing new regulations, changes to existing regulations, providing regulatory 
authorization or making decisions on evaluation and monitoring, there are a number of key 
drivers in your decision making process.  Please rank the influences below, where 1 indicates 
the most influential and 8 the least. 
______ The public environmental, health or safety need (1) 
______ Science or technological advances in the field (2) 
______ Canada's international trade and investment commitments (3) 
______ The views of key industry stakeholders or proponents (4) 
______ The views of other stakeholders such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or 
the public (5) 
______ Global trends such as the work of international bodies (6) 
______ Domestic initiatives such as efforts at regulatory streamlining or red tape reduction (7) 
______ Other (8) 
 
Q7 7.  To what extent do you consider Canada's trade and investment commitments as 
relevant to the regulatory process? 
 Very much (1) 
 Some (2) 
 not very much (3) 
 not at all (4) 
 
Q8 8.  When are Canada's trade and investment commitments of most concern to you?  Which 
of the following describe how trade plays a role in your decision making?  You can identify as 
many as are relevant. 
 When a trade agreement is being negotiated by Canada (to ensure any new commitments 
are compatible with existing regulations) (1) 
 In balancing the economic cost-benefits of a regulatory decision, in order to avoid a barrier 
to trade or to the free commercial flow of goods and investment (2) 
 To ensure that any new regulation would not lead to a trade dispute or litigation from 
international investors (3) 
 As part of the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS) which necessitates 
consideration of trade and investment implications of any new regulation (4) 
 In identifying regulatory alternatives for addressing a public need (5) 
 They are rarely of concern (6) 
 Other (7) ____________________ 
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Q9 9.  Where trade is a factor, which types of trade commitments are relevant for you to 
consider when making a regulatory decision?  You can identify as many as are relevant. 
 World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments (1) 
 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) commitments (2) 
 Bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) commitments (3) 
 Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA) commitments (4) 
 Other (5) ____________________ 
 
Q10 10.  For greater clarity, please indicate which  WTO agreements have the most impact on 
your regulatory decision making process? 
 SPS (Sanitary & 
Phytosanitary 
Measures) (1) 
TBT (Technical 
Barriers to 
Trade) (2) 
TRIPS (Trade 
Related 
Intellectual 
Property Rights) 
(3) 
TRIMS (Trade 
Related 
Investment 
Measures) (4) 
Has a big 
impact (1) 
        
Has a small 
impact (2) 
        
Has no impact 
(3) 
        
 
 
Q11 11.  For greater clarity please indicate which  NAFTA chapters have the most impact on 
your regulatory decision making process? 
 SPS Chapter 7 
(Sanitary & 
Phytosanitary 
Measures) (1) 
TBT Chapter 3 
(Technical 
Barriers to 
Trade) (2) 
Investment 
Chapter 11 (3) 
Services 
Chapter 12 (4) 
Has a big 
impact (1) 
        
Has a small 
impact (2) 
        
Has no impact 
(3) 
        
 
Q12 12.  Have there been any trade challenges launched against your area of regulatory policy 
that you are aware of? 
 I am aware of a trade challenge against my area of regulation (please describe below) (1) 
____________________ 
 I am not aware of any trade challenge against my area of regulation (2) 
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Q13 13.  Have there been any NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor State Dispute cases launched against 
your area of regulatory policy that you are aware of? 
 I am aware of a NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor State Dispute against my area of regulation 
(please describe below) (1) ____________________ 
 I am not aware of any NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor State Dispute against my area of 
regulation (2) 
 
Q14 14.  Have there been any threats of a trade and investment challenge against your area of 
regulatory policy that you are aware of 
 I am aware of a threat of a trade or investment challenge made against my area of 
regulation (please describe below) (1) ____________________ 
 I am not aware of any threat of a trade or investment challenge made against my area of 
regulation (2) 
 
Q15 15.  If you have answered yes to any of the last three questions, to what degree does this 
influence your decision making within the regulatory development/ management process?  
 Very much (1) 
 Some (2) 
 Not very much (3) 
 Not at all (4) 
 
                   242 of 245 
APPENDIX 10 – QUALITATIVE CODING ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA 
APPENDIX 10:  QUALITATIVE CODING ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA
List of key descriptive codes Categories Frequency
more stringent regulations more stringent 6
static regulations static regulations 2
regulating differently regulating differently 4
complete regulatory overhall substantial regulatory change 2
new act
aggressive tarkets for 2025 future targets (sub) 1
enhancing science requirements Deeper science & technology 3
increased depth analysis
more science based regulations
more complex due to evolving technology complexity (sub) 3
broader regulations New areas being regulated 7
more comprehensive regulations
looking to regulate new areas
international standards driver international influence 5
responding to international crisis
globalization regulations on GHG emissions harmonization 6
RCC 
alignment with US EPA
harmonization initiatives
losing capacity to tailor regulations (Canada) los of sovereignty (sub) 1
improving investment climate Regulatory efficiency & modernization 10
more streamlined and modernized
RCC streamlining of transport regulations
red tape reduction
streamlining to reduce administrative burden
alternative control mechanisms other control instruments (sub) 8
cost/benefit justification cost/benefit focus (sub) 7
big project focus (EA) smarter focussed regulation (sub) 2
tighter more precise regulations
smarter but not less regulation
outcome based outcome based (sub) 4
greater flexibility
greater scrutiny public scrutiny 1
improved investment climate investment climate (sub) 1
43
Examples of changing nature or regulations
Government of Canada initiatives-history of reform overview of major initiatives
RCC - Regulatory Cooperation Council Chemical Management Plan
Red Tape Reduction Initiative and the government's response (including the one-for-one) New Environmental Assessment Act
Cabinet Directive on Smart Regulations 2003/4 Tobacco Control Act and Regs
US EPA alignment on GHG emissions
The Direction of Regulatory Change
The drivers for changes or increases in regulatory stringency
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APPENDIX 11 – SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TOBACCO CONTROL REGUALTORS 
Global Tobacco Control Regulation Survey 2013 
 
Q0   GLOBAL TOBACCO CONTROL SURVEY  THIS SURVEY WILL TAKE LESS THAN 5 MINUTES TO 
COMPLETE!  This survey forms part of a doctoral research project at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE) on Global Tobacco Control Regulations. It will 
supplement a series of interviews which were conducted with tobacco control regulators from 
around the world during the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) Fifth 
Conference of the Parties (COP5) in Seoul Korea in November 2012.  Your input will be very 
valuable.  Thank you for your participation.  INSTRUCTIONS  This survey is confidential.  It will 
take less than 5 minutes to complete.  Please answer all questions (there are only 10 in total). 
The global results will be available to all participants at the completion of the research project.  
Please do not hesitate to contact Christine Cote at c.cote@lse.ac.uk  if you have any questions 
regarding this survey  Thank you for your time! 
 
Q1 1.  What title most approximates your role? 
 Director (1) 
 Head of Section (2) 
 Special Adviser (3) 
 Tobacco Control Focal Point (4) 
 Other (5) ____________________ 
 
Q2 2.  In the area of tobacco control, where in the regulatory process do you spend your 
time?  You can identify more than one. 
 Regulatory policy development and planning (1) 
 Developing regulatory changes or new regulations (2) 
 Monitoring regulatory compliance (3) 
 Evaluating regulatory effectiveness (4) 
 Other (5) ____________________ 
 
Q3 3.  What factors influence your development of tobacco control regulations.  Please rank 
the influences below, where 1 indicates the most influential and 6 the least. 
______ Domestic public health concerns (1) 
______ The FCTC protocol and guidelines (2) 
______ The activities of neighboring countries (3) 
______ Your country's international trade and investment commitments (4) 
______ The views of key tobacco industry stakeholders (5) 
______ The views of other stakeholders such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or 
the public (6) 
 
Q4 4.  What current level of pictoral warnings do you have in place on tobacco packaging? 
 We do not yet have pictoral warnings (1) 
 Warning covering an average of 30% of package front and back (2) 
 Warning covering an average of 50% of package front and back (3) 
 Warning covering an average of 70% of package front and back (4) 
 Warning covering an average of 80% of package front and back (5) 
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Q5 5.  What factors are important to you when considering either the introduction of pictoral 
warnings or increases to the size of pictoral warnings on tobacco products? Please select as 
many of these as are relevant. 
 Domestic public health concerns (1) 
 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control commitments and guidelines (2) 
 The tobacco control policies of neighboring countries (3) 
 The tobacco control policies of world leaders in this area (eg: Australia, Canada, EU 
countries) (4) 
 The threat of litigation from the tobacco industry (5) 
 The threat of an international trade or investment challenge (6) 
 
Q6 6.  What is your country's position on the policy of plain packaging? 
 Plain packaging is not a priority for my country (3) 
 We have begun the formal process of considering plain packaging (4) 
 We will consider this policy sometime in the future (5) 
 
Q7 7.  Which factors will be influential in your decision to pursue plain packaging (either now 
or in the future)?  Please select as many of these as are relevant. 
 Domestic political support for this policy (1) 
 The compatibility of plain packaging regulations with our domestic or regional laws and 
policies (e.g: EU law and directives) (2) 
 The FCTC Guidelines for Articles 11 & 13 (3) 
 The outcome of the WTO challenge to Australia's plain packaging law (4) 
 The outcome of the Philip Morris investor-state challenge to Australia's plain packaging 
law (5) 
 Other (6) ____________________ 
 
Q8 8.  To what extent do you consider your country's trade and investment commitments as 
relevant to the regulatory process on tobacco control? 
 Very much (1) 
 Some (2) 
 not very much (3) 
 not at all (4) 
 
Q9 9.  Where trade is a factor, which types of trade commitments are relevant for you to 
consider when making a regulatory decision on tobacco control?  You can identify as many as 
are relevant. 
 World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments (such as TBT, SPS, TRIPS) (1) 
 Regional trade commitments (e.g.: EU, ASEAN, NAFTA) (2) 
 Bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) commitments (3) 
 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) commitments (4) 
 Other (5) ____________________ 
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Q10 10.  Have there been any trade or investment challenges to tobacco control regulations in 
your country? 
 I am aware of a trade or investment challenge against tobacco control in my country (1) 
____________________ 
 I am not aware of any trade or investment challenge against tobacco control in my country 
(2) 
 
 
 
